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 In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of minors included in a 
broad range of medical research studies.  To date, however, little attention appears to 
have been paid to how the role of minors in the consent process leading to participation in 
these studies should be defined.  
This thesis reviews the legal and ethical instruments and principles that define the 
role of mature minors in the medical research consent process in Canada at present.  The 
thesis goes on to recommend a framework that should be added to the Tri-Council Policy 
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instrument.  According to this framework, the consent of those who are found to have 
decision-making capacity (i.e. are mature minors), unless precluded by law, shall be 
necessary and sufficient.  There are few instances where the law prevents mature minors 
from consenting to their own participation.      
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In the past, minors were largely excluded from medical research because they 
were presumed incompetent and thus too vulnerable.1  It has also been said that studies 
involving minors are expensive and yield relatively low commercial returns, thereby 
discouraging the pharmaceutical industry from investing in this type of research.2  These 
factors have led to the lack of pediatric indication for over 70% of drugs currently 
approved for adult use.3  Furthermore, as the benefits of some of these therapies were 
seen in adults, many physicians opted to treat their pediatric patients on an ‘off-label’4 
1  Minors are not the only group that has not been included in medical research in the past.  As noted in 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada & Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement:  Ethical Conduct 
for Research Involving Humans, December 2010, online:  
<http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/pdf/eng/tcps2/TCPS_2_FINAL_web.pdf [Tri-Council Policy Statement],
women have also historically been excluded from research.  Reasons cited for the latter include the 
possibility of harming foetuses, newborns, and reproductive organs as well as difficulty controlling 
hormonal changes.  As well, many researchers and research sponsors failed to recognize that men and 
women are affected by disease differently and respond to treatment differently.  Finally, the exclusion 
of women has also been attributed to perceived liability concerns on the part of research sponsors.  
Concerns analogous to those raised in justifying the exclusion of women from research may have been 
at play in the case of minors.  That said, these are seldom mentioned in the literature.      
2  Mark Greener, “Bitter Medicine:  New Regulations Aim to Address the Dearth of Clinical Safety Trials 
For Drugs Used in Children” (2008) 9 EMBO Rep 505 at 506 [Greener]. 
3  Seema Shah et al., “How Do Institutional Review Boards Apply the Federal Risk and Benefit Standards 
for Pediatric Research?” (2004) 291 JAMA 476 at 476 [Shah].   
4  The labeling of medications relates to the indications and populations for which a medication has been 
approved by the relevant health authorities.  In Canada, such approval is granted by Health Canada.  In 
this thesis, ‘off-label’ use refers to the use of a drug for a purpose for an unapproved purpose.  For 
example, ‘off-label’ use includes the use of prescription drugs only approved for adults on minors and 
adolescents.    
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basis.5  Such a practice obviously does little to restore the proper distribution of research 
harms and benefits among members of society.  It also leads to a lack of information 
regarding the safety and efficacy of drugs and results in a reduction in the availability of 
drugs to the broader population.     
Fortunately, society has come to recognize that the widespread exclusion of 
certain groups, including minors, from medical research is a clear violation of the 
principle of distributive justice.  This cornerstone of research ethics in Canada requires 
that the benefits and burdens of research be fairly distributed among all members of 
society.6  It stipulates that individual groups “should neither be unjustly denied access to 
potential benefits, nor bear a disproportionate burden of the research.”7  The historical 
exclusion of certain groups contravenes the principle of distributive justice in two key 
ways.  Firstly, being that they were the only ones receiving interventions whose safety 
and efficacy were unknown, men bore all the burdens of research yet they were not the 
only group to benefit from knowledge gains acquired through research.  Secondly, 
although the excluded groups did derive some benefit from research carried out on men, 
considerably more benefits could have flowed to them had they been included.  After all, 
the very reasons given for the exclusion of these groups are also reasons as to why they 
did not derive the maximum available benefit from research developments.   
In response to this realization there appears to have been a move towards the 
greater inclusion of minors in research.  The reasons for and effects of this shift towards 
5  Jennifer Rosato, “The Ethics of Clinical Trials:  A Child’s View” (2000) 28 J Law Med Ethics 362 at 
362. 
6  The importance of the just distribution of harms and benefits was recognized by the drafters of the Tri-
Council Policy Statement, supra note 1, who included this notion among the guiding ethical principles 
of that framework. 
7  Supra note 1. 
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inclusion are many.  Minors may not have been afforded a greater role in medical 
research solely for their benefit.  Rather, through legislative means, several governments 
have encouraged pharmaceutical companies to carry out research on minors.  Notably, in 
the United States, the Pediatric Research Equity Act of 20038 requires that any company 
submitting an application for approval from the United States Federal Drug 
Administration for new active ingredients, new indications, new dosage forms, new 
dosage regimens or new routes of administration provide safety and efficacy data from 
research conducted on minors.  Waivers and deferrals can, however, be granted.9  In 
exchange for conducting such research, pharmaceutical companies are awarded patent 
extensions, which can be quite lucrative for the companies.10  In 2008, these efforts were 
at least partially responsible for the testing of 200 medicines in minors and adolescents in 
the United States.11  In 2007, the European Union introduced similar legislation.12  
Although this type of legislation does not exist in Canada at present, it is possible that the 
American and European Union statutes play a role in determining what studies will be 
carried out within our borders.  This is because many studies funded by pharmaceutical 
companies are carried out in institutions in several countries.  Consequently, incentives 
beyond the best interests of minors may drive much of the pharmaceutical industry’s 
research agenda in Canada.   
Beyond the unfavourable reasons for and effects of including minors in research 
more frequently set out above, there are also some benefits to their inclusion.  Arguably 
8  Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936. 
9  Ibid.  For a description of how FDA approval is obtained, see Michael Baram, “Making Clinical Trials 
Safer for Human Subjects” (2001) 27 Am J Law Med 253 at 260. 
10  Supra note 8 at 505B. 
11  B.G. Kapogiannis & D.R. Mattison, “Adolescents in Clinical Trials” (2008) 84 Clin Pharmacol Ther 
655 at 655. 
12  See Greener, supra note 2 at 507 for a summary of these enactments. 
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the most notable benefit is that, when carried out with appropriate safeguards in place, the 
participation of minors in medical research can lead to improvements in the treatments 
routinely administered to them.  More specifically, since minors are not merely small 
adults, it is important for the medical community to gain knowledge of how their bodies 
will respond to various therapies as well as what course a specific illness follows, to 
name only a few areas in which insight can be gleaned.  
Despite the mixed motivation underlying the greater inclusion of minors in 
medical research, the trend has meant that minors now routinely participate in a broad 
range of research initiatives.  This gamut includes everything from incidence studies to 
cancer treatment studies.13  Not only are minors and their parents now being offered the 
opportunity to enrol in the latter type of study, virtually all the treatment received by 
minors afflicted with cancer in Canada is determined by a research study protocol.14  
Although the total number of Canadian minors participating in medical research at any 
given time has not been reported in the literature, it is clearly a significant number.   
In recent years, minors have been included in research at an increasing rate 
without regard to their role in the process itself.  This thesis attempts to partially remedy 
this procedural lacuna by critically examining the role of mature minors in the medical 
research consent process from both a legal and ethical standpoint.  The framework that I 
set out as a result of this review has the potential to benefit many minors; both the mature 
13  The breadth of areas of research in which minors are involved in can clearly be seen from the studies 
published in a single issue of Pediatrics, a medical journal published by the American Academy of 
Pediatrics.  To this end, the February 2008 issue includes studies on infants, young children and 
adolescents on topics as diverse as arthritis, obesity, mental health issues, alcohol use, vascular disease, 
neonatal health, and cancer treatment.  
14  Conrad V. Fernandez et al., “Offering to Return Results to Research Participants:  Attitudes and Needs 
of Principal Investigators in the Children’s Oncology Group” (2003) 25 J Pediatr Hematol Oncol 704 at 
705. 
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minors whose rights are better respected, and other minors who will subsequently benefit 
from the research findings. 
 
I. DEFINING RESEARCH 
The current trend towards greater inclusion of minors in medical research does 
not mean minors are being treated in an ethically and legally defensible manner.  It just 
means more minors are involved in the research enterprise.  Before turning to how the 
role of minors is presently defined and how it ought to be defined, it is necessary to pause 
briefly over how research is defined and why there is a need to draw a distinction 
between research and treatment.  This section attempts to give readers some context for 
the detailed examination of when the law and ethics affords mature minors the right to 
consent to medical research found in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, respectively.   
A. What is research?   
The law recognizes the ability of mature minors to consent to at least some 
medical treatment.15  To date, however, its ambit has not been extended into the realm of 
research by either courts or statutory enactments in Canada.  It is, however, recognized 
by the authors of the Tri-Council Policy Statement that, subject to applicable laws, some 
minors may have decision-making capacity to consent to their own research participation.  
Specifically, the recently released second edition of the Policy Statement states 
“...children may also lack capacity to consent to participate in research...”16  The use of 
the word ‘may’ necessarily implies that some minors have capacity to consent. 
15  The specific limitations placed upon the right of mature minors to consent to treatment are set out in 
Chapter 2, which provides a detailed review of relevant legal instruments. 
16  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at 49. 
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At present, there is no universally accepted statutory definition of research (or of 
any analogous term).17  Some existing definitions are quite narrow, such as the definition 
of “clinical research” contained within the Federal Food and Drugs Regulations18 passed 
pursuant to the Food and Drugs Act19 which only applies to research being carried out as 
part of the drug approval process and consequently does not capture the large breadth of 
research that does not involve drugs nor does it govern those elements of research falling 
under provincial jurisdiction.  In that instance a “clinical trial” is said to be “an 
investigation in respect of a drug for use in humans that involves human subjects and that 
is intended to discover or verify the clinical, pharmacological or pharmacodynamic 
effects of the drug, identify any adverse events in respect of the drug, study the 
absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion of the drug, or ascertain the safety or 
efficacy of the drug.”20   
Meanwhile, other statutes contain far broader definitions of research.  An example 
of the latter can be found within the Health Research Ethics Authority Act21, a statute 
recently enacted by the Newfoundland and Labrador legislature which delineates the 
roles of research ethics boards.  In so doing, it defines “health research involving human 
subjects” as “activities whose primary goal is to generate knowledge in relation to human 
health, health care and health care systems, and involving human beings as research 
17  Analogous terms for the purposes of this thesis include “health research involving human subjects” and 
“clinical trial”. 
18  C.R.C., c.870. 
19  R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. 
20  Supra note 18, C.05.001.   
21  S.N.L. 2006, c. H-1.2. 
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subjects, health care information respecting human beings and human biological 
material.”22   
Beyond legal instruments, definitions of research can also be found in ethical 
instruments, such as in the Tri-Council Policy Statement where “research” is defined as 
involving “an undertaking intended to extend knowledge through a disciplined inquiry or 
systematic investigation.”23  Despite being somewhat vague like the previously cited 
definitions of research, the lack of specificity contained therein also means that it 
captures the largest scope of activities, including all of that caught under the other 
definitions.24  For that reason, the definition of research contained within the Tri-Council 
Policy Statement will apply throughout this thesis. 
B. What is treatment? 
Research and medical treatment are different but they can involve the same 
patient-research participant and be carried out by the same physician-researcher 
concurrently.  When seen in that light, it is imperative for readers to remain aware of the 
distinction between these two concepts as they consider how the role of mature minors in 
the consent process for research should be defined.   
To that end, unlike research, there are a number of provincial statutes that define 
treatment in the context of medical decision making by or for minors.  Each of these 
statutes is considered in detail in Chapter 2.  At this juncture, it is sufficient to point out 
that although provinces use different labels, be it “medical treatment”, “health care”, or 
“care”, there is considerable consistency between statutes as to the medical acts that are 
22  Ibid., s. 2.
23  Supra note 1 at art. 2.1 and accompanying commentary.   
24  This does not mean that the Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1, applies to all research captured 
under the legal instruments discussed above but rather that the definition of research itself is broader 
than the others.  See Chapter 3 for a discussion on when the Tri-Council Policy Statement applies.  
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captured within the ambit of treatment.25  This near-uniformity is readily apparent when 
one considers the definitions contained in consent to treatment statutes.26  For example, 
New Brunswick’s Medical Consent of Minors Act27 defines “medical treatment” as 
including: 
(a) surgical and dental treatment, 
(b) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of diagnosis, 
(c) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of preventing 
any disease or ailment, and 
(d) any procedure that is ancillary to any treatment as it 
applies to that treatment.28 
 
Similarly, British Columbia’s Infants Act29 defines “health care” as “anything that 
is done for a therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health 
related purpose, and includes a course of health care.”30   
C. Innovative Therapy, Therapeutic Research and Nontherapeutic Research:  
Further Muddying of the Waters. 
 
From the definitions of research and treatment set out above, it is hopefully clear 
to readers that distinguishing between the two concepts is not always straightforward.  
Before setting out my justification as to why it is nonetheless necessary to tease a part 
research and treatment, I raise three additional concepts – innovative therapy, therapeutic 
research and nontherapeutic research – which make the distinction appear even more 
difficult.     
25  Throughout this thesis, the term “treatment” will be used to refer to the provision of all health care 
services by a physician generally, unless speaking to a specific jurisdiction’s legislation.  In the latter 
instance, the terminology used in that province’s statute will be employed.  
26  An in-depth review of the consent to treatment legislation enacted by a number of provinces is set out in 
Chapter 2.   
27  S.N.B. 1976, c. M-6. 
28  Ibid., s. 1. 
29  R.S.B.C. 1996, c.223. 
30  Ibid., s. 17(1). 
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Research can be particularly difficult to distinguish from a particular form of 
treatment known as innovative therapy.  According to the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, “innovative therapy” is “a treatment in the true sense of the word, an act 
performed for the direct and immediate benefit of the recipient, but not yet fully proved 
in scientific terms.”31  However, the lack of demonstrated scientific validity does not 
automatically bring an act under the research umbrella.32  Consequently, rather than 
looking to scientific data as a means of differentiating between innovative therapy and 
research, the implicit suggestion from the above is that one ought to look to the primary 
purpose or aim of that activity as well as whether the care is being delivered in 
accordance with a written protocol.33  As evidenced by the National Council on Ethics in 
Human Research’s finding that many institutions have difficulty distinguishing between 
innovative therapy and research, these determinations are not easily done in practice.34   
The distinction between treatment and research is further blurred by the sub-
classification of the latter by some authors into therapeutic and nontherapeutic research.  
Much like treatment, therapeutic research strives “to directly help or aid a patient who is 
suffering from a health condition”.35  However, unlike treatment, this assistance is 
delivered through participation in a study designed to obtain generalizable knowledge 
31  Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 61:  Biomedical Experimentation Involving 
Human Subjects (Ottawa:  Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1989) at 33. 
32  National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
The Belmont Report:  Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Research (1979), online:  <http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html>. 
33  Simon Verdun-Jones & David N. Weisstub, “Consent to Human Experimentation in Québec:  The 
Application of the Civil Law Principle of Personal Inviolability to Protect Special Populations” (1995) 
18 Int’l J. Law & Psychiatry 163 at 178-179; Kathleen Cranley Glass & Trudo Lemmens, “Research 
Involving Humans” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield, & Colleen Flood, eds., Canadian Health 
Law and Policy, 2nd ed. (Markham:  Butterworths, 2002) 459 at 461 [Glass & Lemmens]. 
34  National Council on Ethics in Human Research, Report on Site Visits:  October 1998 to December 
2001, online: <http://www.ncehr-cnerh.org/pdf/publications/site_visits/Report_April_2002.pdf>. 
35  Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). 
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about that health condition.  Nontherapeutic research, in turn, is much more akin to 
“research”, as defined above, in that participants in that class of research either do not 
have the condition being studied or they are not intended to benefit directly from the 
study in question.  As is the case with research generally, the purpose of nontherapeutic 
research is to derive benefits for society rather than to aid individual participants.36  In a 
sense then, “therapeutic research” covers much of the murky middle ground between 
treatment and research in their purest senses.  However, the former includes elements that 
extend beyond standard care, such as additional tests, procedures, and hospitalizations.37 
The therapeutic/nontherapeutic research dichotomy is problematic and so that 
classification scheme has not been used in this thesis.  It has garnered a great deal of 
criticism in recent decades.38  Schwartz has aptly summarized the perceived problem with 
the sub-classification of research into therapeutic and nontherapeutic categories as 
follows: 
The term “therapeutic research” fails to give due account to 
the differences between research and clinical care, in terms 
of both goals and methods.  Although a clinical trial might 
be conducted with a reasonable expectation that those who 
receive the test article will be therapeutically benefited, the 
primary goal of the trial, like all other research, is the 
acquisition of generalizable scientific knowledge, following 
research procedures that may not accord with the goals of 
therapeutic care for individual participants.   Moreover, in 
clinical care, treatment is determined by reference to the 
personal situation of the patient, whereas in research, 
treatment is determined by reference to the procedures 
specified in the research protocol.39 
 
36  Ibid. 
37  Loretta M. Kopelman, “Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny:  Grimes Narrows Their 
Interpretation” (2002) 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 38 at 41 [Kopelman].
38  Ibid. 
39  Jack Schwartz, “The Kennedy Krieger Case:  Judicial Anger and the Research Enterprise” (2002-2003) 
6 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 148 at 152 [Schwartz]. 
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Despite this criticism, it is nonetheless worth noting that the Maryland Court of 
Appeals adopted this classification scheme in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. 
in 2001, a case involving two minors under the age of five.40  Specifically, the Court 
relied upon the distinction between therapeutic research and nontherapeutic research as a 
means of delineating the magnitude of risk permitted in pediatric research.  After 
reviewing a number of authorities, including the Declaration of Helsinki41 and the 
Nuremberg Code42, the Court unequivocally stated that children, even with parental 
consent, could not participate in “nontherapeutic study that promises no medical benefit 
to the child whatever, so that any balance between risk and benefit is necessarily 
negative.”43  Interestingly, this was framed as a holding by the Court, rather than as obiter 
despite the fact that it was wholly unnecessary for the Court to make such a 
40  The research giving rise to that case was aimed at determining the effectiveness of different lead paint 
abatement procedures by, among other things, collecting blood samples from children residing in 
specific homes on numerous occasions over a two-year period.  Two sets of parents brought forward 
separate claims of negligence against the researchers for failing to inform them that lead remained a 
potential hazard in the home at the time informed consent was obtained as well as for failing to notify 
them of the high dust lead levels found in home during the study.  At first instance, the researchers were 
successful on their summary judgment application on the basis that the researchers owed no duty to 
avoid the alleged injury.  However, on appeal, the Baltimore City Circuit Court’s decision was reversed 
and the case was ordered to proceed to trial. Given the scathing criticism of the research practices 
contained within the Court of Appeal’s reasons, it is unsurprising that the case does not appear to have 
proceeded to trial. 
41  World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki:  Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects (Adopted at the 18th World Medical Assembly in Helsinki, Finland in June 
1964.  Amended at the 19th World Medical Assembly in Tokyo, Japan in October 1965; the 35th World 
Medical Association in Venice, Italy in October 1983; the 41st World Medical Assembly in Hong Kong 
in September 1989; the 48th World Medical Assembly, Somerset West, Republic of South Africa, 
October 1996; the 52nd World Medical Assembly, Edinburgh, Scotland, October 2000; the 53rd World 
Medical Assembly, Washington, U.S.A. in 2002; the 55th World Medical Assembly, Tokyo, Japan in 
2004; and the 59th World Medical Assembly, Seoul, South Korea, in October 2008), online:  
<http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm> [Declaration of Helsinki]. 
42  U.S., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 
10, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949) at vol. 2, 181-182, online: < 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/references/nurcode.htm>.  
43  Grimes, supra note 35 at 862.  Interestingly, in Nielsen v. Regents of the University of California et al., 
No. 665-049 Cov. 8-9, a lawyer sitting on a university’s institutional review board43 asked the court to 
make a similar declaration nearly thirty years earlier.  No written reasons were ever released by the 
Court in that case. 
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pronouncement to review the summary judgment granted by the lower court.  The 
research at issue was found to be nontherapeutic in nature. 
Based on the breadth of sources referred to throughout its decision, it is doubtful 
that the Court was oblivious to the issues raised by Schwartz and other commentators.  
As such, the fact that the Court relied heavily on the therapeutic/nontherapeutic research 
distinction in the face of this criticism then clearly suggests that, at least in the eyes of the 
Maryland Court of Appeals, the classification of research as either therapeutic or 
nontherapeutic is less problematic than the “direct benefit” analysis proposed by critics of 
the former.44  The basis for this preference is highly speculative but one possible reason 
might be that the term “therapeutic research” better recognizes the reality that some 
studies are truly a hybrid of treatment and research.   
In the end, despite being heavily criticized and described as being “ill-
considered”45, the Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. decision remains a rare 
glimpse into how judges may choose to address the lack of clarity between treatment and 
research in the pediatric research context.  Because of this, it has been, and will likely 
continue to be, studied beyond the Maryland state lines.46     
D. The Research and Treatment Dichotomy:  Theoretically Tenuous but 
Practically Necessary. 
 
There is nothing in the definition of research set out in the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement that requires that the primary aim be to generate generalizable knowledge.  
Similarly, there is also nothing in the definition of treatment (or other analogous term) in 
44  See e.g. Grimes, ibid. 
45  Schwartz, supra note 39 at 148. 
46  Loretta M. Kopelman, “Group Benefits and Protection of Pediatric Research Subjects:  Grimes v. 
Kennedy Krieger and the Lead Abatement Study” (2002) 9 Accountability in Research 177 at 191 
[Kopelman, “Group”].
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any of the consent to treatment statutes that explicitly requires the primary or sole aim of 
the treatment to be improving the health of or providing optimal care for a particular 
patient.  So, if the definitions themselves are not mutually exclusive, why is it necessary 
to clearly delineate research and treatment?  Despite the inherent complexity in trying to 
distinguish between treatment and research, there are two important reasons why a 
distinction must nonetheless be made.47   
First and foremost, the applicable regulatory enactments and ethical statements as 
well as underlying legal and ethical principles depend on the context.  Notably, the Food 
and Drugs Regulations and the Tri-Council Policy Statement only apply to research 
endeavours whereas consent to treatment legislation applies to all treatment and as I will 
argue in Chapter 2, to a limited range of research activities.  One instance in which 
research and treatment may differ relates to the disclosure of risk.  There is some debate 
amongst Canadian legal scholars as to whether the scope of risk that must be disclosed 
varies between the treatment and the research context.48  The ability to define the proper 
role of mature minors in the medical research context does not depend on the resolution 
of that debate.49  Awareness of this differential treatment however, will assist readers in 
understanding some of the possible motivations that may underlie arguments as to 
whether something constitutes research or treatment.   
47  These reasons are only discussed briefly in this thesis as a more exhaustive examination of them can be 
found elsewhere, such as in Glass & Lemmens, supra note 33 at 460. 
48  See Michael Hadskis, “The Regulation of Human Biomedical Research in Canada” in Jocelyn Downie, 
Timothy Caulfield, & Colleen M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed. (Markham:  
Butterworths, 2007) 257 at 286-289 [Hadskis], where it is argued that there is little authority for the 
proposition that a higher standard applies to the research context than that applied to treatment.  See 
also Glass & Lemmens, ibid at 484-485, where it is suggested that the disclosure standard does in fact 
differ between research and treatment.   
49  For that reason, I have chosen not to pronounce myself, one way or the other, on this point. 
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Secondly, the role of physicians and researchers is different.  As one author has 
argued the distinction between research and treatment acts as an “ethical warning flag” 
that signals when there may be a misunderstanding on the part of patients as to physician-
researchers’ primary objective (i.e. acting solely for the benefit of the patient vs. acting to 
generate new knowledge).50  The duties physicians and researchers owe to patients and/or 
research participants, as the case may be, as well as the standards against which their 
behaviour will be measured are also different.  With different motivations, duties and 
standards guiding the actions of physicians and researchers (or physician-researcher if an 
individual wears both hats), it is necessary to ensure that the legal and ethical parameters 
that apply to each context are appropriate.   
The most confusion arguably arises when the roles of physician and researcher 
completely merge, as is the case when a physician administering therapy is also the 
researcher responsible for carrying out the particular research study in question.51  This 
fusion benefits the young patient/research participant in that she will be more familiar 
with the individual and will not need to interact with another individual.  However, the 
dual role can lead to some confusion for the minor in terms of what aspects are necessary 
to improve her own health and what is being done for the sake of advancing scientific 
knowledge.  That being said, there is some suggestion in the literature that this confusion 
may be more of a theoretical problem.  Notably, Marion Broome and her colleagues have 
shown that adolescents with either diabetes or cancer are able to distinguish between 
50  T. Lewens, “Distinguishing Treatment from Research:  A Functional Approach” (2006) 32 J Medical 
Ethics 424 at 424-425. 
51  Based on the institutional affiliations given for authors publishing the results of pediatric research 
studies, it would appear that virtually all medical research involving children is carried out in tertiary 
care facilities.  That is, most research is done in children’s hospitals by individuals that are both 
clinicians and researchers.  For an example of these affiliations, see the February 2008 issue of 
Pediatrics.  
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those activities that were part of their treatment regimen and their involvement in a 
research study.52  
From the above discussion, it is clear that there are valid reasons to distinguish 
between research and treatment but that doing so leads to a somewhat artificial 
distinction in certain instances.  Nonetheless, the remainder of this thesis considers only 
the research context and thus assumes that a distinction can in fact be made.  It is also 
worth noting at this juncture that the discussion to follow largely focuses on hospital-
based medical research because most of the relevant literature has come out of that 
setting.  The proposed means of ensuring that mature minors’ decisions are given 
appropriate consideration has been developed as a tool to be incorporated into the Tri-
Council Policy Statement but can also function as a stand-alone instrument.53  
Nonetheless, the framework proposed herein ought to be applied to research being carried 
out by physicians and allied health professionals, be it in hospitals or in private offices. 
 
II. STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  Following this overview, the second 
chapter contains a detailed examination of the legal instruments that could potentially 
apply to the research context, from various spheres.  Specifically, international 
instruments such as the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child54 are 
52  Marion E. Broome, Deborah J. Richards & Joanne M. Hall, “Children in Research:  The Experience of 
Ill Children and Adolescents” (2001) 7(1) Journal of Family Nursing 32 at 40-42.
53  Since a detailed examination of the Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1, has been included at 
Chapter 3, at this juncture it is only necessary to note that it applies to investigators conducting research 
at institutions receiving funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Natural Sciences 
and Engineering Research Council of Canada, or the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada.  It also applies to other organizations, including Health Canada, the National Research 
Council, and the Community Research Ethics Board of Alberta.   
54  GA Res. 44/25, UN GAOR, 1989, online:  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights < 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm>. 
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considered.  There is then an in-depth review of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) where the Court had the 
occasion to discuss a minor’s ability to make medical treatment decisions.  Lastly 
provincial and territorial legislative instruments, being child protection legislation and 
consent to treatment legislation, as well as the Civil Code of Quebec are examined.  The 
third chapter reviews the ethical instruments that apply to most research carried out in 
Canada, not the least of which is the Tri-Council Policy Statement.  I also discuss key 
ethical principles that govern how research involving minors ought to be carried out.  
With knowledge of the law and ethics, the discussion shifts in Chapter 4 to proposing a 
way in which to define the role of individual minors in the medical research consent 
process throughout all common law jurisdictions in Canada.  As readers will see, the 
framework proposed requires an individualized capacity assessment of each minor whose 
participation in research is sought using a validated instrument.  Lastly, the thesis ends 
with Chapter 5, where general conclusions are set out as well as suggestions for next 
steps.  The most significant such step involves mobilizing the research community, 
government stakeholders, lawyers, and bioethicists to develop an instrument that could be 
used to assess the capacity of minors.  It is only after an instrument to assess the capacity 
of minors has been validated and its use becomes an established part of the consent 
process for research studies involving minors that I will have achieved my ultimate goal 








Before turning to the substance of this thesis, I feel it is useful to give readers 
insight into the lens through which I have approached this thesis.  Today, I am a 
practicing lawyer and a parent.  Before attending law school, I completed undergraduate 
studies in a health sciences discipline.  I also spent over a year and a half working as a 
research associate at the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario.  During that period of 
time, I was involved in medical research that was sponsored by various pharmaceutical 
companies as well other research that was made possible by grants from the Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research.  I have actively participated in all phases of the research 
process – from study design to the preparation of the consent form to carrying out the 
study to preparing manuscripts.  Given the many hats I have worn and continue to wear, I 
think I approach the issue of the role of mature minors in the medical research consent 
process from a unique perspective.  Hopefully the thoughts, opinions, and insights that 













Before one can propose a change in how the rights of mature minors are addressed 
in the medical research context, a thorough understanding of how minors are treated 
under the law at present is required.  Furthermore, where the aim is to provide lawyers, 
researchers, and health care institutions with a framework that can be applied on a 
national scale, the legal regimes in place within each Canadian jurisdiction must be 
canvassed.  These ends are achieved in this chapter by beginning with the broadest legal 
and quasi-legal instruments that affect the rights of minors – those set out in international 
law.  The legal requirements imposed by the Federal Government are then reviewed.  
This is followed by a detailed examination of the mature minor concept at common law 
and how it has been modified by child protection and consent to treatment statutes.  
Finally, the unique regime in place in Quebec is discussed. 
II. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
With medical research being carried out throughout the world, it is of little 
surprise that international bodies have drafted guidance documents as a means of 
ensuring a certain degree of consistency in the way research is carried out in different 
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countries.  The two such documents that are the most relevant to the present examination 
of the role that ought to be afforded to mature minors in the informed consent process in 
the research context are the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use’s Good Clinical 
Practice:  Consolidated Guideline55 and the ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline:  
Clinical Investigation of Medicinal Products in the Pediatric Population (E11).56   These 
documents do not address the more procedural elements of research, which are captured 
under national laws and policies, nor do they address the legal rights of children 
generally.  The latter is left to the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which is an international treaty that has been ratified by Canada.  The ICH GCP and ICH 
CIMPPP focus on the general conditions necessary for ethical research while also 
flagging potential legal requirements.  In doing so, they straddle the gap between law and 
ethics.  Given the impossibility of characterizing these documents as either purely legal 
or ethical instruments (and thus allowing them to fit nicely into one of the broader 
categories of analysis of this thesis) a review of these documents has somewhat 
arbitrarily been left to Chapter 3 of this thesis.  Before proceeding with a discussion of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it is worth noting that by adopting the ICH 
GCP, Health Canada also indirectly mandates compliance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki, which is also discussed in the following chapter. 
55  International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, Good Clinical Practice:  Consolidated Guideline, online:  < 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/applic-demande/guide-ld/ich/efficac/e6_e.html > [ICH 
GCP]. 
56  International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, Clinical Investigation of Medicinal Products in the Pediatric 
Population, online:  <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hpfb-dgpsa/tpd-dpt/e11_e.html> [ICH CIMPPP]. 
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The United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child was ratified by 
Canada on December 13, 1991.  As its title suggests, this legal instrument delineates all 
universally recognized rights of children, from the right to education to the right to 
freedom of speech and beyond.  The United Nations monitors compliance with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child by requiring signatories to submit reports 
periodically.  Canada’s most recent submission in this regard was on November 20, 
2009.57   
Obviously, not all the rights set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
are germane to the present discussion.   That said, because it supersedes all other 
Canadian or international law that may apply in Canada unless such other laws “are more 
conducive to the realization of the rights of the child”58, it is essential to briefly examine 
the Convention’s recognition of the evolving capacity of children.  Although the tenets of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child apply to all individuals under the age of 
eighteen, it is nonetheless clear that respecting the rights of children necessitates different 
actions depending on the age and maturity of a child.59  Notably, article 5 reads in part:  
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties 
of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended 
family or community as provided for by local custom, legal 
guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to 
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the 
child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the 
child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.60  
57  See Canada, Canada’s Third and Fourth Reports on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 
November 2009), online <http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/pdp-hrp/docs/pdf/canada3-4-crc-reports-nov2009-
eng.pdf>.  Interestingly, under the heading “Articles 12 and 3(1): Right of the child to express views on 
matters affecting him/herself and the best interests of the child” where in Appendix 1, there is a brief 
discussion of the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s decision in Director of Child and Family Services v. A.C., 
2007 MBCA 9, 276 D.L.R. (4th) 41.  
58   Supra note 54, art. 41. 
59  See ibid., art. 1, where child is defined as including being those under the age of 18. 
60  Ibid., art. 5. 
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For added clarity, article 12(1) states that: 
 
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming 
his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.61 
 
A strict interpretation of Article 12(1) reveals that, although children must be 
allowed to express their views, these views are not necessarily determinative.  
Specifically, giving “due weight” to the views of children could mean as little as 
including these views as one of several considerations to be weighed when contemplating 
research participation.  It could, however, also grant mature minors the right to 
autonomous decision-making with respect to their participation in medical research 
where local laws permit such action.  Based on the review of the law set out in this 
chapter, the laws of each common law jurisdiction lend themselves to such an 
interpretation.   
Adopting a position somewhere between considering a minor’s views part of a 
collection of factors and allowing a mature minor’s views to be determinative is 
obviously not a simple task.  It is perhaps for this reason that, apart from Quebec, no 
provincial legislation has made any pronouncement on the role to be given to the views 
of minors in the research context.  The Federal Government has also not passed any 
legislation concerning participation in research by minors.62  Although theoretically, this 
inaction by government actors has left the interpretation of the pivotal phrase “due 
weight”63 to the courts, to the three Councils, and to other bodies requiring adherence to 
61  Ibid., art. 12(1). 
62  The only federal legislation governing research more generally is the Food and Drug Regulations, 
supra note 18.   
63  Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 54, art. 12(1).  
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the Tri-Council Policy Statement, practically the decision is made by researchers and 
research ethics boards, at least until a legal challenge is raised. Obviously, leaving such 
key decisions to the discretion of individuals untrained in the law provides little 
reassurance to mature minors whose rights hang in the balance.   
 Despite the fact that it remains somewhat vague how the evolving capacity of 
minors needs to be recognized in the research setting to meet the standard contained 
within the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it is abundantly clear that the transition 
from childhood to adulthood is a legal reality.   
III. NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 The principles enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child inform how 
some pediatric medical research is carried out throughout Canada.  On a national level, 
there is then also the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms64 as well as a few 
initiatives developed by Health Canada.  In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the 
discussion on the Charter can be found under subsection B(v) below, as part of the 
discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of 
Child and Family Services)65.  Prior to discussing the other initiatives by Health Canada, 
it is worth noting that the measures discussed in this section, those from the previous 
section, and criminal laws are the only tools that apply in all Canadian jurisdictions.  
64  Part I of the Constitution Act,1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[Charter]. 
65  2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181. 
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Beyond these instruments and so long as it respects the division of powers limits, each 
jurisdiction is free to enact its own laws regulating the pediatric research enterprise.66  
A. Health Canada’s Initiatives 
 Beyond adopting the ICH GCP and ICH CIMPPP, Health Canada has also 
undertaken a couple of projects in an attempt to fulfill the emerging need for additional 
information on therapeutic and safety issues involving children.  In 2005, it developed the 
Office of Paediatric Initiatives.  This Office was intended to deal with issues affecting 
children throughout the health product life cycle, including pre-market approval and post-
market surveillance and evaluation.67  Unfortunately, as no further details on this rather 
vague mandate or on the current activities of the Office could be found the specific work 
it is doing is unknown.  Secondly, Health Canada also established a Paediatric Expert 
Advisory Committee under the auspices of its Health Products and Food Branch in 2009.  
This Committee was intended to provide policy advice on health and safety issues 
involved in the regulation of health products and food.  It is unknown precisely what this 
committee has achieved to date or what ties (if any) it has to the Office of Paediatric 
Initiatives.  It is nonetheless interesting to note that no one with legal expertise was 
targeted by Health Canada for potential membership to the Committee.68  Given the lack 
of information available on either the Office of Paediatric Initiatives or the Paediatric 
Expert Advisory Committee, it is doubtful that any clarity on the role to be afforded to 
66  Marie Hirtle, “The Governance of Research Involving Human Participants in Canada” (2003) 11 Health 
L. J. 137.  See also Martha Jackman, “Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Health in Canada” (2000) 8 
Health L. J. 95, for discussion on jurisdiction over ‘health’ generally. 
67  Canada, Health Canada, online: Office of Paediatric Initiatives <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/branch-
dirgen/hpfb-dgpsa/opi-bip/index-eng.php>. 
68  Canada, Health Canada, Frequently Asked Questions:  Paediatric Expert Advisory Committee (Ottawa:  
Health Canada, undated), online:  < http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/branch-dirgen/hpfb-dgpsa/opi-
bip/peac-cceip/faq-eng.php>. 
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mature minors in the research context will flow from these mechanisms in the near future.  
After all, one would expect any significant developments in this sphere to have been 
disseminated to the public through the media or publicly available government 
documents.69   
B. The Mature Minor at the Supreme Court of Canada 
 
On June 26, 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in A.C. 
v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services).  This is our highest court’s first 
pronouncement on the applicability of the common law mature minor rule to the medical 
treatment context.  Given that this decision shapes how the earlier jurisprudence should 
be interpreted as well as how trial-level and appellate courts will define the role of mature 
minors in future cases, a thorough review of A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and 
Family Services) is warranted.70  In the discussion below, I argue that the majority did not 
discuss the common law in any meaningful way, despite its claims that it did.  As a result, 
I construct a description of the mature minor rule at common law that is consistent with 
previous jurisprudence and properly supported conclusions contained in the present case.  
Throughout the remainder of the discussion, readers will find that I am somewhat critical 
of the majority and minority’s reasoning.  This criticism has been levelled because I want 
to ensure that if any aspects of this decision are incorporated into the capacity assessment 
tool that needs to be developed (a point which is discussed further in Chapter 4), it is 
necessary that they be cast in the correct light.     
69  Efforts to obtain further information through numerous telephone and email requests have also failed. 
70  Should readers be interested in reading the facta filed by the parties and interveners in this case, they 






The facts of the case are quite straightforward.  It involved a minor, A.C., who 
was admitted to hospital when she was 14 years and 10 months old because of 
gastrointestinal bleeding caused by Crohn’s disease.  A few months prior to her hospital 
admission, she had signed an advance directive indicating she did not want to receive any 
blood transfusions.  During her admission, her treating physician determined that she 
required a blood transfusion.  A.C., a Jehovah’s Witness, refused the blood transfusion.  
Her parents supported her decision.  As a result of this refusal, three psychiatrists carried 
out a psychiatric assessment, in which it was determined that A.C. was competent.  The 
Director of Child and Family Services then apprehended her as a child in need of 
protection under Manitoba’s Child and Family Services Act71 and brought an application 
pursuant to sections 25(8) and 25(9) for an order authorizing treatment.72  Those 
provisions read: 
25(8)   Subject to subsection (9), upon completion of a hearing, 
the court may authorize a medical examination or any medical or 
dental treatment that the court considers to be in the best interests 
of the child. 
  
25(9)   The court shall not make an order under subsection (8) 
with respect to a child who is 16 years of age or older without the 
child’s consent unless the court is satisfied that the child is unable 
  
(a)      to understand the information that is relevant to 
making a decision to consent or not consent to the medical 
examination or the medical or dental treatment; or 
  
(b)      to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences 
of making a decision to consent or not consent to the medical 
examination or the medical or dental treatment.73 
 
71  C.C.S.M. c. C80. 
72  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at paras. 5-11.  
73  Supra note 71, ss. 25(8)-25(9). 
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Kaufman J., the judge hearing the application, proceeded on the assumption that 
A.C. had the requisite capacity.  Despite this finding, he granted the order sought by the 
Director on the basis that the statutory scheme did not restrict the court’s ability to order 
medical treatment that was in a minor’s “best interests” even if that minor was competent 
where the minor was less than sixteen years of age.  Potential breaches of the Charter 
were not considered.74   
A.C. and her parents appealed the order to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, 
challenging the legislative scheme on the basis that it contained an irrebuttable 
presumption of incapacity for minors less than sixteen years of age.75  There, speaking on 
behalf of a unanimous court, Steel J.A. dismissed the appeal.  In so doing, the Court held 
that under the Child and Family Services Act, the court was empowered to make 
treatment decisions for minors under the age of sixteen based on a “best interest” test, 
whether or not the minor demonstrated decision-making capacity.  Stated differently, the 
Court explicitly held that the legislative scheme ousted the common law mature minor 
rule entirely with respect to minors under the age of sixteen.76  The Court further held that 
the scheme did not violate section 7 of the Charter because it was not arbitrary, nor did it 
violate section 15(1).  Finally, any violation of sections 2(a) could be justified under 
section 1.77   
A.C. and her parents further appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.  
Ultimately, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the legislative scheme at issue.  
However, unlike the Manitoba Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada was 
74  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para. 12. 
75  Ibid. at para. 25. 
76  Director of Child and Family Services v. A.C., supra note 57 at paras. 50, 57. 
77  Ibid. at paras. 62-107. 
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divided, with three separate sets of reasons being written; Abella J. wrote the majority 
reasons on behalf of a four justice majority, McLachlin C.J. wrote minority reasons on 
behalf of herself and Rothstein J., and Binnie J. wrote dissenting reasons.  The analysis of 
the decision that follows is broken down by topic so as to better allow comparison of the 
different views held by the three groups of justices and how those views might be applied 
to the medical research context.  Those topics are:   (1) the characterization of the issue, 
(2) the capacity of minors at common law, (3) the rights of minors under the Charter, (4) 
the capacity assessment, (5) the application of the decision to A.C., (6) how the decision 
can be applied to the research context, and (7) the questions left unanswered by the 
Court.  
(ii) Characterization of the Issue 
 
A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) is about the 
constitutionality of sections 25(8) and 25(9) of the Child and Family Services Act.  
Specifically, according to the majority the issue before the Court was “whether the 
statutory scheme strikes a constitutional balance between what the law has consistently 
seen as an individual’s fundamental right to autonomous decision making in connection 
with his or her body and the law’s equally persistent attempts to protect vulnerable 
children from harm.”78  Such tacit endorsement of the welfare principle79 is also seen in 
the manner in which the majority carefully interprets “best interest” as requiring that a 
78  Supra note 65 at para. 30. 
79  As noted by Joan M. Gilmour, “Death, Dying and Decision-Making About End of Life Care” in Jocelyn 
Downie, Timothy Caulfield, & Colleen M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed. 
(Markham:  LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 437 at 441, citing Manitoba Law Reform Commission, 
Minors’ Consent to Health Care (Report No. 91) (Winnipeg:  The Commission, 1995) at 5 [Manitoba 
Law Reform Commission], the welfare principle is the “argument that a minor can only consent to care 
that would be of benefit”.  This concept is considered in greater detail in subsection (viii)(1) below. 
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minor’s views become more important as maturity evolves but then refuses to go so far as 
to say that once capacity is attained, the minor’s decision will be determinative.80        
In his dissenting opinion, Binnie J. defines the issue quite differently; the issue “is 
not what is to be decided about medical treatment but who is to make the decision” 
[emphasis in original]81.  As noted in the dissenting reasons, the “Charter is not just 
about the freedom to make what most members of society would regard as the wise and 
correct choice”82.  Implicit in Binnie J.’s characterization of the issue is the view that 
mature minors should be allowed to consent to and refuse any treatment, contrary to the 
majority and minority’s shared view that mature minors should be afforded “freedom to 
exercise wishes that are in the minor’s best interests”83.  In Binnie J.’s view, the only way 
this can be achieved is by allowing minors under the age threshold contained in a statute 
to rebut the presumption of incapacity and that, once rebutted, they be treated like 
competent adults.  Binnie J.’s reading of sections 25(8) and 25(9) of the Child and 
Family Services Act does not allow for that interpretation.84 
The majority, minority and dissent disagree on the sources of information that 
must be canvassed in order to assess the constitutionality of the legislative scheme.  
Notably, the majority deemed it necessary to review the legislative scheme, the common 
law, international jurisprudence, and “relevant social scientific and legal literature”85 
while the minority rejects the relevance of the common law on the basis that the scheme 
80  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at paras. 21-22.  See also the 
discussion below on factors to be considered in evaluating a minor’s capacity.
81  Ibid. at para. 165. 
82  Ibid. at para. 163. 
83  Ireh Iyioha & Yusuff A. O. Akorede, “You Give Me Welfare But Take My Freedom:  Understanding 
the Mature Minor’s Autonomy in the Face of the Court’s Parens Patriae Jurisdiction” (2009-2010) 13 
Quinnipiac Health L. J. 279 at 288. 
84  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at paras. 176, 209-210.
85  Ibid. at para. 30.   
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“displaces” the common law mature minor rule and instead focuses its constitutional 
analysis on the statute itself.86  The dissent, in turn, considers the common law before 
focusing much of its attention on the wording of the statute.87  
(iii) The Mature Minor Rule at Common Law 
 
The common law mature minor rule recognizes the transition from childhood to 
adulthood and accords certain minors greater rights.  It reflects the fact that the capacity 
to make medical treatment decisions does not suddenly materialize on the day an 
individual reaches the age of majority.  The mature minor principle applies in all 
common law jurisdictions in Canada, unless it has been modified or overridden by 
legislative enactments or the court through its parens patriae jurisdiction.88  To date there 
does not appear to be a reported decision from a Canadian court involving the research 
context. It must therefore be recognized that the mature minor rule has evolved in a rather 
narrow sphere. 
Prior to the decision in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 
the mature minor rule was described as the legal concept whereby those under the 
legislated age of majority can consent to medical treatment when they are found to have 
“sufficient understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences of treatment 
and its alternatives to be able to decide whether to proceed with it or not.”89  The 
jurisprudence was also unclear as to whether the mature minor rule incorporated the 
86  Ibid. at para. 123. 
87  Ibid. at paras. 162-236. 
88  The court’s parens patriae jurisdiction as well as the welfare principle are discussed in detail in 
subsections (iii)(2) and (iii)(3) below. 
89  Joan M. Gilmour, “Children, Adolescents, and Health Care” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield, & 
Colleen M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed. (Markham:  Butterworths, 2002) 205 
at 211 [Gilmour, “Children”]. 
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welfare principle, which is the notion whereby minors can only consent to treatment that 
is perceived by others as being in their best interest.90   
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of 
Child and Family Services) seems to think it has clarified this ambiguity in favour of 
importing a best interest requirement into the common law mature minor rule.  Notably, 
Abella J. concludes that  “...while courts have readily embraced the concept of granting 
adolescents a degree of autonomy that is reflective of their evolving maturity, they have 
generally not seen the “mature minor” doctrine as dictating guaranteed outcomes, 
particularly where the consequences for the young person are catastrophic.”91  It is also 
noted that “[w]here a child’s decisional capacity to refuse treatment has been upheld, on 
the other hand, it has been because the court has accepted that the mature child’s wishes 
have been consistent with his or her best interests.”92  These comments, however, miss 
the mark.  The reason for this failing is that, under the heading “Common Law for 
Minors”, Abella J. claims to discuss the rule at common law but in fact reviews cases in 
which the applicable legislation requires the minor’s best interest to be considered in all 
two cases.   
The discussion in this section of this chapter begins with a review of the 
jurisprudence referred to by the majority in its discussion of the common law mature 
minor rule.  Focus then shifts to how the rule is characterized by the majority after the 
erroneous reasoning is teased out.  The latter subsection includes support for my position 
that the welfare principle does not apply to circumstances arising under the common law.  
The last subsection of this section briefly describes the court’s parens patriae 
90  Manitoba Law Reform Commission, supra note 79. 
91  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para. 69. 
92  Ibid. at para. 62. 
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jurisdiction.  Although the latter jurisdiction is not discussed in A.C. v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services) it nonetheless forms part of the complete 
‘picture’ of the common law landscape.  
(1) The Supreme Court of Canada’s Flawed Review of the Jurisprudence 
 
In the discussion of the common law as it applies to minors, the majority makes 
reference to ten earlier Canadian decisions involving the right of minors to refuse medical 
treatment.  In doing so, however, Abella J. ignores the fact that the determination as to 
whether the minor’s refusal of treatment would be respected was only based on the 
common law mature minor rule in two of these cases.  The determination in all eight 
other cases referred to by Abella J. was rooted in legislative provisions that mandated that 
the minor’s best interests be considered.  In light of this criticism, it is appropriate to 
describe in some detail each of the cases relied upon by the majority. 
The first case referred to by Abella J., that being C.(J.S.) v. Wren93, is the only 
case not involving legislative interpretation.  That case involved a girl aged 16 years and 
8 months wanting to have a therapeutic abortion against her parents’ wishes.  The girl 
obtained approval from both her physician and from the therapeutic abortion committee.  
Her parents then sought an injunction prohibiting the defendant physician from 
performing the abortion.  Ultimately the Alberta Court of Appeal found that she had 
“sufficient intelligence and understanding to make up her own mind and did so.”94  The 
decision makes no mention of best interests. 
93  (1986), 76 A.R. 118 (Q.B.), aff’d (1986), 76 A.R. 115 (C.A.). 
94  Ibid. at para. 16. 
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The second case referred to by Abella J. is Van Mol (Guardian ad litem of) v. 
Ashmore95, involved legislative interpretation of the Infants Act96, as it then read, which 
partly preserved the common law mature minor rule.97 In that case, Melanie Van Mol 
required a third surgery to repair a congenital heart defect.  The first two surgeries had 
been done when she was two and six years old while the third was to be done when she 
was sixteen years and three months old.  As a result of complications that arose during 
the third surgery, she was left confined to a wheelchair.  At no time was Melanie’s 
capacity at issue.  Rather, the debate revolved around what limits are imposed on her 
decision-making capacity as a mature minor and the role of her parents in making 
medical treatment decisions.  In a split decision, a two-judge majority of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal found that Melanie was a mature minor and as such, was the 
only person who could consent to the surgery. In discussing the implications of being a 
mature minor at common law, Lambert J.A. on behalf of the majority commented: 
…once the required capacity to consent has been achieved by the 
young person reaching sufficient maturity, intelligence and 
capability of understanding, the discussions about the nature of 
the treatment, its gravity, the material risks and any special or 
unusual risks, and the decisions about undergoing treatment, and 
about the form of the treatment, must all take place with and be 
made by the young person whose bodily integrity is to be invaded 
and whose life and health will be affected by the outcome.  At 
that stage, the parent or guardian will no longer have any 
overriding right to give or withhold consent.  All rights in relation 
95  1999 BCCA 6, 168 D.L.R. (4th) 637 [cited to D.L.R.]. 
96  R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 196. 
97  Under section 16(4) of the Infants Act, ibid., the consent of all minors sixteen years of age or older was 
given the same weight as the consent of persons over the age of majority, where either parental consent 
or a written opinion from a physician stating that the “treatment or procedure to be undertaken is in the 
best interest of the continued health and well being of the infant” was obtained.  Despite these 
requirements which render the mature minor’s decision non-binding, section 16(5) of the Act preserved 
the common law mature minor rule.  As such, based on the latter provision, the Court was free to apply 
the test at common law, which clearly constrained the rights of mature minors to a lesser degree.  After 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal rendered its decision, the relevant provisions of the Infants Act 
were revised in 1992 and again in 1996. 
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to giving or withholding consent will then be held entirely by the 
child.  The role of the parent or guardian is as advisor or friend.  
There is no room for conflicting decisions between a young 
person who has achieved consenting capacity, on the one hand, 
and a parent or guardian on the other.98  
 
The majority then went on to find that the surgeon failed to disclose relevant risks to 
Melanie.99    
The third case referred to by Abella J. is H.(T.) v. Children’s Aid Society of 
Metropolitan Toronto100.  As noted by Abella J., it involved a 13-year-old suffering from 
aplastic anaemia and her mother, both of whom refused to consent to treatment involving 
blood products.  This refusal resulted in the minor being made a temporary ward of the 
state under the Child and Family Services Act101.  This means that the minor’s capacity 
was evaluated in the child protection context and not strictly based on the common law 
mature minor rule. 
The fourth case referred to by Abella J is D.(T.T.), Re102, which involved an 
application brought by the Minister of Social Services pursuant to Saskatchewan’s Child 
and Family Services Act103 to determine if the earlier nine month supervisory order that 
had been granted to the Minister ought to be terminated or varied.  That order had been 
issued when T.T.D. began receiving chemotherapy to treat osteosarcoma and his parents 
refused to consent to the treatment.  After receiving two courses of chemotherapy, 
T.T.D., who was thirteen years old at the time, indicated to the pediatric oncologist 
98  Van Mol (Guardian ad litem of) v. Ashmore, supra note 95 at para. 75. 
99  Ibid.  See the discussion under subsection IV(B)(i) for further comment on the relevant provisions of 
the Infants Act, supra note 29. 
100  (1996) 138 D.L.R. (4th) 144 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). 
101  R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 [Child and Family Services Act (Ontario)]. 
102  (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 761 (Sask. Q.B.).  The majority refers to this decision as Dueck (Re) but all 
other references to this case I have found use the style of cause D.(T.T.), Re and so the latter has been 
used throughout this thesis.
103  S.S. 1989-90, c. C-7.2 [Child and Family Services Act (Saskatchewan)]. 
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treating him that he did not want any further chemotherapy and that he did not want to 
have surgery.  This refusal of further treatment was found to be based, in part, on 
T.T.D.’s belief that he had been healed by God.104  The court ultimately determined that 
T.T.D. was not a mature minor.  The bases for this finding included a psychologist’s 
conclusion that T.T.D. was “less mature than average thirteen year old children in 
Saskatchewan”, as well as that his father set all the rules for the family and had provided 
T.T.D. with misleading information about the success of alternative treatment.105  It was 
further ordered that all treatment be administered in the absence of his parents on the 
basis that such action was in the boy’s best interests.106   
The fifth case referred to by Abella J. is H.(B.) v. Alberta (Director of Child 
Welfare)107.  In that case, the Director of Child Welfare sought an apprehension and 
medical treatment order under the Child Welfare Act108.  It is in that context that Jordan J. 
of the Provincial Court determined that Bethany Hughes was not a mature minor, 
irrespective of the opinions of her treating physicians.  She went on to find, however, that 
even if Bethany had been found to be a mature minor, the Child Welfare Act treats all 
children under the age of eighteen the same; it overrides any rights mature minors held at 
common law.  Jordan J. also firmly asserts that parents have not only a right but a “duty 
to make decisions affecting the child” so long as those decisions are made in the minor’s 
best interests.  After all, she states that “it would be a difficult day for parents and 
guardians if their sixteen year-olds had an unfettered right to make every decision 
104  D.(T.T.), Re, supra note 102. 
105  Ibid. at paras. 9-10. 
106  Ibid. at para. 16. 
107  2002 ABPC 39, [2002] 11 W.W.R. 752 at para. 62, aff’d 2002 ABQB 371, 3 Alta. L.R. (4th) 16, aff’d 
2002 ABCA 109, [2002] 7 W.W.R. 644 [H.(B.) v. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) No. 1 cited to 
W.W.R.]. 
108  R.S.A. 2002, c. C-12. 
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affecting them…”109  On appeal, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench accepted the 
alternative position put forth by Jordan J., that being that Bethany was a mature minor at 
common law but that this status was altered by statute.  The Alberta Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal on the basis that Bethany was not a mature minor at the time the 
decision was to be made.110  Neither the Court of Queen’s Bench nor the Court of Appeal 
commented on Jordan J.’s characterization of the rights of parents.  
The sixth case referred to by Abella J. is the Quebec Superior Court’s decision in 
Hôpital Ste-Justine v. Giron111.  There, Ste-Justine Hospital sought court authorization to 
administer blood transfusions against the fifteen-year-old minor’s wishes.  Such 
authorization was required under the applicable articles of the Civil Code of Quebec112.  
Emanating out of Quebec, this is clearly not a case applying the common law mature 
minor rule.   
The seventh case referred to by Abella J. is U.(C.)(Friend of) v. McGonigle113, 
where an apprehension order was sought under Alberta’s Child Welfare Act114 after the 
sixteen and a half year old minor refused to consent to the administration of blood 
transfusions, should such transfusions become necessary during a surgery to control 
dysfunctional menstrual bleeding.  C.U.’s decision was supported by her parents, all of 
whom were Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The Provincial Court Judge granted the treatment 
order, a decision which was upheld by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.115  As was 
the case with A.C., C.U. had already received blood transfusions by the time the case 
109  H.(B.) v. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) No. 1, supra note 107 at para. 52. 
110  Ibid. at paras. 11-13.  
111  2002 CanLII 34269 (Qc. C.S.). 
112  S.Q. 1991, c. 64.
113  2003 ABCA 66, 223 D.L.R. (4th) 662 (C.A.) [cited to D.L.R.]. 
114  S.A. 1984, c. C-8.1.  This Act has since been repealed and replaced with the Child Welfare Act, supra 
note 108, which is discussed in greater detail under section IV(C) below. 
115  U.(C.)(Friend of) v. McGonigle, supra note 113 at paras. 6-9. 
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reached the Court of Appeal but the case was heard so that it could serve as a precedent 
in subsequent cases.  The latter court was clear that in child protection proceedings in 
Alberta “a mature minor’s wishes respecting medical treatment will not be dispositive of 
the issue, but rather will be one factor to be considered in determination of their best 
interests.”116  The Court of Appeal explicitly stated at paragraph 4: 
…mature minor rule does not apply in child welfare 
proceedings in which a child refuses to consent to essential 
treatment recommended by a physician. While the court must 
consider the expressed wishes of a mature child, it is not bound 
to comply with those wishes. Instead, the best interests of the 
child govern.117 
 
 The eighth case referred to by Abella J. is K. (L.D.), Re118, an action in which a 
twelve year old refused to consent to chemotherapy that would require blood 
transfusions.  She refused for religious reasons as well as because she did not want to 
experience the pain related to such treatment.  In the face of this refusal, the Children’s 
Aid Society brought an application seeking an order that the child was in need of 
protection, as defined under the Child Welfare Act119.  The application was dismissed by 
Main Prov. Ct. J. on the basis that “proper” medical treatment had not been refused.  
Specifically, the mega-vitamin treatment proposed by L.D.K. and her parents was 
“proper” because it allowed L.D.K. to try to overcome her illness with dignity.120  
Undoubtedly, the fact that the chemotherapy proposed by specialist physicians only had a 
thirty percent change of success and had many severe side effects played into the 
balancing by the court.  
116  Ibid. at para. 39. 
117  Ibid. at para. 4. 
118  1985 CarswellOnt 318, 48 R.F.L. (2d) 164, 23 C.R.R. 337. 
119  R.S.O. 1980, c. 66.  Note that this statute has been repealed.  In its place, there is now the Child and 
Family Services Act (Ontario), supra note 101.   
120  Supra note 118 at para. 34. 
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The ninth case referred to by Abella J. is Y. (A.), Re121.  There, the Director of 
Child Welfare sought an order finding the fifteen year old minor involved in the action to 
be a child in need of protection and an order authorizing blood transfusions.  A.Y., a 
Jehovah’s Witness, consented to intensive chemotherapy but refused to consent to blood 
transfusions that may become necessary.  Contrary to what Abella J. indicated in her 
reasons at paragraph 63, his treating physician was not of the view that he “required 
blood transfusions”.  Rather, his physician’s view was that blood transfusions were often 
required by individuals receiving intensive therapy but that there were other options.  The 
physician himself was also unwilling to administer blood transfusions against A.Y.’s 
wishes.  Ultimately Wells J. held that A.Y. was not in need of protection because blood 
transfusions were not “essential”.    A.Y. was also found to be a mature minor.  However, 
the decision provides little detail as to what criteria were considered in making that 
determination.  That being said, Wells J. does state that “it is proper under the Act, and in 
law generally, for me to take into consideration his wishes”.122  He then goes on to look 
at what course of action is in A.Y.’s best interests.  As was the case in the other decisions 
outlined above, the decision in this case was based on the provisions of the applicable 
child protection statute, not on the common law mature minor rule. 
 Lastly, in Walker (Litigation Guardian of) v. Region 2 Hospital Corp123, Joshua, a 
fifteen year old Jehovah’s witness, refused to consent to blood transfusions should such 
transfusions become a necessary component of his treatment for acute myeloid leukemia. 
The Court of Appeal was called upon to review the lower court’s interpretation of the 
interaction between the common law mature minor rule and the provisions of the Medical 
121  (1993), 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91. 
122  Ibid. at para. 34. 
123  (1994), 150 N.B.R. (2d) 366, 116 D.L.R. (4th) 477 (C.A.) [cited to N.B.R.]. 
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Consent of Minors Act.  In his reasons on behalf of the majority, Hoyt, C.J.N.B. 
remarked:   
At common law, when a minor is mature, no parental consent is 
required. As noted, New Brunswick has codified the common law 





In New Brunswick, the Act makes provision for permitting 
mature minors to make decisions about their medical treatment. 
By s.3(1)(b), the common law right to self-determination by a 
person under 16 years of age is modified so that, in addition to the 
informed consent of the mature minor, there must also be 
opinions from two medically qualified practitioners that the minor 
is capable of understanding the nature and consequences of the 
treatment and that such treatment is in the best interests of the 
minor and his continuing health and well-being. In the event there 
are changes proposed to the treatment, a further consent may be 
required.124 [Emphasis in original] 
 
In sum then, the majority’s review of the jurisprudence consists of referring to 
only two cases that were decided on the basis of the common law mature minor rule.  
Neither one of these cases considered what action was in the minor’s best interests.  Six 
other cases involved child protection statutes which require that the minor’s best interests 
be considered while another case involved consent to treatment legislation that had 
altered the rule at common law.  Finally, the last case discussed by Abella J. was decided 
under the civil law of Quebec.     
(2) The Common Law Mature Minor Rule:  Post-A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child 
and Family Services) 
  
 The essence of what remains to be considered in terms of the common law mature 
minor rule can be boiled down to what a minor needs to prove to establish that she has 
124  Ibid. at 14-16. 
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capacity and what beyond capacity is required for her medical treatment decisions to be 
respected.  Each of these two issues is considered in turn below, with the latter 
subdivided into an examination of the welfare principle and parens patriae jurisdiction. 
(a) The Common Law Mature Minor Rule Generally 
 The mature minor rule allows minors to make their own medical treatment 
decisions where they have “sufficient understanding and appreciation of the nature and 
consequences of treatment and its alternatives to be able to decide whether to proceed 
with it or not.”125  As discussed further below, it has been suggested that the welfare 
principle also forms part of the rule.  For reasons set out in the following subsection, I 
disagree.  Formulated in this manner, the mature minor rule essentially requires a minor 
to demonstrate that she has ‘capacity’.  So, what is capacity? 
 Prior to deciding A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), the 
Supreme Court of Canada had had the occasion to define the term in 2003 in Starson v. 
Swayze126.  There, capacity was said to be: 
Capacity involves two criteria. First, a person must be able to 
understand the information that is relevant to making a treatment 
decision. This requires the cognitive ability to process, retain and 
understand the relevant information. …Second, a person must be 
able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the 
decision or lack of one. This requires the patient to be able to 
apply the relevant information to his or her circumstances, and to 
be able to weigh the foreseeable risks and benefits of a decision 
or lack thereof.127  
 
Admittedly, Starson v. Swayze did not involve a minor.  The concept has, however, been 
recently described by LeBlanc J. in P.H. v. Eastern Regional Integrated Health 
125  Gilmour, “Children”, supra note 89. 
126  2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 722 [cited to S.C.R.].  
127  Ibid. at para. 78. 
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Authority128, a case involving a sixteen year old who refused mental health treatment that 
was heard and decided after the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in 
A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services).  There, it was stated: 
With regard to the first component of the test of competency 
stated above, the cognitive ability to process and retain relevant 
information must be present in determining whether a person 
understands information relevant to making a treatment decision. 
The person need not understand technical descriptions of their 
illness or issues, nor does the person have to agree with the 
specific diagnosis made of that condition but must be capable of 
recognizing that he or she is affected by an illness or condition. 
 
For the second component of the test – being able to appreciate 
the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the treatment decision 
or lack of one, the person must have the ability to appreciate the 
consequences of the decision to be made. The person does not 
have to actually appreciate these consequences.129   
Precisely how a minor goes about demonstrating that she has the requisite 
capacity is not discussed by the majority in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and 
Family Services) under the heading “Common Law for Minors”.  This omission is likely 
due to the fact that A.C. was assumed to be competent.  That being said, some insight 
into the factors to be considered can be gleaned from the criteria to be weighed when 
carrying out a maturity assessment to determine a minor’s best interests.  Discussion of 
each of those criteria is set out in a subsequent section below. 
It nonetheless seems appropriate at this juncture to comment briefly on why the 
maturity assessment, as described by Abella J., should not be carried out on each minor.  
The maturity assessment should not be conflated with a capacity assessment; only the 
latter applies to all minors, whatever the context (i.e. at common law or based on child 
128  2010 NLTD 34. 
129  Ibid. at paras. 38-39. 
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protection or consent to treatment legislation).   The assessment of a minor’s maturity is 
used to determine a minor’s best interests and so is an additional requirement.  Stated 
differently, the ‘result’ of a maturity assessment is not intended to tell a physician (or a 
judge) whether the minor is competent.  Rather, it is meant to shed some light on whether 
respecting a minor’s medical treatment decision is in her best interest.         
This distinction between the required capacity assessment and the maturity 
assessment is aptly seen in the decision of LeBlanc J. of the Trial Division of 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s Supreme Court in P.H. v. Eastern Regional Integrated 
Health Authority.  The issue in that case was whether sixteen year old S.J.L. was 
competent to make her own mental health treatment decisions.  At the time of the 
hearing, S.J.L. was detained by court order at Waterford Hospital, a hospital for adult 
inpatient psychiatric care.  Without detailing her psychiatric history, it is sufficient to 
note that she had a history of self-harming behaviour and was suspected to have 
Borderline Personality Disorder.  For purposes of this discussion, it is significant to note 
that unlike A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), this was not a child 
protection case.     
In deciding the case, LeBlanc J. considered testimony and reports from four 
psychiatrists (two of whom were treating physicians and the other two prepared reports at 
the Court’s request) and one treating psychologist.  These experts reached different 
conclusions as to whether S.J.L. was legally competent.  As well, S.J.L. filed an affidavit 
and met briefly with LeBlanc J.  Lastly, P.H., S.J.L.’s mother testified at the hearing.130 
130  S.J.L. was presumed competent under section of the Advance Health Care Directives Act, S.N.L. 1995, 
c. A-4.1.
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LeBlanc J. found that it is necessary to first consider if S.J.L. is legally competent, 
based on the test from Starson v. Swayze.131  On the evidence, he held that the 
presumption of capacity with respect to S.J.L.’s ability to understand the information 
relevant to a treatment decision is not rebutted.  This conclusion was consistent with the 
finding of legal competence by one of S.J.L.’s treating psychiatrist and went against the 
finding of incompetence by the two psychiatrists retained by the Court. However, 
LeBlanc J. then found that S.J.L. did not appreciate the consequences of her treatment 
decisions or lack thereof.   The presumption that S.J.L. was competent had consequently 
been rebutted on the balance of probabilities.132      
LeBlanc J. then found that whether or not the presumption of capacity was 
rebutted, the court “in the exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction should go further and 
consider the young person’s level of maturity in determining whether it will force 
treatment in the face of the right of autonomous decision-making given to such a 
person”133.  Despite the Supreme Court of Canada not stating whether best interests could 
be considered where minors are over the age of sixteen and where there is no best interest 
requirement under the applicable statute, LeBlanc J. held that a “sliding scale application 
131  It is worth noting that despite claiming to carry out an examination of how adults and minors are treated 
at common law with respect to consent to medical treatment, Abella J.’s majority reasons in A.C. v. 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65, do not even mention the Starson v. 
Swayze, supra note 126, decision.  Although this omission can be partially attributed to the fact that 
A.C.’s capacity was not at issue, in my view the test for capacity is still a necessary part of any 
discussion on the common law right to consent to treatment and consequently ought to have been 
included in Abella J’s reasons (as it was by Binnie J. at para. 194).   
132  P.H. v. Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority, supra note 128 at paras. 83-91.  Note that 
throughout the application of the test to S.J.L., LeBlanc J. is considering her ability to make medical 
treatment decisions generally, which goes against the notion that competence is time and situation 
specific.  Based on LeBlanc J.’s order that counsel return with suggestions of treatment options so that 
His Lordship can determine what treatment is in S.J.L.’s best interest, it is clear that there had not even 
been a treatment plan proposed at the time of the capacity assessment. 
133  Ibid. at para. 52. 
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of the best interest standard”134 is to be applied to all minors.135  Although the decision is 
not explicit on this point, I would suggest that in using the phrase “all minors”, LeBlanc 
J. really means “all minors where the preservation of life is at stake”.136  LeBlanc J. then 
went on to cite the list of factors that, according to Abella J., could be considered when 
assessing the maturity of an adolescent.  There is no discussion included in LeBlanc J.’s 
reasons as to how any of these factors apply to S.J.L.  Rather, LeBlanc J. essentially 
concluded that S.J.L. was not mature enough to make her own treatment decisions.137   
Ultimately then, the first reported decision after A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of 
Child and Family Services) sets out to expand the “very limited class of cases”138 where a 
minor’s wishes must accord with her bests interests to be upheld.  In remains to be seen if 
this is merely a one-off flawed application of the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasons.   
134  Ibid. at para. 51. 
135  Ibid. at para. 45. 
136  Support for this position is derived from comments made by LeBlanc J., ibid. at paras. 45, 92.  
Specifically, LeBlanc J. stated: 
[45]         It is with all of this in mind that I must proceed to assess the evidence before 
me as to the competency of S.J.L.  Before doing so, however, due to her age and level 
of maturity, I find it necessary to refer to what I consider is another aspect of the 
decision that I must make in this case, that being the application of the best interest 
standard.  It is my opinion that the best interest standard should have application, where 
the treatment decision is related to the preserving of life of a person who is not 
legislatively recognized as an “adult”. I am of the opinion that the best interest standard 
must be applied in line with the level of maturity had by the individual involved as well 
as the independence of their judgment.  My reason for concluding that this is a proper 
consideration is based upon the rationale used by the Supreme Court of Canada’s 




[92]         A consideration of best interests here will have two aspects.  First of all, as I 
indicated earlier in reference to the law, I am satisfied that even if I were to have found 
S.J.L. met the legal competency test set out in Starson, consideration of the best 
interests standard based on her level of maturity on a sliding scale as referred to earlier 
would still be necessary here.  Clearly in this case a decision by S.J.L. to refuse to seek 
treatment for her mental condition would likely result in further increasingly serious 
self-harming acts.  I am satisfied that death or serious bodily harm would result, either 
intentionally or accidentally.  The evidence I have heard, including what S.J.L. has said, 
supports this. [Emphasis in original]
137  Ibid. at paras. 92-94. 
138  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para. 86. 
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LeBlanc J.’s reasons in P.H. v. Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority also 
provide no guidance as to how the maturity assessment proposed by Abella J. ought to be 
applied.  
(b) The Welfare Principle 
The welfare principle is the notion whereby minors can only consent to treatment 
that is perceived by others as being in their best interest.139  It has been described by Joan 
M. Gilmour as follows:  
While a mature minor can consent to medically recommended 
treatment, the extent to which he or she has the power to consent 
to a treatment that is not beneficial or therapeutic remains unclear. 
The argument that a minor can only consent to care that would be 
of benefit (or refuse that which is of little or no benefit) is 
sometimes referred to as “the welfare principle”. It suggests that a 
mature minor can only make those decisions about medical care 
that others would consider to be in his or her interests; as such, it 
challenges the extent of the commitment in law to mature minors’ 
interests in self-determination and autonomy. . . . 
 
. . . [The welfare principle] reflects an uneasiness with autonomy 
as the overriding value that the law advances in this context, 
rather than protection of the minor’s life and health as one who is 
still vulnerable.140 
 
As noted above, the majority does not explicitly endorse or reject the inclusion of 
the welfare principle into the common law mature minor rule.  Given this lack of clear 
pronouncement from the Supreme Court of Canada, a discussion of the mature minor rule 
would not be complete without considering whether such rule includes a best interest 
requirement or not.  My view is that it does not include a best interest requirement.  There 
are three principal reasons why I have adopted this position, all of which are consistent 
with the majority’s reasoning.  
139  Manitoba Law Reform Commission, supra note 79. 
140 Joan M. Gilmour, “Death and Dying”, in Mary Jane Dykeman et al., eds., Canadian Health Law 
Practice Manual, looseleaf (Toronto:  Butterworths, 2008) 8.01 at ss. 8.52, 8.54.
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Firstly, the Court unanimously holds that some but not all children are in need of 
protection.  None of the Justices require that all minors, who are all captured under the 
definition of “child” set out in s.1(1) of the Child and Family Services Act be liable to 
have their medical treatment decisions overridden when their decision is seen as being 
against their best interests.  The difference between the majority and minority on the one 
hand and the dissent on the other is precisely who those “some” children are.  For the 
majority and minority, any minor under the age of sixteen who requires medical 
treatment to protect her life and where such treatment is in the minor’s best interest and is 
necessary to protect her life is in need of protection.141  This position is consistent with 
the protection is afforded under section 25(8) of the Child and Family Services Act.   The 
dissent, in turn, only finds that minors who are not mature minors are in need of 
protection.142  
Secondly, the court and the appropriate provincial or territorial government 
department retain the ability to override the medical treatment decisions of a minor when 
her refusal will endanger her life or health without the need to subject all minors to a best 
interest requirement.  That recourse is through child protection proceedings because when 
a minor refuses such treatment, child protection legislation generally applies.  The only 
circumstance in which it would not apply is if the specific child protection statute did not 
require that the minor’s best interest be considered, as is the case for minors over the age 
of sixteen in Manitoba.  Beyond being found to be constitutional by the majority and 
141 A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para 86. 
142 Ibid. at paras 176, 209-210.  As well, Binnie J. cites the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Van Mol (Guardian ad Litem of) v. Ashmore, supra note 95 at 75 for the proposition that at common 
law, once a minor has been found to have the requisite capacity to consent, “the decision about 
undergoing treatment, and about the form of treatment, must all take place with and be made by the 
young person whose bodily integrity is to be invaded and whose life and health will be affected by the 
outcome”.   
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minority, such an approach is also supported by the majority’s view that medical 
treatment decisions are not all created equal.  Specifically, support for the proposition 
that the welfare principle does not apply unless the minor’s life or health is in danger can 
also be found in the majority’s reasons.  Notably, Abella J. states at paragraphs 85 and 
86: 
In the vast majority of situations where the medical treatment of a 
minor is at issue, his or her life or health will not be gravely 
endangered by the outcome of any particular treatment 
decision.  That is why courts have determined that medical 
practitioners should generally be free to rely on the instructions of 
a young person who seems to demonstrate sufficient maturity to 
direct the course of his or her medical care.143  
 
Where a young person comes before the court under s. 25 of 
the Child and Family Services Act, on the other hand, it means 
that child protective services have concluded that medical 
treatment is necessary to protect his or her life or health, and 
either the child or the child’s parents have refused to consent.  In 
this very limited class of cases, it is the ineffability inherent in the 
concept of “maturity” that justifies the state’s retaining an 
overarching power to determine whether allowing the child to 
exercise his or her autonomy in a given situation actually accords 
with his or her best interests.  The degree of scrutiny will 
inevitably be most intense in cases where a treatment decision is 
likely to seriously endanger a child’s life or health.144 
 
Thirdly, the assessment of maturity is subjective and imprecise.  Abella J. herself 
acknowledges this difficulty: 
I acknowledge that because we are dealing with the inherent 
imprecision of childhood and adolescent development, maturity is 
necessarily an imprecise standard. There is no judicial divining 
rod that leads to a “eureka” moment for its discovery; it depends 
on the court’s assessment of the adolescent, his or her 
circumstances and ability to exercise independent judgment, and 
the nature and consequences of the decision at issue.  But I am 
143  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), ibid. at para. 85.  Note the use of “rely on the 
instructions of”, thereby suggesting that mature minors have the right, at common law, to consent or 
refuse medical treatment.  
144  Ibid. at para. 86. 
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nonetheless strongly of the view that in order to respect an 
adolescent’s evolving right to autonomous medical decision 
making, a thorough assessment of maturity, however difficult, is 
required in determining his or her best interests.145 
 
Given this difficulty, it seems rather nonsensical to impose a best interest requirement to 
protect minors who have not been shown to be in need of any protection.   
For these three reasons, I see no good reason why the welfare principle should be 
incorporated into the common law mature minor rule.  For similar reasons, I see no room 
for the welfare principle in the expansion of the common law mature minor rule to 
research involving minors.  More specifically, much like not all minors eligible to make 
medical treatment decisions are in need of protection, not all minors whose participation 
in a research study is sought require protection.  Research covers a broad spectrum of 
activities, some of which carry little risk while others involve greater risks.  Although 
there are no statistics available, I would suspect that relative to the total number of studies 
conducted on minors, participation is only rarely required to protect the life of a minor.  
This is because prior to getting to that point, a minor would generally have had to exhaust 
all proven treatments.  Furthermore, even where proven treatments had not been tried or 
found to be inferior, the researcher would have to think that participation in the study was 
an acceptable course of action before even proposing it to the minor.   
As well, mature minors already have the right to decline research participation.146  
This means that even where the research activities are captured under the definition of 
“treatment”, they cannot ethically be imposed on a minor.  Admittedly, the resolve to 
145  Ibid. at para. 4.  Note that the majority uses “maturity” as a measure of competence in some instances 
(as seen at para. 86) and, as seen in this paragraph, as a means of determining an individual’s best 
interest elsewhere.   Based on the criteria included in the majority’s ‘maturity assessment’, it seems that 
the latter characterization is more consistent with the majority’s overall reasoning. 
146  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at art. 3.10. 
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uphold this ethical standard has not yet been tested in the courts.  It is consequently 
possible that a court would override a minor’s refusal to participate where the activities at 
issue could be brought under ambit of the applicable child protection statute. 
It is also worth noting that the justification for the welfare principle appears to be 
largely based on the need to protect minors from improvident decisions.  In the case of 
research, I suggest that less rights-limiting protective measures are more appropriate than 
denying a mature minor her autonomy.  Such measures include the duty of researchers 
and research ethics board to ensure ethically sound recruitment practices and, as 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, ensuring that the means of communication used 
are appropriate.  Many of these alternatives also apply in the treatment context, which 
further strengthens the argument for treating minors in these two spheres in a similar 
fashion.  
Prior to concluding my discussion of the welfare principle, it is necessary to 
respond to the possible argument that the research context ought to be treated more akin 
to the child protection context than to the treatment context because the minor is exposing 
herself to risks for little or no benefit in at least some instances.  My response to this is 
quite simple:  exposure to some risk is not the same as putting one’s life in jeopardy or 
exposing oneself to severe harm.  As discussed in Chapter two, clinical trials are only 
conducted on minors once some safety data has already been accumulated, unless the 
condition cannot be studied in an older population.  Furthermore, if participating in a 
particular research study does include the possibility of death, the mere fact that 
participation is proposed as an alternative means that, as noted above, the minor has 
exhausted proven treatment. 
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(c)  The Parens Patriae Jurisdiction 
In finding that when a mature minor is less than sixteen, her treatment decision is 
not determinative but rather only part of a “best interest” analysis, the majority and 
minority recognize the courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction, which vests the court with the 
“discretion is to do what is necessary for the protection of the person for whose benefit it 
is exercised”147.  Stated differently, by leaving the determination of the mature minor’s 
best interests to the judge hearing the case (rather than to the minor or her parents), the 
discretion to override the minor’s decision remains with the court.  Conversely, had 
Binnie J.’s view that in order to be constitutional, mature minors had to be able to rebut 
the presumption of incapacity and be permitted to consent to and refuse all medical 
treatment, courts would have relinquished their parens patriae jurisdiction with respect to 
treatment decisions made by mature minors.  In my view and as explained more fully 
below, the latter would have been more consistent with the raison d’être of the parens 
patriae jurisdiction – that being the protection of those who need protection.148     
Before carrying out a more probing examination into the parens patriae 
jurisdiction than that provided to us by either the majority or minority, it is necessary to 
comment a little further on how the majority and minority apply the parens patriae 
jurisdiction.  Much like the welfare principle, the majority and minority focus little 
attention on how the jurisdiction has been applied by Canadian courts before they use it 
to justify, as the majority describes it, the “sliding scale of scrutiny”149 with respect to the 
decision-making of minors under the age of sixteen.  The majority does, however, note 
147  E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388 at para. 77. 
148  Ibid. at para. 73.  Although being unable to care for oneself encompasses more than an individual’s 
capacity, for purposes of the present discussion, my comments are directed at a lack of capacity. 
149  Supra note 65 at para. 22. 
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that in the United Kingdom as well as in Australia, courts have relied on the parens 
patriae jurisdiction to override medical treatment decision of a mature minor where such 
treatment is in the mature minor’s best interest.150   
How did the Supreme Court of Canada define and apply the parens patriae 
jurisdiction in earlier cases?  The Court first commented on it in the 1986 seminal case of 
E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, where it stated that the parens patriae jurisdiction is “founded on 
necessity, namely the need to act for the protection of those who cannot care for 
themselves”.151  The constraints on the applicability of the jurisdiction were then made 
more explicit by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the subsequent case of Fleming v. 
Reid152, where Robins J.A. made the following remarks:  
The parens patriae jurisdiction was intended to operate only 
where a person is unable to take care of himself or herself.  It 
cannot be exercised by the state to overrule a treatment decision 
made by a competent patient, who, by definition, is able to direct 
the course of his or her medical care, regardless of the fact that 
the decision may be considered by objective standards, medically 
unsound or contrary to the patient’s best interest.153   
 
 Following this line of reasoning, the majority of the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal in Walker (Litigation Guardian of) v. Region 2 Hospital Corp. held that the 
parens patriae jurisdiction of the court could not be used to override the refusal of blood 
transfusions by a fifteen year old boy suffering from acute myeloid leukemia.  The main 
thrust of Chief Justice Hoyt’s reasons was that the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court 
did not apply in the case of mature minors.  Without ruling out unequivocally that the 
150  Ibid. at paras. 56, 68. 
151  Supra note 147 at para. 73.  Although being unable to care for oneself encompasses more than an 
individual’s capacity, for purposes of the present discussion, my comments are directed at a lack of 
capacity. 
152 (1991), 82 D.L.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.). 
153  Ibid. at 315-316. 
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parens patriae jurisdiction may have some application to those under the age of sixteen, 
the Chief Justice asserted that sections 2 and 4 of the Medical Consent of Minors Act in 
New Brunswick specifically excluded the application of the court’s inherent jurisdiction 
to those between sixteen and nineteen years of age.154  In his concurring reasons, Angers 
J.A. agreed with the majority that section 2 of the Medical Consent of Minors Act 
extinguished the supervisory role of both parents and the court for minors who were 
sixteen years of age or older.155   
However, in a separate set of reasons concurring in result, Ryan J.A. reasoned that 
since the Medical Consent of Minors Act only refers to “consent to treatment” it does not 
grant mature minors the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.  As well, he also 
expressed a willingness to impose limits on the respect to human dignity owed to mature 
minors.  Specifically, despite labelling this respect as a principal of fundamental justice, it 
was his opinion that the State retained a right to intervene where the withholding of 
treatment will likely result in the “underage” patient’s death.156  This contention implies 
that the court can use its parens patriae jurisdiction where an individual under the age of 
majority, whether a mature minor or not, refuses life-sustaining treatment.  Since the boy 
in the present case’s refusal of blood transfusions was not likely to lead to his death, the 
parens patriae jurisdiction was not applicable on the facts of that particular case. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, however, reached the opposite conclusion. 
In Van Mol (Guardian ad Litem of) v. Ashmore, Huddart J.A. in his concurring reasons 
commented that “in the case of a person under 19 years of age in British Columbia, the 
154  Walker (Litigation Guardian of) v. Region 2 Hospital Corp, supra note 123 at para. 27. 
155  Ibid. at para. 36. 
156  Ibid. at paras. 59-62. 
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ultimate resort is to the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”157  However, 
no reasons were given for this holding.  As well, the majority judgment delivered by 
Lambert J.A. in that case does not so much as mention the parens patriae jurisdiction.  
Despite the lack of justification provided by Huddart J.A. or the fact that the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal’s decision was based on statutory language, the Court of 
Queen’s Bench in H.(B.) v. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare)158 stated that opposite 
conclusions had been reached by the appellate courts of New Brunswick and British 
Columbia with regards to the applicability of the parens patriae jurisdiction.  However, 
after noting these differing opinions, Kent J. declined the opportunity to add to the debate 
and did not express an opinion on the matter.159   
With the release of its decision in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family 
Services), the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that the parens patriae 
jurisdiction can be used to restrict the right of a mature minor to refuse medical treatment 
in child protection matters.  What is less certain is whether courts can use this jurisdiction 
to override a mature minor’s decision outside the child protection context.   
Contrary to the conclusion reached by LeBlanc J. in P.H. v. Eastern Regional 
Integrated Health Authority, I argue that the parens patriae jurisdiction does not apply to 
medical treatment decisions or decisions regarding research participation made by mature 
minors. My reasons for adopting this position are similar to those outlined above as to 
why the welfare principle does not form part of the common law mature minor rule.  
Those reasons will therefore not be repeated here.  Additionally, it is necessary to note 
157  Supra note 95 at para. 143. 
158  2002 ABQB 371, 3 Alta. L.R. (4th) 16, aff’d 2002 ABCA 109, [2002] 7 W.W.R. 644. [H.(B.) v. Alberta 
(Director of Child Welfare) No. 2 cited to Alta. L.R.].  
159  Ibid. at paras. 30-33. 
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that finding that the welfare principle does not apply at common law but then preserving 
the parens patriae jurisdiction would amount to allowing a best interest requirement that 
I have disallowed through the front door to come in through the back door.   
(iv) The Maturity Assessment 
Despite opting not to rule on A.C.’s capacity to refuse blood transfusions, the 
majority does provide a list of considerations that could be included in the “careful and 
sophisticated analysis of the young person’s ability to exercise mature, independent 
judgment”160 that should be carried out.  Notably, possible considerations include: 
• What is the nature, purpose and utility of the recommended 
medical treatment?  What are the risks and benefits?   
• Does the adolescent demonstrate the intellectual capacity and 
sophistication to understand the information relevant to 
making the decision and to appreciate the potential 
consequences? 
• Is there reason to believe that the adolescent’s views are stable 
and a true reflection of his or her core values and beliefs? 
• What is the potential impact of the adolescent’s lifestyle, 
family relationships and broader social affiliations on his or 
her ability to exercise independent judgment? 
• Are there any existing emotional or psychiatric vulnerabilities? 
• Does the adolescent’s illness or condition have an impact on 
his or her decision-making ability?  
• Is there any relevant information from adults who know the 
adolescent, like teachers or doctors?161 
 
Before discussing each of these “considerations” individually, it is necessary to 
provide some context.  Firstly, these “considerations” appear under the heading 
“Interpreting Best Interests”.  Secondly, they come after the majority’s comments 
regarding the need to consider a minor’s best interests in the “very limited class of 
160  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para. 87.
161  Ibid. at para. 96. 
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cases”162 involving child protection proceedings.  Taken together, these contextual points 
suggest that the maturity assessment only needs to be carried out in child protection 
matters and in situations where the applicable legislation only authorizes minors to 
consent to treatment that is in their best interests.  It may be that in other instances where 
there are serious consequences at play, a minor’s refusal of treatment (or research 
participation where such participation is captured under the relevant child protection 
statute) may trigger the application of child protection provisions.  For reasons set out 
earlier in this chapter, it is entirely consistent with the majority’s reasons in A.C. v. 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) not to import the assessment of 
maturity into the research realm.  Thirdly, despite my position that the maturity 
assessment does not apply to research, it is nonetheless relevant to examine each of the 
“considerations” included in the maturity assessment because they could serve to inform 
the development of the capacity assessment tool that is required under the framework set 
out in Chapter 4.  With those general comments in mind, it is now possible to turn to an 
examination of each of the “considerations”. 
The first factor, described by Abella J. is “the nature, purpose and utility of the 
recommended medical treatment”163.  It is unsurprising that the nature of the decision to 
be made plays a role in evaluating the capacity of a minor to consent to or to refuse 
medical treatment.  After all, more significant treatment decisions undoubtedly require 
understanding of a more complex medical intervention as well as graver consequences.  
Similarly, more complex research protocols would demand a greater appreciation of 
precisely what participation entails, including acknowledgement of the associated risks 
162  Ibid. at para. 86. 
163  Ibid.  
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and benefits.  As well, more complex protocols would be harder to understand.  As well, 
although it may be appropriate to consider utility in the medical treatment context, it 
becomes more problematic in the research realm where some but not all activities have 
little utility to research participants.  Stated differently, the utility criterion would 
generally weigh against respecting a minor’s wishes in the research realm without 
allowing for the consideration of society’s need for research involving minors.164 
 The second consideration, being the demonstration of “the intellectual capacity 
and sophistication to understand the information relevant to making the decision and to 
appreciate the potential consequences” is merely an articulation of the common law 
mature minor rule.165  Specifically, elsewhere it has been defined as the legal concept 
whereby those under the legislated age of majority can consent to medical treatment 
when they are found to have “sufficient understanding and appreciation of the nature and 
consequences of treatment and its alternatives to be able to decide whether to proceed 
with it or not.”166  This principle applies in all common law jurisdictions in Canada, 
unless it has been modified or overridden by legislative enactments.  At first blush, it 
seems somewhat circular to include an articulation of the common law mature minor rule 
as a factor to be considered when determining if a minor has capacity (i.e. amounts to 
saying look at whether a minor has capacity when assessing capacity).  However, it is 
possible that Abella J. included this consideration to clarify that understanding the 
164 The role of minors in the research enterprise is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1. 
165 As I argue above, the common law mature minor rule does not include the welfare principle.  Prior to 
the release of the decision in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65, 
it was somewhat unclear if the welfare principle formed part of the common law mature minor rule.  
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, despite having the opportunity to clearly state that the 
welfare principle formed part of the mature minor rule, did not do so.  
166  Gilmour, “Children”, supra note 89. 
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proposed course of action and the consequences of consenting and refusing such action is 
but one factor in the determination.  
 The third factor, the stability of views and whether a decision reflects a minor’s 
true values.  This entails looking at the degree of resolve they have (and how long they 
have had it) with respect to their position.  The inquiry therefore indirectly requires a 
consideration of the minor’s age and maturity, both of which had been previously 
considered by courts.  With respect to age, courts have appeared willing to evaluate the 
capacity of children to consent to medical treatment once they reach twelve years of age, 
hence the reason why much emphasis in this thesis is on adolescence rather than 
childhood more generally.  Even where the treatment to be given is relatively common 
and poses no more than minimal risk, the courts seem unwilling to extend the mature 
minor status to younger children.167  The emphasis on age may be due to the fact that it is 
readily ascertainable, it does not require a subjective inquiry into the minor’s mind, and is 
not context-specific.  It is also used in several child protection statutes to define the role 
of minors in the decision-making process.168   Unlike age, maturity is much harder to 
assess.  In the treatment context, the requisite age and maturity to demonstrate sufficient 
understanding of what purpose the treatment will serve and what it entails is variable.  
There is no reason to believe that this would be any different in the research setting.  That 
being said, in the case of research, minors would, beyond understanding the research 
activities themselves, also have to show an understanding of which aspects of their care 
167 See e.g. Chmiliar v. Chimiliar, 2001 ABQB 525, [2001] 11 W.W.R. 386 [Chmiliar cited to W.W.R.], 
where a father brought an application for an order that his two children be vaccinated against their 
mother’s wishes, the judge hearing the case immediately deemed the 10 year old boy not to be a mature 
minor without pursuing any sort of inquiry into his capacity.  The boy’s 13 year old sister, however, 
was found to be a mature minor whose capacity to consent had been removed by the undue influence of 
her mother.
168  See discussion below under subsection IV(C) for a synopsis of the relevant portions of the child 
protection statute for each province and territory. 
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are being delivered for research purposes and which they would receive whether or not 
they participated in the particular study.     
The fourth factor labelled as “...the adolescent’s lifestyle, family relationships and 
broader social affiliations”169 by Abella J. is in part equivalent to what courts have 
historically labelled the child’s dependence on her parents or guardian.  In that regard it is 
worth noting that although living apart and being financially independent from one’s 
parents is not required under this criterion, emancipation is likely to weigh heavily in 
favour of granting mature minor status to a minor.170  But, the absence of emancipation 
will not necessarily lead to the denial of a minor’s rights.  Rather, despite the fact that no 
other possible ways of demonstrating independence have been explicitly noted in the 
jurisprudence, it would nonetheless seem that a minor’s ability to drive a motor vehicle, 
to work part-time, and to assume various responsibilities around the home would be 
worth raising in future cases.  After all, as early as 1910, courts have treated children as 
mature minors where they showed themselves to be “capable of taking care” of 
themselves and “capable of doing a man’s work.”171     
The reference to “the potential impact of...broader social affiliations” included 
within Abella J.’s fourth consideration clearly captures religious practices.  This is the 
first suggestion by any court that membership in a religious group and the effect of such 
membership on one’s views need to be considered.  One author has gone further, arguing 
that inclusion of this factor suggests that the majority questions the ability of a minor 
169  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para. 96.
170  Jeffery Wilson, Wilson on Children and the Law (Toronto:  Butterworths, 1994) at para 5.21. 
171  Booth v. Toronto General Hospital (1910), 17 O.W.R. 118 (S.C. Jud. (H.C.J.).  Although the mature 
minor rule had not been articulated at that time, the court nonetheless allowed an individual under the 
age of majority to pursue an action in negligence against a physician.
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raised by religious parents to ever be found to have the capacity for autonomous decision-
making.172     
The fifth and sixth considerations outlined by Abella J. relate to the effect the 
illness to be treated or any other unrelated condition may have on the minor’s ability to 
make autonomous decisions.  Although this was never explicitly included by other courts 
in their capacity assessments, I would suggest that it was part of the broader examination 
into the minor’s understanding of the proposed treatment.   
The last factor explicitly endorses the view that information from others is 
relevant to the capacity assessment.   Depending on how this is interpreted by the courts, 
this factor may be the most troublesome.  If it is taken to mean that physicians are to 
consider any information regarding capacity from others that is presented to them, I have 
no problem with this factor.  However, if it should be interpreted as permitting physicians 
to seek out information from others, I see this factor as highly problematic because 
essentially means according different privacy rights to an individual whose capacity is 
not yet ascertained from one who has already been found to be competent.  Competent 
individuals are entitled to expect that their privacy regarding their health status (and 
therefore any treatment they are offered) will be respected.  I see no reason why 
individuals who have not yet been found to be competent or incompetent should treated 
any differently.  Once an individual is found to lack capacity, physicians are free to 
discuss health issues and possible courses of treatment with her authorized decision 
maker (usually parents in the case of a minor).  I suspect that it is the former of the two 
172  Christopher Bird, “A.C. v. Manitoba:  Saving Pressing Questions for Later” The Court (10 July 2009), 
online:  The Court (by Osgoode Hall Law School) <http://www.thecourt.ca/2009/07/10/ac-v-manitoba-
saving-pressing-questions-for-later/>. 
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possible interpretations that will carry the day because it is doubtful that the court would 
be allowing privacy violations.     
Despite taking the time to set out some of the elements that may be included in a 
maturity assessment, Abella J. provides no guidance on how each of these factors would 
apply to a particular case because she declined the opportunity to carry out an assessment 
of A.C.’s “ability to exercise mature, independent judgment”173.  We also have been 
given no guidance from our Highest Court as to how findings pertaining to each 
consideration would be weighed collectively.   
(v) Mature Minors, Medical Treatment and the Charter 
 
(1) Application of the Charter 
The Charter applies to all government laws and actions.  It also applies to all 
bodies whose authority is derived from those laws.174   According to those criteria and 
how they have been explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in McKinney v. 
University of Guelph175, I argue that once the framework proposed in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis is incorporated into the Tri-Council Policy Statement (as is proposed it should be), 
it will attract Charter scrutiny.  There are two principal justifications for this conclusion. 
Firstly, there are the ties between the Interagency Advisory Panel on Research 
Ethics (PRE) who authored the Tri-Council Policy Statement on the one hand and the 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council on the other.  PRE 
is a body of experts that was established by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and the Natural Sciences and 
173  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para. 87.
174  Supra note 64, s. 32. 
175  [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229. 
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Engineering Research Council.  After it was prepared by PRE, each of the latter three 
entities adopted the Tri-Council Policy Statement as a means of discharging their 
legislative mandates.176  Specifically, the Introduction of the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement describes those mandates as:
The people of Canada, through Acts of Parliament,1 have created 
and funded the Agencies to promote and assist research within 
their respective legislative mandates. In discharging their 
mandates, the Agencies wish to promote research that is 
conducted according to the highest ethical standards. The 
Agencies have therefore adopted this Policy as a benchmark for 
the ethical conduct of research involving humans. As a condition 
of funding, the Agencies require that researchers and their 
institutions apply the ethical principles and the articles of this 
Policy and be guided by the application sections of the articles.177 
Secondly, the three national research agencies (i.e. the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and the Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council) act on behalf of the Federal Government.  
Specifically, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research is an agent for Her Majesty and 
acts as an adviser to the Government.  All employees as well as the Presidents of the 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research are members of the federal public service.178  The 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Natural Science and 
Engineering Research Council report to the Minister of Science, Industry and 
Technology.  They are agents for and must exercise all of their powers in the name of Her 
Majesty.  Both Councils must report annually to Parliament.179  Briefly stated, the three 
176 Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics, online:  < http://pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/panel-group/about-
apropos/reference/>.  More detailed information on PRE’s mandate and terms of reference are available 
on its website. 
177 Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at 5. 
178  Canadian Institutes of Health Research Act, S.C. 2000, c. 6, ss. 3(2), 5(e), 8, 12, 25.   
179  Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-12, ss. 4(1)(b), 15(1), 20; Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-21, ss. 14(1), 18(1); Order 
Designating the Minister of Industry, Science and Technology as Minister for Purposes of the Social 
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research councils are controlled by Government, thereby making the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement Government policy.   
In light of my conclusion that the Charter applies to the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement and my recommendation in Chapter 4 of this thesis that the framework 
proposed be incorporated into a revised version of the Tri-Council Policy Statement, it is 
necessary to examine how legislation affecting mature minors has been evaluated in light 
of the Charter.  This is accomplished in the discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) with respect to 
sections 1, 2(a), 7, and 15(1) of the Charter set out below.  Before proceeding to that 
discussion, it is necessary to note that because the rights enshrined in the Charter are 
continually evolving as well as the fact that a complex body of jurisprudence has already 
been developed, an exhaustive review of the Charter and the jurisprudence on how it 
should be interpreted will be left for another time.   
(2) Section 2(a): Religious freedom 
 
 Section 2(a) of the Charter guarantees the right to “freedom of conscience 
and religion”.180  As has been noted by at least one other author, all three sets of reasons 
provide no more than a cursory examination of the alleged violation of A.C.’s section 
2(a) right.181  The brevity of the discussion on this point can undoubtedly be partially 
attributed to the fact that the Director of Child and Family Services conceded that the 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council Act and as Appropriate Minister with Respect to the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council for Purposes of the Financial Administration Act, SI/94-18; 
Order Designating the Minister of Industry, Science and Technology as Minister for Purposes of the 
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Act and as Appropriate Minister with Respect to 
the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council for Purposes of the Financial Administration 
Act, SI/93-234.
180  Supra note 64 at s. 2(a). 
181  Shawn H.E. Harmon, “Body Blow:  Mature Minors and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in 
A.C. v. Manitoba” (2010) 4 McGill Journal of Law and Health 83 at 93.  
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legislative scheme violated section 2(a) of the Charter.182  Despite not even noting this 
concession in its reasons, the majority’s comments on this point are very brief and only 
essentially amount to saying that according a minor’s views greater weight as her 
maturity increases strikes an appropriate balance between religious rights and the need to 
protect minors.183   
  Both the dissent and the minority accept the Director of Child and Family 
Services’ concession of a section 2(a) violation.  The minority, however, finds that A.C.’s 
claims need really only be addressed under section 7:  
In this case, the s. 7 and s. 2(a) claims merge, upon close 
analysis.  Either the Charter requires that an ostensibly “mature” 
child under 16 have an unfettered right to make all medical 
treatment decisions, or it does not, regardless of the individual 
child’s motivation for refusing treatment. The fact that A.C.’s 
aversion to receiving a blood transfusion springs from religious 
conviction does not change the essential nature of the claim as 
one for absolute personal autonomy in medical decision 
making.184  
 
I question the appropriateness of the approach adopted by the minority.  
Conflating two Charter right violations into one diminishes the significance of each right, 
thereby making it easier for the state to justify the infringement.  Specifically, both 
section 2(a) and 7 Charter rights can be “constrained by law to reflect other competing 
societal interests”185.  I submit that upholding a violation of an individual’s right to 
freedom of religion and her right to liberty and security of the person under section 1 
requires more compelling reasons than actions that violate only one of these two rights.  
182  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 (Factum of the Respondent at 
para. 21).
183  Ibid. at paras. 112-113.
184  Ibid. at para. 155. 
185  Ibid. at para. 137, citing Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519. 
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This is because the cumulative effect on an individual’s constitutionally protected rights 
is greater where there are two violations.186              
(3) Section 7: Right to Liberty and Security of the Person 
 
Section 7 of the Charter states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice.”187  In order to establish a section 7 violation, an 
individual must therefore first prove that a statutory scheme deprives her of her right to 
life, liberty or security.  Thereafter, it must be proven that the deprivation is not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.     
In this case, A.C. claimed that her section 7 right to liberty and security were 
violated because the statutory scheme arbitrarily denies competent minors under the age 
of sixteen their right to autonomous decision-making by allowing a court to order 
treatment against the wishes of such minors.   
All seven of the justices hearing the case agreed that imposing medical treatment 
on an individual implicates the liberty and security interests captured under section 7 of 
the Charter.188 This is rather unsurprising given the court’s earlier pronouncement on this 
issue.  Both Abella J. and Binnie J., cite Ciarlariello v. Schacter189 in support of their 
view.  In that case, Cory J. explained: 
It should not be forgotten that every patient has a right to bodily 
integrity.  This encompasses the right to determine what medical 
procedures will be accepted and the extent to which they will be 
accepted.  Everyone has the right to decide what is to be done to 
one’s own body.  This includes the right to be free from medical 
treatment to which the individual does not consent.  This concept 
186 Admittedly, I was unable to find a reported decision in which this notion was explicitly argued.   
187  Supra note 64 at s. 7.  
188  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at paras. 101, 136, 219.
189 [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119. 
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of individual autonomy is fundamental to the common law and is 
the basis for the requirement that disclosure be made to a 
patient.  If, during the course of a medical procedure a patient 
withdraws the consent to that procedure, then the doctors must 
halt the process.  This duty to stop does no more than recognize 
every individual’s basic right to make decisions concerning his or 
her own body.190  
There was also a general consensus that the principal of fundamental justice at play in the 
case was that laws cannot be arbitrary.191   
Disagreement arises when the majority, minority and dissent apply the test for 
arbitrariness to sections 25(8) and 25(9) of the Child and Family Services Act.  In 
particular, the majority and minority define the objective of the legislative scheme very 
differently from how it is construed by the dissent.  According to the majority, the 
purpose of the Act is to protect children from harm.  Specifically, unlike competent 
adults, “those who are vulnerable” are not “entitled to independently assess and 
determine their own best interests, regardless of whether others would agree when 
evaluating the choice from an objective standpoint”.192  Similarly, McLachlin C.J. on 
behalf of the minority states that the purpose of the legislative scheme “is to balance 
society’s interest in ensuring that children receive necessary medical care on the one 
hand, with the protection of minors’ autonomy interest to the extent this can be done, on 
the other”193.   
Allowing courts to force treatment upon minors under the age of sixteen where 
such treatment is in their “best interest” while granting those over sixteen years of age the 
190  Ibid. at 135. 
191  As noted in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 at para. 131, “in 
order not to be arbitrary, the limit on life, liberty and security requires not only a theoretical connection 
between the limit and the legislative goal, but a real connection on the facts”.   
192  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para. 81.  See also paras. 31, 
104, 108 and 115.
193  Ibid. at para. 141. 
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right to autonomous decision-making is then said to be a legitimate response to the 
legislative objective and therefore not arbitrary in the eyes of the majority and minority.  
Consequently, section 25(8) and 25(9) of the Children and Family Services Act are held 
not to violate section 7 of the Charter.194  The majority does admit, however that if the 
“best interest” standard had been found to include a presumption of incapacity that was 
irrebutable (as Binnie J. finds), the impugned law would be arbitrary and therefore violate 
section 7.195  Although not acknowledged by Abella J., the majority’s interpretation of 
“best interest” was first articulated by the Alberta Court of Appeal in U.(C.)(Friend of) v. 
McGonigle six years earlier.        
Binnie J., however, holds that the objective of sections 25(8) and 25(9) is “to 
defend the “best interests” of children who cannot look after themselves and who are, 
therefore “in need of protection”.196  In his opinion, the state interest is grounded in a lack 
of capacity and so when capacity is established, there is no longer a valid state interest.  
The irrebutable presumption of incapacity that applies to all minors under the age of 
sixteen included within the legislative scheme leads to a deprivation of liberty and 
security of the person that is arbitrary and consequently not in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice.197  As a result, according to Binnie J., sections 25(8) 
and 25(9) violate section 7 of the Charter.  
 In light of the above comments, it is clear that whether the statutory scheme 
would be found to violate section 7 of the Charter depended solely on whether mature 
minors under the age of sixteen are seen as being vulnerable or not.  Binnie J. is, in my 
194  Ibid. at paras. 142-149. 
195  Ibid. at para. 107. 
196  Ibid. at para. 222.
197  Ibid. at paras. 176, 179, 207, 223. 
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opinion, correct in being critical of the majority and minority’s implicit assumption that 
all minors under the age of sixteen captured by the child protection statute are vulnerable 
and in need of protection.  As he notes at paragraph 194, the majority and minority’s 
holding that regardless of capacity, the views of a minor who is under the age of sixteen 
will not be determinative, cannot be reconciled with the Court’s earlier commentary on 
balancing autonomy against the need for protection.  Notably, in Starson v. Swayze, 
McLachlin C.J. herself remarked: 
Like understanding, appreciation does not require agreement with 
a particular conclusion, professional or otherwise.  A patient may 
look at the pros and cons of treatment and arrive at a different 
conclusion than the medical experts.  Nor does it amount to a 
“best interests” standard.  A patient who is capable has the right 
to refuse treatment, even if that treatment is, from a medical 
perspective, in his or her best interest.  It is crucial to guard 
against interpreting disagreement with a particular diagnosis or 
proposed treatment plan as itself evidence of incapacity.198   
As well, although some minors are indisputably vulnerable and in need of the 
court’s protection, the majority and minority provide no specific reason why mature 
minors under the age of sixteen are vulnerable and should therefore have their decisions 
subject to review by the courts.  Even after carrying out an independent search of the 
social science literature on the decision-making ability of adolescents, Abella J. was 
unable to point to any such evidence.199  As will be seen in the discussion on the need for 
protection in Chapter 4, it may be that Abella J. did not cite any such evidence because 
198  Supra note 126 at para. 19.  It is particularly noteworthy that in that case, the Supreme Court of Canada 
does not limit its comments to those over the age of majority; it refers to “a patient”. 
199  As reported in Cheryl L. Milne, “The Differential Treatment of Adolescents as a Principle of 
Fundamental Justice:  An Analysis of R. v. B.(D.) and C.(A.) v. Manitoba” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 235 
at 249 in footnote 56, only approximately 15% of the secondary sources cited by the majority were cited 
in the facta of any of the parties or intervenors.  This point is also taken up by Binnie J. at para. 232 
where he notes that the Attorney General of Manitoba chose not to lead any evidence on “the state 
interest in subjecting the medical treatment of minors under 16 to judicial control irrespective of 
capacity” [emphasis in original].  
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the literature supports the opposite conclusion; that being that there is no difference in 
decision-making capacity between older adolescents and young adults.  
(4) Section 15: Right to Equality 
 
Section 15(1) of the Charter guarantees that “every individual is equal before and 
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national 
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”200  The two-
part test to determine if there is a section 15(1) violation was recently restated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Kapp201 as: “(1) does the law create a distinction based 
on an enumerated or analogous ground? and (2) does the distinction create a disadvantage 
by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?”202 
The majority held that there was no discrimination on the basis of age because the 
legislation allowed those under the age of sixteen to rebut the presumption that they 
lacked sufficient maturity to participate in medical treatment decisions.  By defining the 
presumption at play as being rebuttable, the majority was then able to say the distinction 
drawn by the legislation was ultimately based on maturity not age.203  This is a highly 
dubious conclusion given that the Attorney General of Manitoba had itself conceded that 
the legislative scheme imposed differential treatment on the basis of age (it then denied 
that such treatment was discriminatory).204   
The minority, however, agreed with A.C. and the Attorney General of Manitoba 
that the legislation made a distinction on the basis of age but then went on to find that the 
200  Supra note 64 at s. 15(1). 
201  2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 [cited to S.C.R.]. 
202  Ibid. at para. 17. 
203  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at paras. 110-111.
204  Ibid. (Factum of the Intervener Attorney General of Manitoba at para. 37).
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distinction is ameliorative and therefore not discriminatory.  It is said to be ameliorative 
because it (1) protects the interests of minors as a vulnerable group and (2) ensures that 
individual minors have input into treatment decisions.205  McLachlin C.J. on behalf of the 
minority also points to the fact that age is used in other contexts to distinguish between 
which minors will be accorded certain rights.206  The flaw with this reasoning is similar to 
that levelled by me against the majority and minority’s reasoning with respect to section 
7 above.  Notably, it assumes vulnerability where there may not be any.207  It also affords 
some minors “input” when were it not for this distinction on the basis of age they would 
be the sole decision-maker.  
The dissent declined the opportunity to carry out a section 15(1) analysis; instead 
choosing to consider A.C.’s argument on this point as part of her rebuttal to the 
government’s section 1 justification.  The reason given for this approach is that 
differential treatment on the basis of age is not A.C.’s pre-eminent concern with the 
legislative scheme.  She is said to be more concerned with her rights under sections 2(a) 
and 7 of the Charter.208         
(5) Section 1: Justifying Charter Violations 
 
 Any Charter violation must be justified by the state under section 1, which 
“guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in [the Charter] subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
205  Ibid. at para. 152. 
206  Ibid. at para. 145. 
207 If the legislature’s intent was to discern between those minors who are vulnerable and those who are not, 
it could have required an individualized capacity (or maturity) assessment for all “children”, regardless 
of age.  Instead, by including an age in the scheme, the legislature assumed that all minors under the age 
of sixteen captured by the act are vulnerable and need to be treated differently from those who are over 
sixteen years of age. 
208  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at para. 231.
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democratic society.”209  The test from R. v. Oakes210 to be applied by the courts was 
succinctly described by Deschamps J. at para. 48 in Egan v. Canada211:  
First, the objective of the legislation must be pressing and 
substantial. Second, the means chosen to attain this legislative end 
must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society. In order to satisfy the second requirement, 
three criteria must be satisfied: (1) the rights violation must be 
rationally connected to the aim of the legislation; (2) the 
impugned provision must minimally impair the Charter 
guarantee; and (3) there must be a proportionality between the 
effect of the measure and its objective so that the attainment of 
the legislative goal is not outweighed by the abridgement of the 
right. In all s. 1 cases the burden of proof is with the government 
to show on a balance of probabilities that the violation is 
justifiable.212 
On the facts of A.C. v. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), the 
majority found that the legislative scheme at issue did not violate sections 2(a), 7, and 15 
of the Charter and so did not carry out a section 1 analysis. The minority, having found a 
section 2(a) violation needed to consider if that violation could be saved under section 1.  
McLachlin C.J.’s reasons, however, merely state that the breach is justified under section 
1 for the same reasons that the laws were not arbitrary under section 7.213   
The only thorough section 1 analysis is carried by Binnie J., who had earlier 
found violations of sections 2(a) and 7.  He found that the first step of the Oakes test was 
met; the care and protection of children was a pressing and substantial objective.  He then 
went on to find that the Charter violations could not be saved because there was no 
rational connection between the scheme and the objective.  Specifically, denying minors 
under the age of sixteen the opportunity to rebut the presumption of incapacity was 
209  Supra note 64, s. 1. 
210  [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
211  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
212  Ibid. at para. 48. 
A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at 156.
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“arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations”214.  He also found that the use of 
an irrebutable presumption was not minimally impairing.  In this respect, Binnie J. 
pointed to the fact that section 4(2) of the The Health Care Directives Act215 allows 
minors under the age of sixteen to rebut the presumption of incapacity.216           
(vi) Application of the Reasoning to A.C.  
 
 By the time the Supreme Court of Canada heard the case, the issue insofar as A.C. 
was concerned was moot; blood transfusions had already been forced upon her.  
However, given the amount of time it takes for a case to reach our Highest Court and the 
urgency of situations where the state wants to apprehend children and force care upon 
them, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court of Canada would ever get to review a decision 
before irreversible action was taken.  The Court nonetheless seized the opportunity to 
articulate how minors in the child protection contexts should be treated with respect to 
autonomous medical decision-making. 
The majority and the minority both explicitly declined the opportunity to 
determine if A.C. herself was sufficiently competent to refuse blood transfusions, citing 
the lack of record from the lower courts on this point.217  The minority also concludes 
that it was reasonable for the applications judge to assume capacity but notes that if 
possible, it would be preferable in future cases for the judge to outline the reasons he or 
she relies upon to determine the minor’s best interests.218  The problem with this is that 
since time and circumstances do not always permit a judge to give reasons, I am left 
214  R. v. Oakes, supra note 210 at para. 70. 
215  C.C.S.M. c. H27. 
216  A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65 at paras. 209-211, 221-223, 
232-237.
217  Ibid. at paras. 119-120, 157-158.  
218  Ibid. at para. 159. 
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wondering how likely it is that time and circumstances would ever allow for “the careful 
and sophisticated analysis”219 of the minor’s capacity proposed by the majority and 
minority.  As well, how can the court know that the applications judge properly 
determined A.C.’s best interest if the only evidence before the Court was that A.C. had 
refused blood transfusions?  
The Court was unanimous that A.C. should be awarded her costs, something that 
is generally awarded to the successful party.220 For the dissent, although not explicitly 
stated by Binnie J., this was likely simply the result of A.C. having been the successful 
litigant.  The majority justified this decision on the basis that A.C. had successfully 
argued that the legislative scheme should be interpreted so as to allow “an adolescent 
under the age of 16 to demonstrate sufficient maturity to have a particular medical 
treatment decision respected”221.   
So, ultimately this decision means that if A.C. had been fourteen months older at 
the time she was admitted to the hospital, her refusal of the blood transfusions would 
likely have been upheld.  Instead, she received blood transfusions she did not want and 
then spent the next three years fighting for greater recognition of the autonomy right of 
minors, for which she received money to cover part of her legal costs.  Bluntly stated, 
such a result is unlikely to encourage other minors to take up the fight for their own rights 
in the future. 
 
 
219  Ibid. at para. 87. 
220  Ibid. at paras. 121, 161, 239. 
221  Ibid. at para. 121. 
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(vii) Application of the Reasoning to the Research Context 
 
When the governing law is the common law, there is nothing in the reasons of any 
of the justices to suggest that mature minors can only consent to research participation 
where such participation is in their best interests.  That is, in those circumstances it would 
seem entirely reasonable to expect that if a minor can demonstrate that she has capacity 
and meets the other requirements for providing legally valid consent, her consent is both 
necessary and sufficient.  As will be seen in the discussion that follows, however, when 
research activities are captured by either consent to treatment legislation or child 
protection legislation, there may be limits on a mature minor’s right to autonomous 
decision-making.  Specifically, in those contexts, a best interest requirement sometimes 
applies.   
IV. PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
The discussion in this chapter to date has set out the relevant international and 
national legal instruments that impact the participation of minors in medical research 
throughout Canada.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in A.C. v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services) and other relevant jurisprudence has also been 
explained.  Together, these instruments and court decisions all set out general parameters 
on pediatric medical treatment and research, while also attempting to ensure some degree 
of consistency across jurisdictions.  However, provincial jurisdiction over the 
“establishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals, asylums, charities and 
eleemosynary institutions”222 and “property and civil rights”223 has meant that mature 
222 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s.92(7), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, s. 
92(7). 
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minors residing in different provinces and territories are not necessarily accorded the 
same rights with respect to consenting to or refusing medical treatment.  This inter-
jurisdictional variability likely also extends to medical research.  The discussion below 
explores how the common law mature minor concept has been varied through two forms 
of legislation:  consent to treatment legislation and child protection legislation.  
Thereafter, the regime in place in Quebec is appraised.   
A. Legislation Generally 
 
Despite the need for a test that can be adapted to various settings and 
circumstances, through legislative enactments many provincial and territorial 
jurisdictions have opted to eliminate some of the discretion bestowed upon the courts 
while others have altered the parameters of the capacity assessment.  The two general 
types of legislation – consent to treatment legislation and child protection legislation – 
used to these ends must be considered in order to understand the complex legal regime 
that regulates the rights of children.   
Prior to reviewing each of these types of legislation, it is worth noting that 
provincial/territorial legislation is not a panacea for all the weaknesses of the common 
law mature minor rule.  At the provincial/territorial level, legislation creates greater 
certainty, a value that is arguably even more important when those required to carry out 
the activities in question are not legal minds.  But, however advantageous this certainty 
may be for some, it comes at a price for others.  In the case of medical research involving 
mature minors, legislative enactments support the rights of some minors, arguably reject 
the existence of the rights of other minors, and remain entirely silent on the rights of yet 
223 Ibid., s. 92(13).
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another group of minors.  This is not a bad thing so long as legislators who choose to 
legislate in this sphere get the balance right.  However, it becomes problematic when 
there is no legally and ethically defensible basis to deny an individual’s rights.  At the 
national level, provincial/territorial legislation can potentially, and as you see with child 
protection and consent to treatment legislation, does, lead to minors having different 
autonomy rights depending on their province of residence.  I recognize that adults and 
children are sometimes treated differently under different provincial and territorial 
statutes.224  There are likely many reasons for this differential treatment, including a 
temporal component.  Not all statutes were enacted in and around the same time nor is 
there political will to revise a given statute in every jurisdiction during the same limited 
period of time.  In the case of the role of mature minors in the research process, we have 
essentially a blank slate.  There is no legislation governing procedure, thereby affording 
us the best opportunity possible to treat like cases alike.  Stated differently, there is 
nothing precluding the design of a framework to govern the role to be played by minors 
in the consent process that mandates the same procedural treatment for all minors despite 
the variation in legislative enactments across the country.225  With this backdrop in mind, 
it is now possible to examine the various statutes that have been enacted.  
B. Consent to Treatment Legislation  
 
Some provinces have legislated with respect to the right of minors to consent to 
treatment.  Interestingly, the language used in each of these statutes differs somewhat, 
224  Note that adults and minors are not always treated substantially differently.  For example, all 
individuals aged 18 or 19 years of age in Canada have the right to vote. 
225  Some may argue that there is nothing stopping legislatures from designing uniform frameworks in 
contexts where there is presently great variation.  Although this is theoretically true, practically 
speaking I think it is far less likely to happen because opinions and positions have already been 
formulated in those other contexts.   
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thereby creating a continuum as to the statutory right of children to consent to medical 
treatment and research.  At one end, there are those jurisdictions that have not legislated 
in this sphere whatsoever.  These are Alberta, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut.  
Moving away from this complete void of legislative intervention, there are the remaining 
provinces and territories, all of which have instituted a regime whereby the rights of 
minors to consent to treatment are recognized in varying degrees.  The latter category 
includes British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Yukon.  The 
statutory enactments in each common law jurisdiction are discussed below.  Given the 
vastly different legal regime in Quebec, the specific statutory provisions contained within 
the Civil Code of Québec are set out in section D below.  After reviewing the statutes by 
jurisdiction, the implications for research flowing from these statutes are discussed.     
(i) British Columbia 
Under the auspices of the Infants Act, a minor can consent to “health care” when a 
health care provider “(a) has explained to the infant and has been satisfied that the infant 
understands the nature and consequences and the reasonably foreseeable benefits and 
risks of the health care, and (b) has made reasonable efforts to determine and has 
concluded that the health care is in the infant's best interests.”226  Unlike New 
Brunswick’s Medical Consent of Minors Act and Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act227, 
the Infants Act does not limit the age at which a minor can give his consent.  However, 
because of the “best interest” requirement the right of minors in British Columbia to 
226  Supra note 29, s. 17(2)-(3). 
227  S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. 
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autonomous decision-making with respect to “health care” under the Infants Act is likely 
more restricted than it would be at common law.228 
Section 17 of the Infants Act defines “health care” as “anything that is done for a 
therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health related purpose, 
and includes a course of health care”.229  The definition does not require that the primary 
justification for subjecting a minor to a particular intervention be to better the minor’s 
health; only that one reason for the intervention be for a “health related purpose”.  The 
use of such a broad phrase clearly captures some research, but not all.  Specifically, most 
research carried out on healthy subjects is not likely to be captured because by definition, 
healthy subjects do not require any action by physicians/researchers to improve or 
prevent the deterioration of their state of health.  As well, research that is of no direct 
benefit to participants is unlikely to be captured because in that circumstance, nothing is 
done to the participant for a purpose related to her health.  However, some individuals 
agree to participate in research because they hope that the investigational product will be 
of some benefit to them. Although the primary purpose of the research would be extend 
knowledge through a disciplined inquiry or systematic investigation”230, the secondary 
purpose could be anything from hoping for an improvement in their health condition, 
hoping to stop a further deterioration of their health status, or hoping to learn more about 
their health impediment.  Stated differently, individuals with such hopeful aspirations can 
228  The phrase “likely more restricted” is used because the possibility that the Supreme Court of Canada 
added a “best interest” criterion to the common law mature minor rule in its decision in A.C. v. 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65, cannot be definitively ruled out at 
this time.  For reasons set out in section III(A)(iii) above, I am of the opinion that the common law 
mature minor rule has not been altered in that way.
229 Infants Act, supra note 29, s. 17(1).  Compare to section 1 of Yukon’s Care Consent Act, being Schedule 
B to Decision Making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, S.Y. 2003, c. 21, which defines health care 
in the same way and to section 1 of Manitoba’s The Health Care Directives Act, supra note 215, which 
defines “treatment” in the same way. 
230  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at art 2.1.   
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be said to enrol in research for a health related purpose.  The ability of minors to provide 
legally valid consent in those instances will therefore be governed by the Infants Act.   
(ii) Alberta 
 There is no legislation regarding the ability of minors to consent to medical 
treatment currently in force in Alberta.  Consequently, until they reach eighteen years of 
age, that being the age of majority in that province, the rights of minors in this regard are 
defined by the common law mature minor rule.231 
(iii) Saskatchewan 
 Saskatchewan does not have legislation that specifically addresses consent to 
treatment by minors.  However, the province’s The Health Care Directives and Substitute 
Health Care Decision Makers Act232 does permit individuals who are sixteen years of age 
and older and have “capacity to make health care decisions” to make a health care 
directive. Under The Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care Decision 
Makers Act, “health care decision” includes the affirmative and negative rights of 
consenting to and refusing treatment.233  Saskatchewan’s Act also defines “capacity” in 
much the same way as the common law mature minor rule has been characterized in that 
it requires an understanding of the relevant information, an appreciation of the 
consequences of treatment and non-treatment, and an ability to communicate one’s 
wishes.234   
231  Age of Majority Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-6, s. 1 [Age of Majority Act (Alberta)]. 
232  S.S. 1997, c. H0.001. 
233  Ibid., s. 2(1)(d), 3. 
234  Ibid., s. 2(1)(b).  Compare to Gilmour, “Children”, supra note 89, who defines the mature minor rule as 
requiring “sufficient understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences of treatment and its 
alternatives to be able to decide whether to proceed with it or not.” 
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 As a whole, The Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care Decision 
Makers Act does not affect the ability of minors to consent to medical treatment under the 
common law mature minor rule.  It affords mature minors does not require a mature 
minor’s best interests to be considered, grants mature minors the same right as that which 
I have argued earlier in this chapter they would possess at common law following the 
decision in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) because it does not 
require the minor’s best interests to be considered.  It may in fact grant minors more 
expansive rights than those they hold at common law in that it explicitly bestows upon 
minors the right to refuse medical treatment.235     
(iv) Manitoba 
Under Manitoba’s The Health Care Directives Act, minors who are sixteen years 
of age and older are presumed competent to make health care decisions while those less 
than sixteen are presumed incompetent.  Both of these presumptions are rebuttable and 
apply to both consenting to treatment as well as refusing treatment.236  “Treatment” is in 
turn defined in The Health Care Directives Act in nearly the exact same manner as 
“health care” is defined under British Columbia’s Infants Act and Yukon’s Care Consent 
Act and how “treatment” is defined under Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act.  
Specifically, under the Manitoba statute, “treatment” is said to be “anything that is done 
235  The debate as to whether mature minors can refuse treatment has not been discussed in any great detail 
in this thesis because, in the case of research, the right to refuse is well-established.  Readers should 
nonetheless be aware that there is some uncertainty as to whether a mature minor can refuse treatment.  
If the treatment is life-saving, child protection statutes are often triggered. 
236  Supra note 215, ss. 1, 4(2).  
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for a therapeutic, preventative, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related 
purpose, and includes a course of treatment.”237   
(v) Ontario 
Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act presumes all persons competent unless there 
are reasonable grounds to believe otherwise.238  It also explicitly requires that the 
treatment decisions of a capable person over the age of sixteen be respected.239  The Act 
defines “capacity” as being “able to understand the information that is relevant to making 
a decision about the treatment... and able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of a decision or lack of decision.”240  Whether merely unintended 
consequences of a legislative enactment not directed solely at minors or not, Ontario’s 
Health Care Consent Act makes it easier for all minors to consent to their own medical 
treatment in that they do not need to establish their capacity.   
The Health Care Consent Act defines “treatment” in a similar way to the 
definitions of “health care” in British Columbia’s Infants Act and Yukon’s Care Consent 
Act and of “treatment” in Manitoba’s The Health Care Directives Act.241  The only 
237  Ibid., s. 1.  Compare to Infants Act, supra note 29, s. 17(1), Care Consent Act, supra note 229, s. 1, and 
Health Care Consent Act, supra note 227, s. 2(1). 
238  Supra note 227, ss. 4(2)-(3). 
239  Ibid., s. 1(c)(iii). 
240  Ibid., s. 4(1). 
241  Ibid., s. 2(1) where “treatment” is defined as: 
anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or 
other health-related purpose, and includes a course of treatment, plan of treatment or 
community treatment plan, but does not include, 
(a) the assessment for the purpose of this Act of a person’s capacity with respect to a 
treatment, admission to a care facility or a personal assistance service, the assessment 
for the purpose of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 of a person’s capacity to manage 
property or a person’s capacity for personal care, or the assessment of a person’s 
capacity for any other purpose, 
(b) the assessment or examination of a person to determine the general nature of the 
person’s condition, 
(c) the taking of a person’s health history, 
(d) the communication of an assessment or diagnosis, 
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noteworthy difference in this regard is that the Ontario statute specifically excludes 
anything that “poses little or no risk of harm” from the definition of treatment.242  Even if 
it could be successfully argued that a minimal risk research study was “treatment” (which 
I think it cannot), all minimal risk research is explicitly excluded from the reaches of the 
Act.  As well, the Health Care Consent Act does not affect the law on anything excluded 
from the definition of “treatment”.243  This means that research not captured under the 
Act (which I argue is those same categories not captured under British Columbia’s 
Infants Act set out above plus minimal risk research) could still be subject to the common 
law mature minor rule, if the latter was found to apply to the research context.   
(vi) New Brunswick 
Under New Brunswick’s Medical Consent of Minors Act all minors who are 
sixteen years or older are presumed competent.  Those minors under sixteen can provide 
legally valid consent to treatment where she understands the nature and consequences of 
the proposed treatment and the treatment at issue is in the minor’s best interest.244 The 
Act defines “medical treatment” as including: 
(e) surgical and dental treatment, 
(f) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of diagnosis, 
(g) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of preventing any 
disease or ailment, and 
(h) any procedure that is ancillary to any treatment as it applies 
to that treatment.245 
 
(e) the admission of a person to a hospital or other facility, 
(f) a personal assistance service, 
(g) a treatment that in the circumstances poses little or no risk of harm to the person, 
(h) anything prescribed by the regulations as not constituting treatment. 
242  Ibid. 
243  Ibid., s. 8(2). 
244  Supra note 27, s. 3(1). 
245  Ibid., s. 1. 
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Looking more closely at each component of the definition, research would not be 
captured under (a) because research and treatment are distinct activities.  Under (b), I 
argue that no research is again captured because in studies involving an experimental 
diagnostic test, the participant would nonetheless also have to undergo some other 
established test or procedure to allow researchers to determine if the experimental test 
was rendering the proper diagnosis.246  Given those circumstances, only the use of the 
established test is for “the purpose of diagnosis”.  Unlike under (a) and (b), (c) captures 
some research activities, such as experimental vaccine studies.247  Considering the 
breadth of medical research activities, the fact that only those aimed at preventing a 
disease or ailment are captured under the Medical Consent of Minors Act means that any 
right to autonomous decision-making with respect to other research held by minors 
residing in New Brunswick is subject to the common law mature minor rule. 
(vii) Nova Scotia 
The Hospitals Act248 has essentially codified the common law mature minor rule.  
Specifically, under the Act all minors are presumed incompetent but must have their 
capacity assessed by the treating physician or “other suitable health professional 
determined by the hospital” before treatment is administered.249  Although the Hospitals 
246 There needs to be some way of determining if the experimental test is accurate, whether that be by 
comparing results to those obtained using another diagnostic test or carrying out a procedure to 
otherwise confirm the diagnosis.    
247  In experimental vaccine trials, researchers generally give a large number of health participants a vaccine 
and then periodically evaluate what proportion of those individuals who received the vaccine go on to 
develop the condition it was aimed to prevent.  That result is then compared to the incident of the 
condition in the normal population or in a group who received a different vaccine, or both. 
248 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208.  As a result of the Hospitals Approvals Regulations, N.S. Reg. 212/2003, the 
Hospitals Act applies to the IWK Health Centre, the children’s hospital in Halifax.  As such, although 
the Hospitals Act does not explicitly mention minors, it clearly applies to individuals under the age of 
majority. 
249  Hospitals Act, ibid. at s. 2A(b), 54(1). 
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Act does not define “treatment”, it does explicitly state the criteria to be included when 
evaluating a patient’s capacity.  Notably, the assessor is required to: 
consider whether the person understands and appreciates 
(a) the condition for which the specific treatment is proposed; 
(b) the nature and purpose of the specific treatment; 
(c) the risks and benefits involved in undergoing the specific 
treatment; and 
(d) the risks and benefits involved in not undergoing the specific 
treatment.250 
 
After the assessment of capacity has been completed, the assessor is required to complete 
a “declaration of capacity”251.  It is only if this declaration indicates that an individual 
lacks capacity that consent can be sought from a third party, such as a parent.252  It is also 
worth noting that under the Hospitals Act, if a minor’s capacity is not assessed prior to 
obtaining consent to treatment from her or her parent(s), she is presumed to have been 
competent.  This means that if consent is obtained from a parent before a declaration of 
capacity indicating that the minor is incapable is completed, that minor would be able to 
bring an action for battery.   
In addition to the Hospitals Act, on April 1, 2010 the Personal Directives Act253 
came into force in Nova Scotia.  Under the Act “a person with capacity may make a 
personal directive (a) setting out instructions or an expression of the maker’s values, 
beliefs and wishes about future personal care decisions to be made on his or her 
behalf...”254  Capacity is defined as “the ability to “understand information that is relevant 
to the making of a personal-care decision and the ability to appreciate the reasonably 
250  Ibid. at s. 52(2A). 
251  Ibid. at s. 53(1). 
252  Ibid. at s. 54(2). 
253  S.N.S. 2008, c. 8.  This Act replaced the Medical Consent Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 279, which applied 
only to those over the age of majority. 
254  Personal Directives Act, ibid., s. 3(1)(a). 
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foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of a decision”255.  The Personal Directives 
Act does not stipulate a minimum age at which capacity will be presumed nor does it 
preclude minors from making personal directives prior to reaching a certain age.   
 Based on the contents of the Act and the omissions noted above, the Personal 
Directives Act should be seen as a clear endorsement of the mature minor rule at common 
law.  This view is further supported by the fact that, if a minor can specify how she would 
like future health care decisions to be handled, she must necessarily be able to make 
present day decisions.
(viii)  Prince Edward Island 
 Prince Edward Island’s Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act256 
contains a rebuttable presumption whereby every person regardless of age is presumed 
capable of consenting to or refusing medical treatment.257  “Treatment” is defined, in 
part, as “a procedure or set of procedures that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, 
palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related purpose, and includes a course of 
treatment or group of associated treatments...”258  Consent to treatment or refusal to 
consent can be based “on any grounds, including moral or religious grounds, even if the 
refusal will result in death”259.  This statute along with Yukon’s Care Consent Act offer 
mature minors the greatest opportunity to have their rights recognized and respected 
because it contains no age threshold and no best interest requirement.   
255  Ibid., s. 2(a). 
256  R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-17.2. 
257  Ibid., s. 3. 
258  Ibid., s. 1(p).  Compare to Infants Act, supra note 29, s. 17(1), Care Consent Act, supra note 229, s. 1, 
The Health Care Directives Act, supra 215, s. 1, and Health Care Consent Act, supra note 227, s. 2(1), 
which all have similar definitions. 
259  Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, ibid., s. 4. 
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(ix)  Newfoundland and Labrador 
 With the exception of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act,260 which is 
discussed under the child protection legislation section below, the only statute that speaks 
to the ability of minors to consent to medical treatment that is currently in force in 
Newfoundland is the Advance Health Care Directives Act.261  It presumes (though the 
presumption is rebuttable) anyone who is sixteen years of age or older “to be competent 
to make health care decisions”.262  “Health care decision” is in turn defined as “a consent, 
refusal to consent, or withdrawal of consent of any care, treatment, service, medication, 
or procedure to maintain, diagnose, treat, or provide for an individual's physical or mental 
health or personal care...”263  The Advance Health Care Directives Act benefits minors 
over the age of sixteen in that they are presumed competent to consent while still 
affording younger minors the opportunity to prove that they have decision-making 
capacity.  
(x)  Yukon 
Under the Yukon’s Care Consent Act, minors and adults alike can consent or 
refuse health care if the individual understands “(i) the reason or reasons why the care is 
proposed, (ii) the nature of the proposed care, (iii) the risks and benefits of receiving and 
not receiving the proposed care that a reasonable person would expect to be told about, 
and (iv) alternative courses of care.”  Some understanding of their present condition must 
260  S.N.L. 1998, c. C-12.1. 
261  It is worth noting that the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Newfoundland and Labrador does 
provide physicians some guidance on how to interpret the common law mature minor rule by way of its 
“Guideline – Consent to Medical Treatment of Minors”, which can be found on its website at 
<http://www.cpsnl.ca/default.asp?com=Policies&m=359&y=&id=11>. 
262  Supra note 130, s. 7(b). 
263  Ibid., s. 2(b). 
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also be demonstrated.264  These criteria are similar but not as exhaustive as those set out 
by Abella J. in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services).265  Whereas the 
common law mature minor rule and other consent to treatment legislation are silent, the 
Care Consent Act specifically states that it is the care provider who is proposing to 
provide care that determines whether or not an individual has the requisite capacity.266    
The Care Consent Act defines “health care” as “anything that is done for a 
therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health related purpose, 
and includes a course of health care”.267  This definition is similar to the definition of 
“health care” included within British Columbia’s Infants Act and the definition of 
“treatment” in Manitoba’s The Health Care Directives Act and Prince Edward Island’s 
Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act.268 
Read together, the provisions of the Care Consent Act mean that once found to be 
capable of consenting or refusing care, a minor residing in Yukon has the right to do so 
“on any grounds, including moral or religious grounds, even if the refusal will result in 
death.”  She also acquires the right to choose between forms of care available.269  
Implicitly, this means that under the Care Consent Act, minors can consent to or refuse 
care that is not in their “best interest.”  As seen below, however, these rights may be 
curtailed somewhat under the Child and Family Services Act270, which deems the “best 
interests” of minors to be the paramount consideration under that statute.271 
264  Care Consent Act, supra note 229, ss. 5(e), 6(2). 
265  See supra note 65 at para. 96. 
266  Care Consent Act, supra note 229, s. 6(1). 
267  Ibid., s. 1. 
268  Infants Act, supra note 29, s. 17(1); The Health Care Directives Act, supra note 215, s. 1; Consent to 
Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, supra note 256, s. 1(p). 
269  Care Consent Act, supra note 229, ss. 3(a)-(b). 
270  S.Y. 2008, c. 1 [Child and Family Services Act (Yukon)]. 
271  Ibid., s. 2. 
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(xi)  Northwest Territories and Nunavut 
 The Northwest Territories and Nunavut do not have any laws that alter or displace 
the common law mature minor rule.  Stated differently, until reaching nineteen years of 
age, minors residing in either of these two territories are presumed to lack the requisite 
capacity for autonomous decision-making.272   
(xii) Implications for Research 
The review of the provincial and territorial statutes that abolish, modify, or codify 
the common law mature minor rule set out above reveals how differently mature minors 
are treated across the country.  There are those jurisdictions – Alberta, Northwest 
Territories, and Nunavut – that have not legislated in relation to consent to medical care 
by minors at all, meaning that the common law mature minor rule is unchanged.  
Amongst those remaining provinces and territories that have legislated with respect to 
consent to medical treatment by minors, variation is seen in three key elements of the 
statutory schemes.   
Firstly, age is used by some provinces and territories.  Specifically, in one 
jurisdiction – Saskatchewan – minors who are over the age of sixteen have capacity to 
consent to medical care.  There are then a number of jurisdictions – Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador – that presume minors who are sixteen 
years and older to be competent.  Finally, there are jurisdictions – British Columbia, 
Ontario, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Yukon – that require an individualized 
assessment of capacity rather than using age to delineate rights.    
272  Age of Majority Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. A-2, s. 2; Age of Majority Act, R.S.N.W.T. (Nu.) 1988, c. A-
2, s. 2 [Age of Majority Act (Nu)].  
87
Secondly, two jurisdictions – British Columbia and New Brunswick – only permit 
minors to consent to treatment that is in their best interests, thereby explicitly 
incorporating the welfare principle into their respective statutory schemes.  This means, 
however, that seven common law jurisdictions have expressly chosen not to impose a 
statutory best interest requirement and a further three others may or may not include the 
welfare principle under the common law mature minor rule.273  So, in the majority of 
provinces and territories, the welfare principle does not apply to medical decision-making 
by minors in circumstances where only consent to treatment legislation applies.  If child 
protection legislation is triggered, even if there is no requirement to consider the minor’s 
best interest under consent to treatment legislation (or at common law where no consent 
to treatment legislation exists or applies), however, best interest must be considered.274   
Consequently, in the case of research activities captured under consent to treatment 
legislation, minors have the same right to autonomous decision-making in the research 
realm as they do in the treatment context.    
Thirdly, most jurisdictions have defined “treatment”, “medical treatment” or 
“health care”.  In this regard, there is both different terminology (as in some jurisdictions 
define “treatment” or “medical treatment”275 while others define “health care”276) as well 
273 Jurisdictions that make no mention of best interests under their statutory schemes are Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Yukon.  
Jurisdictions with no legislation are Alberta, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut.  Interestingly, as 
noted earlier in this chapter, C.(J.S.) v. Wren, supra note 93 is a case decided based on the common law 
mature minor rule.  That decision, which is admittedly dated, does not refer to best interests. 
274 As noted in Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Ed. (Toronto:  Irwin Law Inc., 2007) at 310, “in 
the event of a conflict between a specific provision dealing with a particular matter and a more general 
provision dealing with not only that matter but with others as well, the specific provision prevails”.  
Consent to treatment legislation provisions setting out the circumstances when a minor can consent to 
medical treatment are more general than child protection legislation provisions that allow for the 
apprehension of minors where refusal of treatment puts the life of the minor in jeopardy.  Therefore, the 
latter class of provisions prevails over the former.  
275  Jurisdictions defining “treatment” or “medical treatment” are Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New 
Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. 
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as what the definition of the chosen term states.  The fact that not too much weight should 
be put on the specific term chosen by any legislature is aptly seen when one considers 
that British Columbia and Yukon define “health care” in the same way Manitoba and 
Ontario define “treatment”.  Given that some legislatures have defined “treatment” and 
“health care” in much the same way, not much weight can be placed on a specific 
jurisdiction’s choice of term in determining if research activities are captured.  However, 
when one looks at the substance of the definition, some of the definitions clearly capture 
some research activities.  The phrase “health related purpose”, for example, is one way in 
which research activities are brought into the consent to treatment legislative regime.  
This notion must be reconciled with the general recognition that research and treatment 
are distinct entities.277  An attempt at such reconciliation is the framework proposed in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
C. Child Protection Legislation 
 
Each provincial and territorial legislature has, whether intentionally or not, altered 
the common law mature minor rule, as that rule was defined earlier in this chapter, by 
enacting child protection legislation.278  As stated in the Nova Scotia Children and 
Family Services Act, the purposes underlying these statutes are to “protect children from 
276  Jurisdictions defining “health care” are British Columbia and Yukon. 
277  See discussion on distinguishing between research and treatment in Chapter 1. 
278  Child, Family and Community Service Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46; Child, Youth and Family 
Enhancement Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-12; Child and Family Services Act (Saskatchewan), supra note 
103; Child and Family Services Act, supra note 71; Child and Family Services Act (Ontario), supra note 
101; Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2; Children and Family Services Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 5 
[Children and Family Services Act (Nova Scotia)]; Child Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-5.1; 
Child, Youth and Family Services Act, supra note 260; Child and Family Services Act (Yukon), supra 
note 270; Child and Family Services Act, S.N.W.T. 1997, c. 13 [Child and Family Services Act 
(NWT)]; Child and Family Services Act, S.N.W.T. 1997, c. 13, as duplicated for Nunavut by s. 29 of 
the Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28 [Child and Family Services Act (Nunavut)].
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harm, promote the integrity of the family and assure the best interests of children”.279  In 
striving to attain these ideals, child protection legislation governs a broad range of 
circumstances.  That being said, only those provisions dealing with the role of minors in 
medical decision-making are discussed below.  Also, given that there are twelve different 
statutes, unnecessary repetition has been avoided by discussing the three aspects that 
affect the applicability of these statutes to medical decision-making and medical research.  
The overall implications for research of these statutes are then set out.    
(i) Defining “Child” 
Given that these acts strive to “protect” children, arguably one of the most 
important provisions is how they have defined “child”.  Interestingly, a review of the 
statutory definitions of “child” reveals that there exists considerable variation.  
Specifically, the statutes in force in the Saskatchewan, Ontario, Nova Scotia, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut define “child” as an 
individual below sixteen years of age.280  Alberta, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island in 
turn, use eighteen years of age as the cut-off.281  Finally, British Columbia, New 
Brunswick and the Yukon use nineteen years of age.282       
Although some of this variation merely reflects the fact that the statutory age of 
majority varies between eighteen and nineteen years of age, it remains notable that nearly  
279 Children and Family Services Act (Nova Scotia), ibid. at s. 2(1). 
280  Child and Family Services Act (Saskatchewan), supra note 103, s. 2(1)(d); Child and Family Services 
Act (Ontario), supra note 101, s. 37(1); Children and Family Services Act (Nova Scotia), supra note 
278, s. 3(1); Children, Youth and Family Services Act, supra note 260, s. 2(1)(d); Child and Family 
Services Act (NWT), supra note 278, s. 1; Child and Family Services Act (Nunavut), supra note 278, s. 
1. 
281  Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, supra note 278, s. 1(1)(d); Child and Family Services Act, 
supra note 71, s. 1(1); Age of Majority Act, C.C.S.M.  c. A7, s. 1 [Age of Majority Act (Manitoba)]; 
Child Protection Act, supra note 278, s. 1(h). 
282  Child, Family and Community Service Act, supra note 278, s. 1(1); Family Services Act, supra note 278, 
s. 1; Age of Majority Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. A-4, s. 1(1) [Age of Majority Act (NB)]; Child and Family 
Services Act (Yukon), supra note 270, s. 1. 
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half of the provinces and territories make it much harder if not impossible for authorities 
to force treatment on unwilling minors who are sixteen years of age and older. The 
conclusion flowing from this is that the legislatures in those jurisdictions felt that minors 
over the age of sixteen were in no more need of protection than adults.  This point is 
raised at the outset of the discussion on the specific legislative provisions of child 
protection statutes because it casts doubt on one of the most often cited reasons for 
denying mature minors the right to consent to medical treatment; that being that they are 
vulnerable and are in need of protection.283  This means that, at least insofar as mature 
minors over the age of sixteen are concerned, there is a strong argument to be made that 
legislatures are prepared to presume that they need no more protection than adults and 
therefore should be allowed the right to consent to medical treatment unless there is 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.  The same logic applies to consent to 
research participation.  This is not to say that there are not instances where individuals 
under the age of sixteen could be mature minors at common law and ought to also be 
afforded the right to consent to their own participation in research.        
(ii) Defining “Health Care” 
Not all medical treatment can be forced upon a “child”.  Rather, each provincial 
and territorial legislature has opted to limit the degree of permissible interference with the 
rights of minors to those instances where the consequences of non-treatment are severe.  
Specifically, “health care” generally only includes medical, surgical, or other remedial 
283  In the child protection context, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in A.C. v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65, were willing to accept that under the Child and 
Family Services Act, supra note 71, those minors who are sixteen and older were not subject to judicial 
override of their treatment decisions based on what was in their “best interest”. 
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services which are “essential”284 or “necessary”285 for the health or well-being of the 
child.  Elsewhere, the “care or treatment” at issue must be required “to cure, prevent or 
alleviate physical harm or suffering.”286  For purposes of the present discussion, suffice it 
to say that the inter-jurisdictional variability as to how health care that can be forced upon 
minors is defined is more a matter of semantics than of one of substance.   
As noted earlier, research consists of activities that are primarily aimed at 
generating generalizable knowledge.  However, much like some activities could be 
carried out for a “health related purpose” under some consent to treatment statutes, some 
activities (not necessarily the same activities as under consent to treatment legislation) are 
medical, surgical or other remedial “care”.  Specifically, although research carried out on 
healthy participants is unlikely to be captured, circumstances where the research 
participant may derive health benefits personally from participating would, in some 
circumstances, be found to be “care”.287  However, simply being “care” is not enough to 
trigger the application of child protection provisions.  The research activities must also be 
“necessary” or “essential”.  It is that criterion which greatly removes most, if not all 
research activities from the child protection realm.  Stated differently, participation in 
284  Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, supra note 278, s. 1(2.1)(b); Child and Family Services Act 
(Saskatchewan), supra note 103, s. 11(a)(iv); Child, Youth and Family Services Act, supra note 260, s. 
14(g). 
285  Child, Family and Community Service Act , supra note 278, s. 29(1); Child and Family Services Act, 
supra note 71, s. 17(2)(b)(iii); Family Services Act, supra note 278, s.31(1)(g); Child and Family 
Services Act (Yukon), supra note 270, s. 21(1)(g). 
286  Child and Family Services Act (Ontario), supra note 101, s. 37(2)(e); Children and Family Services Act 
(Nova Scotia), supra note 278, s. 22(1)(e).  Similar wording is also used in Child Protection Act, supra 
note 278, s. 9(o)-(p), Child and Family Services Act (NWT), supra note 278, s. 7(3)(n), and Child and 
Family Services Act (Nunavut), supra note 278, s. 7(3)(j). 
287  I think this would be the case for those activities where the likelihood of participants deriving health 
benefits is thought to be quite high, or where a physician-researcher recommends participating in a 
research study over receiving the standard of care. 
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research is in all but the rarest of cases not “necessary” or “essential” because participants 
can opt to receive the standard of care or to do nothing.     
(iii) Refusal of “Health Care” 
Even where a minor meets the definition of “child” under the applicable act, state 
actors can only intervene with respect to medical treatment where the minor is in need of 
protection.  Only two statutes include a minor’s refusal of health care as a ground for 
finding that the child is in need of protective services:  British Columbia’s Child, Family 
and Community Services Act and the Yukon’s Child and Family Services Act.288  In all 
ten other common law jurisdictions in Canada, the need for protective services is only 
triggered when a parent, guardian, or other caregiver fails to provide a child with certain 
health care.289  Stated differently, the statutory provisions in Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut do not consider the possibility that 
consent may be sought from only a minor (whether they are a “child” or not) rather than a 
parent.  Under those statutes, parental consent is seen as necessary.      
(iv) Implications for Research 
 Ultimately then, in ten jurisdictions in Canada child protection statutes have little 
effect on the right of minors to autonomous decision-making under consent to treatment 
legislation or the common law mature minor rule because they only apply where a parent 
288  Child, Family and Community Service Act, supra note 278, s. 29(1); Child and Family Services Act 
(Yukon), supra note 270, s. 33(1). 
289  Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, supra note 278 at s. 1(2.1)(b); Child, Youth and Family 
Services Act, supra note 260 at s. 14(g); Child and Family Services Act (Saskatchewan), supra note 103, 
s. 11(a)(iv); Child and Family Services Act, supra note 71, s. 17(2)(b)(iii); Child and Family Services 
Act (Ontario), supra note 101, s. 37(2)(e); Family Services Act, supra note 278, s. 31(1)(g); Children 
and Family Services Act (Nova Scotia), supra note 278, s. 22(1)(e); Child Protection Act, supra note 
278, s. 3(h); Child and Family Services Act (NWT), supra note 278, s. 7(3)(n); Child and Family 
Services Act (Nunavut), supra note 278 at s. 7(3)(j). 
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refuses to provide necessary care.  Stated differently, in those ten jurisdictions, the statute 
does not apply to instances where consent is only sought from a minor where that care is 
not necessary.  The fact that most child protection statutes only apply in such limited 
circumstances to medical treatment decisions and that the circumstances in which those 
statutes apply to research are even narrower facilitates the development of a framework 
defining the right to autonomous decision-making possessed by minors in the research 
realm.     
D. Quebec Instruments 
Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction, which means that all laws pertaining to matters 
falling to the provinces and territories under the division of powers are contained within 
the Civil Code of Québec.  This means that, unlike all other provinces and territories in 
Canada which operate under a common law regime, the law of Quebec does not evolve 
by means of jurisprudential developments.  As one author has put it, this means that a 
judge in Quebec “applies the law rather than creates it”290.  It is also generally accepted 
that cases arising from common law jurisdictions are only relevant where the principles 
underlying the courts’ reasoning are also recognized under civil law.291  Consequently, in 
order to understand the role – both present and potential – of mature minors in research in 
Quebec, it is necessary to examine the relevant articles of the Civil Code of Québec.  To 
this end, the articles that address medical treatment and participation in research are as 
follows:  
290  Robert Kouri & Suzanne Philips-Nootens, “Civil Liability of Physicians Under Quebec Law” in Jocelyn 
Downie, Timothy Caulfield, & Colleen M. Flood, eds., eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed. 
(Markham:  LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 133 at 133 [Kouri & Philips-Nootens, “Civil Liability”]. 
291  Ibid. at 133-134. 
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11. No person may be made to undergo care of any nature, 
whether for examination, specimen taking, removal of tissue, 
treatment, or any other act, except with his consent.   
 
If the person concerned is incapable of giving or refusing his 
consent to care, a person authorized by law or by mandate given 
in anticipation of his incapacity may do so in his place.   
 
12. A person who gives consent to or refuses care for another 
person is bound to act in the sole interest of that person, taking 
into account, as far as possible, any wishes the latter may have 
expressed.   
 
If he gives his consent, he shall ensure that the care is beneficial 
notwithstanding the gravity and permanence of certain of its 
effects, that it is advisable in the circumstances and that the 





14. Consent to care required by the state of health of a minor 
is given by the person having parental authority or by his tutor.   
 
A minor 14 years of age or over, however, may give his 
consent alone to such care.  If his state requires that he remain in 
a health or social services establishment for over 12 hours, the 





17. A minor 14 years of age or over may give his consent alone 
to care not required by the state of his health; however, the 
consent of the person having parental authority or of the tutor is 
required if the care entails a serious risk for the health of the 




21. A minor or a person of full age who is incapable of giving 
consent may not be submitted to an experiment if the 
experiment involves serious risk to his health or, where he 
understands the nature and consequences of the experiment, 
if he objects. 
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Moreover, a minor or a person of full age who is incapable of 
giving consent may be submitted to an experiment only if, 
where the person is the only subject of the experiment, it has 
the potential to produce benefit to the person's health or only 
if, in the case of an experiment on a group, it has the potential 
to produce results capable of conferring benefit to other 
persons in the same age category or having the same disease 
or handicap. Such an experiment must be part of a research 
project approved and monitored by an ethics committee. The 
competent ethics committees are formed by the Minister of Health 
and Social Services or designated by that Minister among existing 
research ethics committees; the composition and operating 
conditions of the committees are determined by the Minister and 
published in the Gazette officielle du Québec. 
 
Consent to experimentation may be given, in the case of a 
minor, by the person having parental authority or the tutor 
and, in the case of a person of full age incapable of giving 
consent, by the mandatary, tutor or curator. Where a person of full 
age suddenly becomes incapable of consent and the experiment, 
insofar as it must be undertaken promptly after the appearance of 
the condition giving rise to it, does not permit, for lack of time, 
the designation of a legal representative, consent may be given by 
the person authorized to consent to any care the person requires; it 
is incumbent upon the competent ethics committee to determine, 
when examining the research project, whether the experiment 
meets that condition. 
 
Care considered by the ethics committee to be innovative care 
required by the state of health of the person concerned does 




33. Every decision concerning a child shall be taken in light of the 
child’s interests and the respect of his rights.  
 
Consideration is given, in addition to the moral, intellectual, 
emotional and physical needs of the child, to the child’s age, 
health, personality and family environment, and to the other 
aspects of his situation. [Emphasis added]292 
 
292 Supra note 112, art. 11-12, 14, 17, 21, 33. 
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From the above provisions of the Civil Code of Québec, it is possible to draw 
several general conclusions.  Firstly, minors over the age of 14 may consent to medical 
treatment, whether or not such treatment is required by their “state of health”.  The only 
limitation on this relates to treatment not required due to a health condition that exposes 
the minor to serious risk and that may cause “grave and permanent effects”.293   
Secondly, in a number of the articles cited above, fourteen years of age has been 
chosen as the age beyond which a minor can potentially be the sole individual to consent 
to treatment.  When those articles are read in conjunction with article 11, it is clear that 
they should be interpreted as creating a rebuttable presumption of capacity.  Stated 
differently, even if a minor is more than fourteen years old, if she lacks capacity, she 
cannot provide legally valid consent. Essentially then, minors over the age of fourteen are 
treated in the same manner as adults.  No justification is given in the Civil Code of 
Québec for why fourteen years of age was chosen, though the choice appears to have 
been driven by a political compromise.294   The result of this arbitrary use of a fixed-age 
cut-off is two-fold.  At first instance, the use of a fixed-age cut-off ignores the fact that 
minors of the same chronological age may have attained quite different levels of 
maturity.  This directly contradicts the foundation of the mature minor rule at common 
law.  The second consequence is that it assumes (although the assumption is rebuttable) 
that upon reaching 14 years of age, a minor is able to consent to all forms of medical 
treatment except that entailing a serious risk or severe consequences in cases of “care that 
293 Ibid., art. 14, 17. 
294 Kouri & Philips-Nootens, “Civil Liability”, supra note 290 at 161.  See also R. Kouri & S. Philips-
Nootens, Le corps humain, l’inviolabilité de la personne et le consentement aux soins (Sherbrooke:  Les 
Editions RDUS, 1999) at 407 n0 292 et seq for further discussion on how the precise wording of articles 
14 and 21 came to be passed by the Quebec legislature. 
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is not required by state of health”.295  Not only do all 14 year olds not demonstrate the 
same maturity, not all medical treatment is created equal.   That is, some forms of 
treatment are minimally invasive while others are complex and are carried out over an 
extended period of time.  Intuitively, one would expect a more sophisticated 
understanding to be required in order to consent to a more complex treatment.   
Thirdly, and more germane to the role of mature minors in the research context, 
are the implications of article 21.  In one sense, the Civil Code of Québec explicitly 
mandates greater involvement of minors in the research context than seen at common law 
by precluding that minor’s participation where she dissents.296  In order for such dissent 
to be respected, the minor must demonstrate an understanding of the “nature and 
consequences of the experiment”.  It is interesting that the drafters would choose 
phraseology similar to that used in common law jurisdictions under the mature minor rule 
in the treatment context.  It is equally striking that in the research context, minors need to 
show an appropriate level of understanding rather than merely having attained a specific 
age threshold.  The result is that in Quebec, minors have a legislated right to dissent but 
can never consent to their own participation.       
This is precisely the interpretation of article 21 that has been adopted in practice 
and that is endorsed by the ministère de la Santé et des Services Sociaux in a guide on 
research ethics disseminated amongst the research community.297  Despite the fact that all 
research involving minors carried out in Quebec is generally considered to be an 
295 Civil Code of Québec, supra note 112, art. 17.  The restriction on a minor over the age of fourteen 
providing consent seems quite narrow. 
296  This is not recognized in legislation or jurisprudence emanating from any common law jurisdiction.  It 
is, however, included in the Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1, which applies nationally. 
297  Franca Cantini et al., “Formation en éthique de la recherché, Niveau 3 – Module 3.2, Questions 
pertinentes à certains types de participants à la recherché:  enfants, majeurs inaptes et personnes en 
situation de vulnérabilité” (2004) at 16, online:  Unité d’éthique, ministère de la Santé et des Services 
Sociaux <http://ethique.msss.gouv.qc.ca/>. 
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“experiment”, thereby bringing it under the ambit of article 21, Lévesque has argued that 
this need not be the case.298  Rather, she claims that only research projects that (1) affect 
bodily integrity and that (2) are “experiments” are captured under article 21.299  
Lévesque’s argument is largely based on the fact that the term “experiment” is not 
defined in the Civil Code of Québec and is therefore open to interpretation.  She goes on 
to note that article 21 falls under the heading of “Care” as well as refers to both 
“experiment” and “research project”.  She takes the latter distinction to mean that 
“research project” is the broader of the two terms and as such that not all “research 
projects” are “experiments”.300   
The major flaw with this argument is that Lévesque seems to be trying to carve 
out a third category; notably she appears to be saying that the real distinction ought to be 
between “research,” “treatment,” and “experiment” rather than the currently recognized 
“treatment” versus “research” dichotomy.301    Her proposal ignores the reality of the 
medical research context.  Specifically, time and resource constraints as well as a general 
lack of expertise in the law make it extremely unlikely that researchers and research 
ethics boards will embark upon a rather cumbersome exercise of distinguishing between 
“research” and “experiment”.  Rather, they are merely likely to seek parental consent.  
Even if one assumes that judges would be able to appropriately distinguish between 
“treatment”, “research” and “experiment”, the availability of judicial review of the 
decisions made by the research community would do little to repair the beleaguered 
298  Emmanuelle Lévesque, “Les exigencies légales entourant le consentement dans la recherché avec des 
enfants et des adultes inaptes:  une piste de solution aux difficulties posées par les articles 21 et 24 
C.c.Q.” (2005-2006) 51 McGill L.J. 385 at 389.  
299  Ibid. at 404.  
300  Ibid. at 391, 398. 
301  Different meanings have been ascribed to “treatment” and “research” by the courts.  Although none of 
those cases emanate from Quebec, it is highly likely that such precedents would be considered by a 
Quebec court when asked to interpret the rights of mature minors under article 21.
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rights of mature minors as it is often too late to alter the course of events by the time the 
matter reaches the courts.302    
The above concerns about Lévesque’s argument should not be taken to mean that 
it should merely be assumed that parental consent is a de facto requirement for the 
participation of minors in medical research in Quebec.  A strict interpretation of article 21 
of the Civil Code of Québec precludes minors, be they immature or mature minors, from 
consenting to their own participation in medical research studies.  Also, given the ability 
of mature minors to dissent to research participation as well as the distinction that has 
been drawn between research and innovative care in the Civil Code of Québec, some 
aspects of the framework proposed in Chapter 4 may nonetheless be applicable.  
Furthermore, it remains possible that in the right political atmosphere, amendments may 
be made to the Civil Code of Québec so as to allow mature minors to acquire the same 
rights as those proposed in this thesis for their peers living in other Canadian 
jurisdictions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The above examination reveals that there are a significant number of legal 
instruments that speak to the ability of mature minors to make decisions that affect their 
302  Having found Lévesque’s argument far from compelling, it is unnecessary to embark upon a lengthy 
analysis of the second criterion for exclusion from the ambit of article 21 she sets out, which deals with 
the effects on bodily integrity brought about through participation in research.  My problem with that 
criterion is that it erroneously assumes that serious risk to health necessarily gives rise to a violation of 
one’s bodily integrity.   In Quebec (Public Curator) v.  Syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital 
St-Ferdinand, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 211 at para. 97, Justice L’Heureux-Dube, on behalf of the Court, 
remarked that “common meaning of the word "inviolability" suggests that the interference with that 
right must leave some marks, some sequelae which, while not necessarily physical or permanent, 
exceed a certain threshold.  The interference must affect the victim’s physical, psychological or 
emotional equilibrium in something more than a fleeting manner.”  Obviously, not all research 
participation amounts to a violation of right to personal inviolability guaranteed under section 1 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 64. 
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persons, both physically and emotionally.  The international and national instruments 
apply to minors residing in all Canadian provinces and territories, thereby ensuring a 
certain degree of uniformity.  At common law, mature minors who wish to participate in 
medical research are entitled to consent, whether their participation is in their best 
interests or not.  However, once one delves into areas under provincial territorial 
jurisdiction, it becomes evident that there are considerable differences in how minors are 
treated across Canada.  Whereas some jurisdictions have consent to treatment legislation, 
others do not.  The content of the legislation where it exists is also variable, with some 
setting a presumptive age of capacity at sixteen and others relying on individualized 
capacity assessments.  Some legislative enactments restrict consent to circumstances 
where the treatment is in a minor’s best interest and some statutes do not.  Child 
protection legislation also varies between jurisdictions in how “child” is defined and how 
the effect of a refusing treatment is handled.  Finally, the regime in Quebec is altogether 
different from that seen elsewhere and outright precludes minors from consenting to their 
own research participation.  Beyond directly determining the rights of mature minors, 
many of these legal instruments also inform ethical instruments.  The latter category of 





















It is widely accepted that research must be conducted in accordance with 
applicable laws and ethical requirements.303  Having examined the legal constraints on 
the ability of mature minors to be the sole decision-makers in the previous chapter, the 
focus now shifts to the ethical principles and guidelines that govern medical research in 
Canada.  Prior to looking at specific instruments and principles, it is necessary to briefly 
explore the different origins of law and ethics as well as how these two spheres relate to 
each other. 
Legal and ethical instruments originated in different ways.  The various statutes 
and quasi-legal instruments discussed in Chapter 2 were passed (or adopted) by Federal, 
Provincial and Territorial governments.  The ethical instruments relevant to the issue of 
minors and consent to research participation, on the other hand, largely emanate from 
international bodies, such as the World Medical Association, and from other federal non-
government bodies.  There are two instruments falling into the latter category that guide 
most research involving humans in Canada:  the Declaration of Helsinki and the Tri-
303  Precisely what activities or actions will be in “accordance with applicable laws and ethical 
requirements” will vary since, as is evident from the discussion in Chapter 2, the law differs between 
jurisdictions.   
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Council Policy Statement.  General ethical principles, in turn, can be found within a 
formal document.  They are also widely discussed in the academic literature and other 
secondary sources, which allow them to evolve in response to changing societal views. 
The purpose underlying each of law and ethics is also different.  Specifically, the 
law dealing with consent is primarily concerned with discerning if a physician (or 
researcher, although as noted in the previous chapter, there are few research cases) acted 
negligently, committed battery, or is guilty of professional misconduct.  Medical ethics, 
in turn, involves deriving moral obligations that apply to a broad range of circumstances.  
It also is more responsive because the principles are continually refined through ongoing 
dialogue in the literature.304  Stated differently, the law is about setting the minimum 
basic parameters for acceptable conduct while medical ethics seeks to establish standards 
for “good” conduct.   
This different evolutionary justification, along with the fact that legal and ethical 
instruments are passed at different times by different bodies, means that the two are not 
always reconcilable with one another.  Although such conflicts may not be avoidable, it is 
desirable to minimize them and look for solutions where both legal and ethical norms can 
be upheld.   Despite the aforementioned differences between law and ethics, there 
remains a similarity between the two concepts that goes to the heart of this thesis:  the 
304  Tom L. Beauchamp, “Informed Consent:  Its History and Meaning”, in Tom L. Beauchamp, ed., 
Standing on Principles: Collected Essays (Toronto:  Oxford University Press, 2010) 50 at 66-68.  See 
also P.A. Komesaroff, “The Relationship between Law and Ethics in Medicine” (2001) 31 Internal 
Medicine Journal 413. 
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legal notion of competence and autonomy as an ethical principle.  They are evaluated 
based on essentially the same criteria.305     
With the above comments in mind, I now turn to the ethical instruments and 
principles.  Unlike in Chapter 2 where the discussion was divided according to origin of 
the law (i.e. international, national, and provincial/territorial), the commentary below first 
provides a brief overview of existing ethical instruments and their origins.  That is 
followed by a review of the literature on the three ethical concepts that are most engaged 
with regards to the consent process in medical research involving mature minors:  
autonomy and paternalism306 (which together make up respect for persons) and 
vulnerability.  How these concepts have been incorporated into existing ethical 
instruments – the Nuremberg Code307, the Declaration of Helsinki, the ICH GCP, the 
ICH CIMPPP, and the Tri-Council Policy Statement – is then discussed.  
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ETHICAL INSTRUMENTS  
 
In order to properly understand how ethics informs the consent process in medical 
research involving minors, it is necessary to have a working understanding of how the 
ethical instruments that apply to the pediatric research setting in Canada have come to be 
and the limits on each of their spheres of applicability.  To that end, a brief overview of 
how the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the Tri-Council Policy Statement, 
305  Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed., (Toronto:  Oxford 
University Press, 2009) at 113 [Beauchamp & Childress]. 
306  As is discussed in the section on paternalism below, paternalism is not necessarily (and in fact is not 
according to the manner in which I have defined it in the present case) used as a disparaging term.  I 
have chosen to use it rather than beneficence (which is also briefly discussed below) because at the 
heart of the issue in the consent process is the actions of researchers.  Consequently, the ethical 
implications extend beyond a moral obligation (the term) to the intentional acts of researchers.   
307  U.S. National Institutes of Health, Office of Human Subjects Research, Nuremberg Code:  Directives 
for Human Experimentation, online: < http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html > [Nuremberg 
Code]. 
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the ICH GCP, the ICH CIMPPP is detailed in this section.  Then, following a discussion 
of the concepts of autonomy, paternalism, and vulnerability, the specific provisions that 
speak to capacity and the limits on a minor’s ability to consent are set out.     
A. The Nuremberg Code  
 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, a number of physicians and public health 
officials were tried in Germany after they committed many horrific crimes against war-
time prisoners by conducting a number of experiments on the prisoners without their 
consent.308  Ultimately, these prosecutions led to the creation of the Nuremberg Code in 
1947.  Although there were a number of lesser known documents that preceded the 
Nuremberg Code, the latter is widely considered to be the first set of ethical guidelines on 
human experimentation.309  The development of the Nuremberg Code marked the start of 
the process of ethical regulation of research on human subjects which continues to evolve 
today.  Although it only considers the participation of individuals with legal capacity, it 
nonetheless is worth briefly discussing the Nuremberg Code as it helped to shape the 
Declaration of Helsinki and other modern ethics frameworks.  To this end, it states at 
paragraph 1: 
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely 
essential. 
 
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity 
to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise 
free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of 
308  J. Vollmann & R. Winau, “Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial:  Informed Consent in Human Experimentation 
before the Nuremberg Code” (1996) 313 B.M.J. 1445 at 1445. 
309  See ibid. for a discussion on a non-legally binding directive concerning non-therapeutic research issued 
by the Prussian minister for religious, educational, and medical affairs issued in 1900.  The authors note 
that much of the discussion prior to that directive being issued focused on the concepts of beneficence, 
autonomy, and the requirement for informed consent.  Interestingly, over a hundred years later, these 
topics remain at the heart of many debates in research ethics.     
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force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form 
of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge 
and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter 
involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and 
enlightened decision.  This latter element requires that, before the 
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject, 
there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and 
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is 
to be conducted; all inconvenience and hazards reasonably to be 
expected; and the effects upon his health or person, which may 
possibly come from his participation in the experiment... 
[Emphasis added]310 
 The reference to “legal capacity” in the above citation is significant in that it 
creates a direct link between ethical requirements and the law in the conduct of research 
involving humans.  As discussed in greater depth below, ethical guidelines have since 
distinguished themselves somewhat from the law by specifying parameters that are to be 
read in conjunction with the applicable laws rather than merely relying on legal 
standards.   
B. The Declaration of Helsinki 
The Declaration of Helsinki was developed by the World Medical Association in 
1964.  Since that time, it has undergone a number of revisions, most recently in October 
2008.  As can be gleaned from the discussion below, this most recent amendment 
included a number of changes that are quite significant with respect to defining the 
potential role of minors in the research process.  As this document applies to all forms of 
human experimentation, much of its contents are not strictly relevant to the consent 
process.  That being said, prior to examining those relevant sections of the Declaration of 
310 Supra note 307 at para. 1. 
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Helsinki it is worth briefly considering how it fits into our national legal and ethical 
landscape.   
As it applies to research carried out in a large number of countries, including 
Canada, the Declaration of Helsinki must necessarily be flexible enough so as to be 
adaptable to different cultural settings while still safeguarding the basic rights of research 
subjects.  The World Medical Association has stated in paragraph 10 of the Declaration 
of Helsinki that this balance is best achieved by informing researchers of the need to be 
aware of applicable “ethical, legal and regulatory norms and standards...in their own 
countries”311, however, it then goes on to state that those norms and standards should not 
“reduce or eliminate any of the protections for research subjects set forth in this 
Declaration.”312 From a strictly legal standpoint, only failure to comply with relevant 
laws can result in legal sanctions.  Therefore, unless the Declaration of Helsinki has been 
incorporated into applicable law, failure to comply with all of its protections will not 
result in legal repercussions for researchers nor is there a requirement imposed on 
legislatures to draft laws that are consistent with it (or any other ethical standard).  
However, where the law is somewhat vague or ambiguous, courts may (but need not) 
look to this and other ethical frameworks for guidance.313 
 
 
311  Supra note 41 at para. 10. 
312  Ibid. 
313  This occurred in Weiss v. Solomon (1989), 48 C.C.L.T. 280, 1989 CarswellQue 72, where the Quebec 
Superior Court relied on article 6 of the Declaration of Helsinki (as well as other sources) to hold that 
the right of research subjects to protect their own bodily integrity must be respected by ensuring that 
informed consent is only given after potential risks have been disclosed.  That case involved 
determining whether a physician had fulfilled his duty of care with regards to disclosure of the risk of 
research participation to a research subject who would not derive any direct benefit from participation.  
The physician and hospital were ultimately found liable.   
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C. The Medical Research Council Guidelines 
 
In 1978, the MRC Report No. 6, Ethics in Human Experimentation314 became the 
first medical research guidelines in Canada.  The Medical Research Council subsequently 
replaced those guidelines with the Guidelines on Research Involving Human Research 
Subjects315 in 1987.  The stated purpose of the latter was “to sensitize and guide decision 
makers on the range of perceptions they should bring to bear and to describe the 
processes of decision making that must be observed.”316  Compliance with the Guidelines 
was mandatory for all those in receipt of funding from the Medical Research Council.317   
D. The Tri-Council Policy Statement 
The need for revisions to the Medical Research Council’s 1987 Guidelines 
emerged within only a couple of years of the Guidelines being in place.  By the early 
1990s, there was a real push towards the development of a single set of ethical guidelines 
to govern medical as well as social science and humanities research in Canada was 
gaining popularity amongst all stakeholders.  The reasons underlying this need for change 
are many, including the significant increase in volume of research being carried out, the 
increase in interdisciplinary research that transcended the CIHR/SSHRC divide and the 
emergency of local human research protection policies that were being developed by 
individual institutions.318  It is for that reason that in 1994 the presidents of the CIHR, 
314  No separate reference could be located for this report.  However, this is the title given to it at page xi in 
Medical Research Council of Canada, Guidelines on Research Involving Human Subjects (Ottawa: 
Medical Research Council of Canada, 1987). 
315  Guidelines on Research Involving Human Subjects, ibid. 
316  Ibid. at xi.   
317  Ibid. at iii.   
318  Michael McDonald, “From Code to Policy Statement:  Creating Canadian Policy for Ethical Research 
Involving Humans” (2009) 17(2-3) Health Law Review 12 at 13-14; Guy Rocher, “Origin and 
Development of the Tri-Council Policy Statement on the Ethics of Research Involving Humans” (1999) 
9(2) NCEHR Communiqué 4. 
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NSERC, and SSHRC set up a working group to develop these guidelines.  The process 
was not without its challenges but, after four years and four successive published draft 
versions of the guidelines and extensive consultation with the academic community 
throughout, the Tri-Council Policy Statement (1998)319 became official.320  The 
Declaration of Helsinki had guided medical research in Canada prior to 1998.   
From its inception, the Tri-Council Policy Statement (1998) was intended to be 
continually revised so as to ensure that it kept pace with developing technologies and 
societal views about different aspects of research.  To this end, the Interagency Advisory 
Panel on Research Ethics was created by the three funding agencies in 2001.  Since that 
time, this body set up a number of working groups to look into certain key areas covered 
by the Tri-Council Policy Statement (1998).  Reports from these working groups became 
publicly available in 2008.  Following extensive consultation with interested parties, the 
second edition of the Tri-Council Policy Statement was released in December 2010.   
The CIHR, NSERC, and SSHRC are three sources of research funding in Canada.  
In 2007-2008, CIHR awarded approximately $975,000,000.  This includes funding for 
816 of the 3,625 operating grant applications submitted (i.e. less than one quarter).  
Similarly, NSERC’s budget for 2008-2009 was approximately $1,000,000,000.321  
SSHRC awarded approximately $77,000,000 (twenty-three percent of funds requested), 
which amount includes funding for 904 of the 2,731 applications submitted (i.e. 
319  Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada & Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement:  Ethical Conduct 
for Research Involving Humans, 1998 (with 2000, 2002, 2005 amendments), online:  
<http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/english/pdf/TCPS%20June2003_E.pdf> [Tri-Council Policy Statement 
(1998)] 
320  Rocher, supra note 318.  
321 Canada Research Funding, “Federal Funding”, online: <http://canadaresearchfunding.org/federal-
funding/federal-funding/>. 
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approximately one third).322  The pharmaceutical industry also funds research in Canada.  
Notably, according to the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, in 2005 companies 
holding drug patents spent approximately $567,000,000 on clinical trials (out of 
$1,187,000,000 spent on research and development).323      
Under the Statement, all investigators conducting research at institutions receiving 
funding from CIHR, NSERC, or SSHRC must abide by the requirements set out 
therein.324  Based on the above figures, there is clearly a considerable amount of research 
being carried out in Canada that is not funded by CIHR, NSERC, or SSHRC.  The Tri-
Council Policy Statement also applies to some of that research by means of a reach-
through provision.  Specifically, as is explicitly welcomed by CIHR, NSERC, and 
SSHERC in the Tri-Council Policy Statement, bodies regulating researchers who do not 
work at institutions that receive funds from the Agencies and therefore fall outside the 
reach of the Tri-Council Policy Statement can choose to mandate compliance as a pre-
condition to receiving funding from that body.  To date, this has been done by a number 
of organizations, including Health Canada, the National Research Council, and the 
Community Research Ethics Board of Alberta.325  This results in the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement being the most persuasive statement on the ethics of research involving 
humans in Canada.  
322  Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, “Competition Statistics:  2008-2009”, 
online: <http://www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/results-resultats/stats-statistiques/index-eng.aspx>. 
323  Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, Patented Medicine Prices Review Board: Annual Report 
2005, online:  <http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/view.asp?x=667&all=true>. 
324  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1. 
325 Government of Canada, Panel on Research Ethics, “Applicability of the TCPS to Agency-Funded 
Organizations as well as those not Funded by the Agencies”, online: < http://pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-
politique/tcps-eptc/interpretations/interpretation011/>; Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical 
Research, online <http://www.ahfmr.ab.ca/creba/creba.php>. 
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Given that this document is not binding legislation, the legal consequences for 
breaches of its ethical guidelines are limited.  The possible penalties for failure to abide 
by the Tri-Council Policy Statement (and therefore breaching a Memorandum of 
Understanding) by an individual researcher include the loss or suspension of funding and 
the obligation to return all funds paid to date under a grant.  Where the breach of the 
Memorandum of Understanding is by an institution, penalties include the suspension of 
funding and a declaration that the institute is not eligible for further funding.326  Since 
2000, there have been eighty-four allegations of non-compliance with Tri-Agency 
policies, of which twelve were related to matters associated to the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement.  None of these twelve allegations led to any funding actions being imposed by 
CIHR.  It is unknown if any of the twelve allegations led to researchers being sanctioned 
by their own institution.327 
E. The ICH GCP and The ICH CIMPPP 
 The International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
the Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use has released a series of statements 
that speak to the use of pharmaceutical products.  The two most relevant such statements 
to this thesis are the ICH GCP and the ICH CIMPPP.  Both have made their way into the 
Canadian ethical landscape, albeit in different ways.   
 Firstly, the ICH GCP was adopted in 1997 by Health Canada as a means of 
providing “assistance to industry and health professionals on how to comply with the 
326  Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada 
& Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Agency Process for Addressing 
Allegations of Non-Compliance with Tri-Agency Policies (2010), online: <http://www.nserc-
crsng.gc.ca/NSERC-CRSNG/governance-gouvernance/process-processus_eng.asp>. 
327  Canadian Institutes of Health Research, CIHR Research Integrity Files: Report on allegations of non-
compliance with Tri-Agency policies (fiscal 2000/01-2009/10) (Updated May 11, 2010), online: 
<http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/29073.html>. 
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policies and governing statutes and regulation”.328  The ICH GCP defines informed 
consent as “a process by which a subject voluntarily confirms his or her willingness to 
participate in a particular trial, after having been informed of all aspects of the trial that 
are relevant to the subject’s decision to participate.  Informed consent is documented by 
means of a written, signed and dated informed consent form.”329  It also includes minors 
in the definition of “vulnerable subjects”.330   
Secondly, in 2003 Health Canada adopted the ICH CIMPPP.  This guidance 
document aims to “encourage and facilitate timely pediatric medicinal product 
development internationally.”331  As is evident from its title, the ICH CIMPPP only 
applies to research involving minors.  
III. ETHICAL CONCEPTS: AUTONOMY, PATERNALISM, & 
VULNERABILITY 
 
The predominant ethical principle that governs how minors ought to be treated in 
the consent process is the principle known as respect for persons.332  This broad principle 
includes two distinct requirements:  the need to respect the autonomy of autonomous 
agents and the need to protect those with “developing, impaired, or diminished 
autonomy”.333  In light of these dual requirements, it is necessary to consider how it is 
328  Canada, Health Canada, Guidance for Industry – Good Clinical Practice:  Consolidated Guideline 
(ICH Topic E6) (Ottawa:  Health Canada – Publications, 1997) at foreword.  See e.g. Food and Drug 
Regulations, supra note 18, ss. C.05.001, C.05.012 for references to “good clinical practices”. 
329  ICH GCP, supra note 55 at para. 1.28. 
330  Ibid. at para. 1.61. The inclusion of minors in the definition of “vulnerable subjects” is discussed further 
below. 
331  ICH CMPPP, supra note 56 at para. 1.1. 
332  Tri-Council Policy Statement (1998), supra note 319 at i.5; Belmont Report, supra note 32 at 4, 6.  
Although the principle of respect for persons remains central to the framework outlined in the Tri-
Council Policy Statement, supra note 1, based on art. 1.1 and the introduction to Chapter 3 thereof, it is 
clear that respect for persons must now be considered in conjunction with two other principles – 
concern for welfare and justice – in issues of consent.    
333  Tri-Council Policy Statement, ibid. at art. 1.1 and accompanying commentary. 
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determined whether a minor involved in medical research will be afforded the right to 
decide if she wants to participate.  There is no one answer to this question as the answer 
ultimately depends on the capacity of the particular minor to consent to a specific 
research study.  For that reason, this section contains a discussion of how the concepts of 
autonomy and beneficence have been applied to mature minors generally as well as how 
those concepts are informed by the notion of vulnerability.   
A. Autonomy 
There is considerable debate as to precisely what constitutes autonomy.  On the 
one-hand, there is the traditional conception of autonomy that recognizes that individuals 
have a right to their own views and a right to have those views respected unless doing so 
will cause harm to others.334  Authors subscribing to this liberal individualistic 
conception of autonomy focus either on choice or on whether a person is autonomous.335  
This is evident from the manner it has been defined in the literature and in the 
instruments discussed in this chapter.  For example, Beauchamp and Childress remark 
that it “is behaviour which is governed by plans of action more or less clearly formulated 
through deliberation” and autonomous behaviour flows from intentional and voluntary 
“choices persons make based upon their own life plans.”336  Conversely, the authors of 
the Tri-Council Policy Statement have focused on whether a person is autonomous by 
defining autonomy as: 
...the ability to deliberate about a decision and to act based on that 
deliberation.  Respecting autonomy means giving due deference 
334  Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 305 at 58. 
335 Tom L. Beauchamp, “Who Deserves Autonomy and Whose Autonomy Deserves Respect” in 
Beauchamp, supra note 304, 79 at 80. 
336  Terrence F. Ackerman, “Medical Ethics and the Two Dogmas of Liberalism” (1984) 5 Theoretical 
Medicine 69 at 70. 
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to a person’s judgment and ensuring that the person is free to 
choose without interference. Autonomy is not exercised in 
isolation but is influenced by a person’s various connections to 
family, to community, and to cultural, social, linguistic, religious 
and other groups. Likewise, a person’s decisions can have an 
impact on any of these connections.337 
It is similarly described in the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research’s 1979 Belmont Report, which is the 
ethics guidance document that applies in the United States of America.  It describes an 
autonomous person as “an individual capable of deliberation about personal goals and of 
acting under the direction of such deliberation.”338 
In recent years, the highly individualistic conception of autonomy has been 
criticized and other formulations of the concept have emerged.  One such conception is 
known as “relational autonomy”.  According to the latter, when determining if an 
individual is capable of autonomous choice, consideration needs to be had to the social 
context in which that individual finds herself.339  Subscribers to the notion of relational 
autonomy seek solutions that adequately recognize that autonomy evolves within an 
individual as a result of social relationships and is shaped by a variety of social 
determinants, including age, gender, class, race, and ethnicity.340   
  For purposes of this thesis, I have adopted a liberal individualistic conception of 
autonomy.  Although such a definition of autonomy has been criticized, it nonetheless 
remains the conception explicitly endorsed in Canadian public policy generally, and in 
337  Supra note 1 at 8. 
338  Belmont Report, supra note 32 at 4. 
339  Carolyn McLeod & Susan Sherwin, “Relational Autonomy, Self-Trust, and Health Care For Patients 
Who Are Oppressed” in Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy:  Feminist 
Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Shelf  (Toronto:  Oxford University Press, 2000) 259 
at 259-260 [Mackenzie & Stoljar]. 
340  Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, “Introduction” in Mackenzie & Stoljar, ibid., 3 at 3-5.  
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ethical instruments governing medical research in Canada.  Furthermore, I have chosen to 
focus the discussion on ‘autonomous choice’ rather than on whether a particular 
individual is an ‘autonomous person’.  This is because an individual need not prove 
herself to be an autonomous person generally to be entitled to decide whether or not she 
will participate in a particular research study.  Rather, she needs to establish that she is 
capable of making a specific choice – whether she is possesses the requisite autonomy to 
make any number of other life choices is largely irrelevant.341   
In relation to minors specifically, autonomy raises two pragmatic questions.  The 
first such question is what is required of minors in order for them to be deemed able to 
make autonomous choices?  Some authors have questioned if decision-making capacity is 
in itself sufficient for autonomous medical decision-making.  For example, Ross has 
argued that although decision-making capacity “is necessary and sufficient for adults”, it 
is “necessary but not sufficient” in the case of adolescents.342  He does not specify 
precisely what additional traits or characteristics adolescents must possess in order to be 
entitled to make autonomous decisions.  According to Foreman, another author, what is 
lacking is social independence.343  
Requiring something more than capacity before an individual is capable of 
autonomous decision-making solely because they fall below a legislated age of majority 
341  She must, as is discussed further below, also maintain capacity throughout the study.  As well, I say that 
her ability to make other decisions is “largely irrelevant” because, to the degree that her other life 
choices demonstrate her ability to make informed decisions based on her own life goals, they may be 
considered. 
342  Lainie Friedman Ross, Children, Families and Health Care Decision Making (Oxford, U.K.:  Oxford 
University Press, 1998) at 56-74.   
343  L. Steinberg & S. Silverberg, “The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early Adolescence” (1986) 57 Child 
Development 841 and R. Turner et al., “Autonomy, Relatedness, and the Initiation of Health Risk 
Behaviors in Early Adolescence” (1993) 12 Health Psychology 200, both cited in D.M. Foreman, “The 
Family Rule:  a Framework for Obtaining Ethical Consent For Medical Interventions From Children” 
(1999) 25 J. Medical Ethics 491 at 492. 
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is ethically problematic for two reasons.344  Firstly, it cannot be supported by the general 
conception of autonomy.  Specifically, the Tri-Council Policy Statement refers to 
“person” and the Belmont Report refers to “an individual” and “individuals”.  It is a 
tenuous stretch to suggest that these terms implicitly include only those persons or 
individuals over the age of majority.  Had that limit been intended, it would have been 
explicitly stated.   
Secondly, Foreman ignores the fact that making an autonomous choice requires 
capacity and voluntariness.345  Having capacity for autonomous decision-making does not 
necessarily mean an individual has made an autonomous choice in a particular instance.  
This is because in order for a decision to be autonomous, the individual must have the 
capacity to make the decision and the decision must be made voluntarily.  All individuals, 
regardless of age, must make decisions voluntarily in order for them to be autonomous.346   
The second question raised is what detriment to others warrants overriding a 
minor’s autonomy?  Parents (or other legal guardians) are responsible for providing their 
minor children with the necessaries of life.  This notion serves as the basis for the child 
protection legislation discussed in Chapter 2.  However, does this responsibility translate 
into a right to override a decision made by a mature minor solely because the parents 
disagree with the mature minor’s decision?  I submit it does not.  I would further argue 
that the detriment that must be demonstrated before overriding a mature minor’s decision 
with respect to research participation is much closer to (if not the same as) that required 
344  Support from the psychological literature for my position that capacity cannot be determined based on 
age is set out in Chapter 4.  
345  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at 27. 
346  This thesis is only focused on the capacity component of autonomy.  The point that voluntariness is also 
required is raised here because an alleged lack of voluntariness cannot ground a distinction between 
minors and adults because all persons are subject to a voluntariness requirement.   
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to override an adult’s decision.  An example here may be useful in proving this point.  
Imagine potential research participant ‘A’ who is seventeen years and three hundred and 
sixty-four days old and who has been found to have decision-making capacity.  She 
wishes to participate in an oncology drug trial but her parents do not support her decision.  
Now, imagine potential research participant ‘B’ who is identical to ‘A’ in all respects 
except that she is eighteen years and one day old.  Both live in a jurisdiction where the 
age of majority is eighteen years of age.  It is quite difficult, if not impossible, to defend 
from an ethical standpoint overriding ‘A’’s wishes but respecting ‘B’’s decision. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that in the case of an adult, the wishes of other 
individuals are not generally known at the time informed consent is sought.  
Consequently, any harm that will justify overriding a mature minor or an adult’s 
autonomous decision should be readily ascertainable from the situation itself and be of a 
significant nature.  The views of parents should therefore not be canvassed by researchers 
prior to determining if the minor has decision-making capacity.  If she does, parental 
opinion becomes largely irrelevant (unless it brings into question the voluntariness of the 
minor’s decision).     
B. Paternalism 
As noted above, according to the principle of respect for persons, where an 
individual lacks full autonomy, they are in need of protection.  The moral obligation to 
act for the benefit of others, including the obligation to protect them from possible harm 
is known as the principle of beneficence.347  The means used to discharge this moral 
obligation is the principle of paternalism, which can be defined as “the intentional 
347  Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 305 at 207. 
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overriding of one person’s preferences or actions by another person, where the person 
who overrides justifies this action by appeal to the goal of benefitting or of preventing or 
mitigating harm to the person whose preferences or actions are overridden.”348  Defined 
in this way, paternalism clearly serves beneficence.  As well, although paternalism can 
carry a negative connotation or can be seen as prejudging interference as inappropriate, 
the formulation of the principle adopted here does neither. 
Bearing this contextual backdrop in mind, I now return to looking at paternalism 
more closely.  Some authors have divided paternalism into soft paternalism and hard 
paternalism.  Whereas hard paternalism involves interfering with decisions made by 
individuals capable of autonomous decision-making to protect them from the 
consequences of their decisions, soft paternalism involves interfering with the decisions 
made by an individual whose decision-making is not voluntary or not autonomous (or 
presumed to be lacking in either of those traits).349  According to Miller, examples of 
circumstances that can give rise to soft paternalism include: 
mistaken or inadequate factual beliefs, substantially impaired 
cognitive functioning, gross defects in rationality, impulsiveness, 
lack of self-control or weakness of will, distortions of judgment or 
appreciation relating to risks of harm – for example the tendency 
to underestimate long-term risks or overweight short-term 
benefits, and vulnerability to power or authority.350 
Although age is not mentioned by Miller directly, it could be argued that minors as a 
group are captured within a number of the circumstances he cites.   
348  Ibid. at 208.     
349  Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, “Facing Up To Paternalism in Research Ethics” (2007) May-
June 24 at 26 [Miller & Wertheimer]; J. Feinberg, Harm to Self (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1986) at 12. 
350  Miller & Wertheimer, ibid. at 27. 
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The impulsiveness noted by Miller has been taken up by Levine as a reason to 
limit the ability of even mature minors to consent to their own research participation.  
Specifically, while he acknowledges that it is overly paternalistic to treat mature minors 
like children if they do in fact have the same capacity as adults, Levine goes on to argue 
that the authority of mature minors to provide informed consent to research should be 
limited somewhat because “many of them are more likely than adults to act 
impulsively.”351  No proof is given by Levine for the claim that “many...act more 
impulsively”.  Absent such supporting evidence, the claim ought not to be used to restrict 
the ability of mature minors to make their own decisions regarding participation in 
research. 
Authors subscribing to this dichotomy generally agree that soft paternalism is 
relatively easy to justify.  They disagree, however, as to whether hard paternalism can 
ever be justified.  Feinberg, for example, claims that hard paternalism is never justifiable 
whereas Miller has adopted the position that, although it is harder to justify than soft 
paternalism, it is not impossible to justify.352  Ultimately, in the case of younger minors, 
paternalism can be justified on the basis of soft paternalism.353  However, if one looks 
only at mature minors (rather than all minors), it becomes more difficult to bring the 
narrower group within one of Miller’s circumstances and impossible to prove Levine’s 
impulsiveness justification.  This position is supported by the fact that, by definition 
mature minors have similar cognitive abilities to adults and they are capable of 
appreciating the harms and benefits of research participation.  Mature minors ought 
351  Robert J. Levine, “Adolescents as Research Subjects Without Permission of Their Parents or Guardians:  
Ethical Considerations” (1995) 17 J. Adolescent Health 287 at 294. 
352  Supra note 349. 
353  John H. Sorenson & Garrett E. Bergman, “Delineating Paternalism in Pediatric Care” (1984) 5 
Theoretical Medicine 93 at 93. 
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therefore not to be presumed to be in need of protection merely because minors can 
generally be presumed to be incapable of autonomous decision-making.   
Based on my position that mature minors are not (or cannot be presumed to be) 
lacking in autonomy or voluntariness, if mature minors are to be denied the right the 
consent, it must justified on the basis of hard paternalism, not soft paternalism.  Stated 
differently, if they are to have their decisions overridden, the reason for doing so would 
generally have to be worthy of overriding the autonomy rights of an adult in like 
circumstances.   
C. Vulnerability 
Despite my conclusion that only hard paternalism can ground overriding a mature 
minor’s decision to participate in a research study, minors are frequently collectively 
classified as vulnerable.354  Given this historical classification, it is necessary to critically 
evaluate whether considering all mature minors as vulnerable is defensible on ethical 
grounds.  In order to do so, an understanding of what constitutes vulnerability and how 
we determine whether it exists in a particular set of circumstances is needed. 
Vulnerability can be succinctly defined as “an identifiably increased likelihood of 
incurring additional or greater wrong.”355  Vulnerability must therefore be related to a 
sufficiently specific wrong or harm, otherwise it is impossible to determine what 
protective measures, if any, are appropriate.  In the research context, only vulnerabilities 
that affect an individual’s ability to consent or render it doubtful that the individual 
354  Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 305 at 90; European Union’s Ad Hoc Group for the Development 
of Implementing Guidelines for Directive 2001/20/EC, “Ethical Considerations for Clinical Trials on 
Medicinal Products Conducted with the Paediatric Population” (2008) 15 Eur. J. Health L. 223 at 249 
[E.U. Ad Hoc Group]. 
355 Samia A. Hurst, “Vulnerability in Research and Health Care:  Describing the Elephant in the Room?” 
(2008) 22 Bioethics 191 at 195. 
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intended to give her permission to participate in the research need to be considered by 
researchers.  Vulnerability in everyday life does not necessarily mean that an individual is 
a vulnerable research subject.356  This is because any vulnerability that does not affect a 
person’s ability to consent is irrelevant to the determination of who should be afforded 
the right to consent to research participation.   
Views as to who is truly vulnerable and how those individuals are identified 
differ.  With respect to children, at one extreme there are those that claim that all children 
(which term is defined as including all minors) are vulnerable.357 For those groups and 
individual scholars, the vulnerability of children is an absolute truth that need not be 
questioned further.358  One author has attributed this vulnerability to the “lengthy 
experience with the incapacities of minors – some physical, some cognitive, some 
economic, some psychological and some social – that expose them to exploitation.”359 
Fortunately, some ethicists are becoming increasingly critical of the labelling of 
specific subpopulations as vulnerable.360  There appear to be two primary reasons for this 
criticism.  Firstly, labelling entire subpopulations ignores individual variations amongst 
members of that subpopulation.361  Secondly, too many people end up being classified as 
vulnerable, thereby diminishing the utility of the concept (i.e. if nearly everyone falls 
356  Kenneth Kipnis, “Seven Vulnerabilities in the Pediatric Research Subject” (2003) 24 Theoretical 
Medicine 107 at 109 [Kipnis]. 
357  See e.g. E.U. Ad Hoc Group, supra note 354 at 249. 
358  See e.g. Gail E. Henderson, Arlene M. Davis, & Nancy M.P. King, “Vulnerability to Influence:  A 
Two-Way Street” (2004) 4 American J. of Bioethics 50 at 51 [Henderson, Davis, & King]. 
359  Jonathan D. Moreno, “The Natural History of Vulnerability” (2004) 4 American J. of Bioethics 52 at 
53.  See also Amar D. Trivedi, “Rethinking Adolescent Assent:  A Triangular Approach” (2005) 5 
American J. of Bioethics 75 at 75 for claim that power imbalance between physicians (and arguably 
researchers) and adolescents leaves the latter vulnerable. 
360  See e.g. Florencia Luna, “Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability” (2009) 2 International J. of 
Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 121 at 121 [Luna]; Carol Levine et al., “The Limitations of 
“Vulnerability” as a Protection for Human Research Participants” (2004) 4 American J. of Bioethics 44 
at 47 [Carol Levine].  
361  Kipnis, supra note 356 at 107; Henderson, Davis, & King, supra note 358 at 50; Luna, ibid. at 123; 
Carol Levine, ibid. at 46-47. 
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within one group or another, are the means used to protect them really special protections 
or do they become standard elements of research?).362   
The result of this growing body of critics has been the emergence of new means 
of ‘flagging’ potentially vulnerable individuals.  One such tool that has been developed is 
Kipnis’ catalogue of seven vulnerabilities, which essentially sets out the seven types of 
vulnerability that may affect the permissibility of research involving minors.  Those 
vulnerabilities are: 
1. Incapacitational: Does the C[andidate]-S[ubject] lack the 
capacity to deliberate about and decide whether to participate 
in the study? 
2. Juridic: Is the C-S liable to the authority of others who may 
have an independent interest in that participation?  
3. Deferential: Is the C-S given to patterns of deferential 
behavior that may mask an underlying unwillingness to 
participate? 
4. Social: Does the C-S belong to a group whose rights and 
interests have been socially disvalued? 
5. Situational: Is the C-S in a situation in which medical 
exigency prevents the education and deliberation needed to 
decide whether to participate in the study? 
6. Medical: Has the C-S been selected, in part, because of the 
presence of a serious health-related condition for which there 
are no satisfactory remedies? 
7. Allocational: Is the C-S or proxy lacking in subjectively 
important social goods that will be provided as a consequence 
of participation in research?363  
Although Kipnis’ taxonomy has been criticized on the basis that it leads to the 
same end as the subpopulation labelling approach – it creates fixed categories.  However, 
even Luna who levels this criticism is prepared to concede that the taxonomy could be a 
useful guide.364  I agree.  Kipnis’ seven vulnerabilities gives researchers and research 
362  Carol Levine, ibid. at 56; Henderson, Davis, & King ibid. 
363  Kipnis, supra note 356 at 110. 
364  Luna, supra note 360 at 135. 
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ethics boards a clear list of possible sources of vulnerability to consider when developing 
research protocols.  This has great practical utility.   
So what does this all mean for the use of protective measures (i.e. paternalistic 
intervention) to override a mature minor’s consent to research participation?365  In the 
end, whether subpopulations are labelled as vulnerable or Kipnis’ taxonomy is used to 
establish categories of vulnerability, the inquiry into vulnerability cannot be stopped 
there.  Whether a particular potential research subject is in need of protection with respect 
to her involvement in a specific research project ought to then be evaluated by 
researchers on an individual basis as part of the consent process.366  In the framework I 
propose in Chapter Four, this assessment of vulnerability could be carried out as part of 
the individualized capacity assessment of each minor.   
IV. ETHICAL INSTRUMENTS 
A. The Declaration of Helsinki 
When it revised the Declaration of Helsinki in 2008, the World Medical 
Association added the “right to self-determination”367 as one of the key considerations to 
be weighed when attempting to strike the appropriate balance between the need for 
research to improve society’s collective ability to understand and treat various medical 
conditions against the various needs of research subjects.  Beyond the right to self-
365  I am only referring to consent because minors with some understanding of the proposed research (i.e. 
threshold is lower than that to be deemed a mature minor) who decline research participation must have 
their dissent respected under art. 3.10 of the Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1. 
366  Joseph P. DeMarco, “Vulnerability:  A Needed Moral Safeguard” (2004) 4 American J. of Bioethics 82 
at 83. 
367  Supra note 41 at para. 11. 
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determination, the other recognized needs of research subjects are the need to “protect the 
life, health, dignity, integrity,..., privacy, and confidentiality of personal information.”368   
There is nothing in the Declaration of Helsinki that suggests that legally 
competent minors are to be treated any differently than legally competent adults.  
Specifically, the limits on the “right to self-determination” based upon whether an 
individual is competent are then set out in paragraphs 22, 24, 27, and 28, which state: 
22. Participation by competent individuals as subjects in 
medical research must be voluntary.  Although it may be 
appropriate to consult family members or community leaders, 
no competent individual may be enrolled in a research study 
unless he or she freely agrees. 
 
24. In medical research involving competent human subjects, each 
potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims, 
methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, 
institutional affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated 
benefits and potential risks of the study and the discomfort it 
may entail, and any other relevant aspects of the study. The 
potential subject must be informed of the right to refuse to 
participate in the study or to withdraw consent to participate at 
any time without reprisal. Special attention should be given to 
the specific information needs of individual potential subjects 
as well as to the methods used to deliver the information. After 
ensuring that the potential subject has understood the 
information, the physician or another appropriately qualified 
individual must then seek the potential subject's freely-given 
informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot 
be expressed in writing, the non-written consent must be 
formally documented and witnessed. 
 
27. For a potential research subject who is incompetent, the 
physician must seek informed consent from the legally 
authorized representative. These individuals must not be 
included in a research study that has no likelihood of benefit 
for them unless it is intended to promote the health of the 
population represented by the potential subject, the research 
cannot instead be performed with competent persons, and the 
research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden. 
368  Ibid.     
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28. When a potential research subject who is deemed 
incompetent is able to give assent to decisions about 
participation in research, the physician must seek that 
assent in addition to the consent of the legally authorized 
representative. The potential subject's dissent should be 
respected. [Emphasis added]369 
Arguably what is most interesting from the above-cited paragraphs is the lack of 
mention of age or childhood as an example of incompetent research subjects.  Prior to 
2008, the predecessor to paragraph 27 referred to “a legally incompetent minor”370 while 
the equivalent to the current paragraph 28 stated, in part, “when a subject deemed legally 
incompetent, such as a minor child...”371  Although both the previous and current versions 
of paragraphs 27 and 28 allow for the possibility that not all minors are incompetent, the 
2008 revision seems to make this more obvious in that it implies that the minor’s capacity 
must be evaluated and only if found incompetent is third party consent to be obtained.   
B. The Tri-Council Policy Statement 
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, the guidelines set out in the Tri-
Council Policy Statement are based on the principles of respect for persons, concern for 
welfare, and justice.  In the case of mature minors and their ability to consent to research, 
it is primarily the principle of respect for persons that is engaged.  Additionally, the 
potential vulnerability of individual mature minors is also directly addressed.
369  Ibid. at paras. 22, 24, 27-28.  
370  Ibid. at para. 24. 
371  Ibid. at para. 25. 
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(i) Mature Minors and Their Capacity to Consent 
The Tri-Council Policy Statement unequivocally affords mature minors the ability 
to consent to their own research participation.  Support from this position is based on 
three key points.  Firstly, the general statements on the principle of respect for persons do 
not limit an individual’s ability to consent to her participation on the basis of age.  The 
most relevant portions of those statements declare:   
Respect for Persons implies that individuals who participate in 
research should do so voluntarily, understanding the purpose of 
the research, and its risks and potential benefits, as fully as 
reasonably possible. Where a person has the capacity to 
understand this information, and the ability to act on it 
voluntarily, the decision to participate is generally seen as an 
expression of autonomy. The Policy refers to the process of 
seeking consent from prospective participants, which may result 
in either agreement or refusal to participate. This process is meant 
to emphasize Respect for Persons. Under no circumstances may 
researchers proceed to conduct research with anyone who has 
refused to participate. Subject to exceptions set out in this Policy, 
consent must be obtained from participants prior to the conduct of 
research. 
 
Equally, Respect for Persons implies that those who lack the 
capacity to decide for themselves should nevertheless have the 
opportunity to participate in research that may be of benefit 
to themselves or others. Authorized third parties acting on 
behalf of these individuals decide whether participation would 
be appropriate.372 [Emphasis added] 
 
According to these statements, the three funding bodies (CIHR, NSERC, and SSHERC) 
as well as other organizations who have endorsed the Tri-Council Policy Statement, are 
satisfied that the ethical obligations arising out of the notion of respect for persons will be 
discharged so long as individuals who have capacity can determine whether or not they 
will participate in a research study.  The principle only supports obtaining consent from a 
legally authorized third party if an individual (whether she is a minor or not) lacks 
372  Supra note 1 at 27. 
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capacity.  Stated somewhat differently, capacity is both necessary and sufficient to be 
deemed able to consent to one’s own participation.  There is no separate ‘maturity’ 
requirement.  Of course, the other requirements for informed consent including 
voluntariness must also be established before valid consent can be given.   
Secondly, the only mention of children in the entire section on capacity is at 
article 3.10 which only applies when a minor lacks capacity.  The Tri-Council Policy 
Statement describes capacity itself as: 
…the ability of prospective or actual participants to understand 
relevant information presented about a research project, and to 
appreciate the potential consequences of their decision to 
participate or not participate. This ability may vary according to 
the complexity of the choice being made, the circumstances 
surrounding the decision, or the point in time at which consent is 
sought. The determination of capacity to participate in research, 
then, is not a static determination. It is a process that may change 
over time, depending on the nature of the decision the prospective 
participant needs to make, and on any changes in the participant’s 
condition.  Assessing capacity is a question of determining, at a 
particular point in time, whether a participant (or prospective 
participant) sufficiently understands the nature of a particular 
research project, and the risks, consequences and potential 
benefits associated with it.373 
 
Supra note 1 at 40.  It is worth noting that in the Tri-Council Policy Statement (1998), supra note 319, 
the term “competence” was used instead of “capacity”.  The descriptions of the two terms are, however, 
quite similar.  Specifically, in the Tri-Council Policy Statement (1998), competence was characterized 
at s.2E as:   
the ability of prospective subjects to give informed consent in accord with their 
own fundamental values.  It involves the ability to understand the information 
presented, to appreciate the potential consequences of a decision, and to 
provide free and informed consent.  This ability may vary according to the 
choice being made, the circumstances surrounding the decision, or the time in 
question.  Competence to participate in research, then, is not an all-or-nothing 
condition.  It does not require prospective subjects to have the capacity to make 
every kind of decision.  It requires that they be competent to make an informed 
decision about participation in particular research.  Competence is neither a 
global condition nor a static one; it may be temporary or permanent.
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Given the wording, any doubt as to whether or not mature minors can consent to their 
own participation that existed when the Tri-Council Policy Statement (1998) was 
operative has now been removed.  
 Thirdly, and for still further certainty, the commentary that accompanies article 
4.4 of the Tri-Council Policy Statement specifically states “where children have not yet 
attained the capacity to consent for themselves to participate in research, researchers shall 
seek consent from an authorized third party...”374  This again amounts to saying that 
where a minor has capacity, her consent is required and consent from a third party will 
not be sufficient.    
(ii)  Vulnerability of Mature Minors 
The Tri-Council Policy Statement’s clear endorsement of autonomy of all 
individuals with decision-making capacity regardless of age should not, however, be 
regarded as a failure to recognize that minors may be vulnerable and in need of different 
treatment.   
In what looks at first glance to be the ‘labelling’ of children collectively as 
vulnerable, close examination of the section on children reveals that this is not in fact the 
case.  Specifically, the role of children in research is discussed in “Chapter 4:  Fairness 
and Equity in Research Participation”.  The introductory comments of that section, state 
in part:   
Children have varying degrees of maturity – metabolically, 
immunologically and cognitively – that may present important 
challenges for research design and the consent process, depending 
on the nature and complexity of the research. In addition to the 
vulnerability that arises from their developmental stage, 
374  Supra note 1 at art. 4.4 and accompanying commentary. 
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children may also lack capacity to consent to participate in 
research (see Article 4.6).375 [Emphasis added]  
 
Then, the commentary accompanying article 4.4 plainly states that all children are subject 
to article 4.6.  Prior to setting out article 4.6, it is worth noting that “children” is not 
defined in the Tri-Council Policy Statement.  However, it is unnecessary to attribute a 
specific meaning to the term because article 4.6 speaks to circumstances where immature 
minors can be included in research.  It says nothing about mature minors: 
Subject to applicable legal requirements, individuals who lack 
capacity to consent to participate in research shall not be 
inappropriately excluded from research.  Where a researcher 
seeks to involve individuals in research who do not have capacity 
to consent for themselves, the researcher shall, in addition to 
fulfilling the conditions in Articles 3.9 and 3.10, satisfy the REB 
that: 
(a) the research question can be addressed only with participants 
within the identified group; and 
(b) the research does not expose the participants to more than 
minimal risk without the prospect of direct benefits for them; 
or 
(c) where the research entails only minimal risk, it should at least 
have the prospect of providing benefits to participants or to a 
group that is the focus of the research and to which the 
participants belong.376 
 
Taken together, the immediately preceding extracts from the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement necessarily leads to the conclusion that according to the funding agencies, 
vulnerability does not in and of itself preclude an individual from consenting to research 
participation.  The implications of this point are significant.  It means that even if mature 
minors as a group are found to be potentially vulnerable (either through subpopulation 
labelling or the application of Kipnis’ taxonomy) and then a mature minor is found to be 
375  Ibid. at 49. 
376  Ibid. at art. 4.6. 
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individually vulnerable through an individualized capacity assessment, she may still be 
afforded the right to single-handedly decide whether she wishes to participate.  
Furthermore, researchers are required to make this process possible by ensuring that 
consent forms are appropriately drafted.  The commentary accompanying article 4.7 
makes this point clear: 
The core principles of Respect for Persons, Concern for Welfare, 
and Justice entail special ethical obligations toward individuals or 
groups whose circumstances may lead to their vulnerability in the 
context of a specific research project and limit their ability to fully 
safeguard their own interests. Those who are owed special ethical 
obligations may include individuals who are institutionalized, 
those in dependent situations, or those whose circumstances (e.g., 
poverty or poor health status) may render even modest 
participation incentives so attractive as to constitute an 
inducement to take risks they would otherwise not take. Their 
situation may also compromise the voluntariness of consent in 
other ways. However, individuals should not automatically be 
considered vulnerable simply because of assumptions made about 
the vulnerability of the group to which they belong. Their 
particular circumstances shall be considered in the context of the 
proposed research project.377  
 
 By preceding all references to vulnerability with the word “may”, the three funding 
agencies are essentially adopting Luna’s position that although groups may be more 
likely to be vulnerable, individual vulnerability still needs to be assessed. 
C. The ICH GCP 
 As noted above, the ICH GCP includes minors as a class in its definition of 
“vulnerable subjects”.  As well, statements contained within the ICH GCP clearly 
establish that all minors are to be active participants in the informed consent process, 
regardless of the type of research in which their participation is sought.  However, in so 
377  Ibid. at art. 4.7 and accompanying commentary.  See also ibid. at 40-44. 
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doing, the drafters of the ICH GCP also add much confusion to the role of minors in 
research.  The laudable yet also problematic provision reads:   
when a clinical trial (therapeutic or non-therapeutic) includes 
subjects who can only be enrolled in the trial with the consent of 
the subject’s legally acceptable representative (e.g., minors, or 
patients with severe dementia), the subject should be informed 
about the trial to the extent compatible with the subject’s 
understanding and if capable the subject should sign and 
personally date the written informed consent.378   
 
The delineation of the role of minors in the informed consent process is not in itself 
problematic.  Rather, the difficulty flows from the implicit assumption contained within 
paragraph 4.8.12 that no minor can consent to her own participation in a research 
study.379  This assumption is not necessarily true in the case of all minors.  As is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, there is no explicit pronouncement in any 
common law jurisdiction in Canada that precludes mature minors from consenting to 
their own participation in at least some research studies.  Admittedly, there is also no 
clear legal authority bestowing such a right on mature minors.  Furthermore, although 
ethical frameworks may suggest limitations on when minors can consent to their own 
participation, such pronouncements are not legally-binding on researchers or the courts 
nor should they be taken as such.380      
 Seen in this light then, paragraph 4.8.12 of the ICH GCP can have one of two 
consequences.  Firstly, it can serve to bolster the claim that minors (be they mature 
minors or not) can never consent to their own participation in research on a quasi-legal 
378  Supra note 55 at para. 4.8.12. 
379  This assumption follows from the clause “(e.g. minors, or patients with severe dementia)” which could 
be interpreted to mean that the consent of a substitute decision-maker is needed in all instances where 
minors are to be involved in research. 
380  This comment is not intended to suggest that ethical guidelines are entirely irrelevant in legal 
proceedings.  They may, for example, be considered by the courts in defining the standard of care owed 
by researchers and determining if a particular researcher has discharged her duty of care.   
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basis.  Secondly, the provision can be deemed applicable only in instances where the 
consent of a substitute decision-maker is in fact needed in order for a minor to participate 
in a research study.  Given that the ICH GCP is intended to help researchers comply with 
policies, regulations and statutes, it is doubtful that one poorly drafted paragraph 
contained therein would be sufficient to curtail the rights of mature minors that may 
otherwise exist, especially where it can bear two interpretations.  As such, if there is a 
legal basis that enables a mature minor to consent to her own participation in a research 
study, paragraph 4.8.12 of the ICH GCP should not be found to alter this entitlement in 
any way.  In fact, in the framework set out in chapter 5 of this thesis, I argue that there is 
in fact such a basis in law. 
 The meaning ascribed to paragraph 4.8.12 further affects the ambit of paragraph 
4.8.14 of the ICH GCP, which sets out the instances where a substitute decision-maker 
can consent to a subject’s participation in a study that is expected to be of no clinical 
benefit to study participants.381   
 For purposes of this thesis, what is not captured by paragraph 4.8.14 is arguably 
of greater significance.  Its application is restricted to research that is of no direct benefit 
to participants.  No mention is made of any analogous limitations that may exist in the 
case of therapeutic trials anywhere in the ICH GCP.  Based on this omission, there 
381  Paragraph 4.8.14 of the ICH GCP, supra note 55, reads: 
Non-therapeutic trials may be conducted in subjects with consent of a legally acceptable 
representative provided the following conditions are fulfilled:  
(a) The objectives of the trial cannot be met by means of a trial in subjects who can 
give informed consent personally.  
(b) The foreseeable risks to the subjects are low.  
(c) The negative impact on the subject's well-being is minimized and low.  
(d) The trial is not prohibited by law.  
(e) The approval/favourable opinion of the IRB/IEC is expressly sought on the 
inclusion of such subjects, and the written approval/favourable opinion covers 
this aspect. 
132
appears to be no restrictions (beyond those imposed upon research participants generally) 
on the authority of a substitute decision-maker to consent to a minor’s participation in 
research that will be of direct benefit to the minor.
D. The ICH CIMPPP 
Although issued by the same body as the ICH GCP, the ICH CIMPPP improves 
upon some of the ambiguity found in the former.  Most notably, it explicitly concedes 
that “…mature minors (defined by local laws) may be capable of giving autonomous 
consent”.382  Despite the fact that this acknowledgement is found at the end of a 
paragraph that begins “as a rule, a pediatric subject is legally unable to provide informed 
consent”383, it remains a welcome improvement upon paragraph 4.8.12 in the ICH GCP.  
The recognition that some minors may in fact be able to provide autonomous consent 
may also be taken as clarifying the confusing phraseology found within paragraph 4.8.12 
of the ICH GCP.  It also bolsters the argument that nothing within the ICH GCP (or 
likewise the ICH CIMPPP) is intended to curtail any legal rights that may otherwise 
exist.    
The second element of the ICH CIMPPP of interest is the section on the timing of 
pediatric studies in relation to research involving less vulnerable populations.  A list of 
factors to be considered when determining when pediatric studies should be initiated is 
set out in section 2.1 of the guidance document.  Generally speaking, studies aimed at 
developing products to treat serious or life-threatening conditions for which there is no 
(or little) treatment should be initiated “early”.  Other pediatric studies should be started 
382  Supra note 56 at para. 2.6.3. 
383  Ibid. 
133
at “later phases of clinical development,” when at least some preliminary adult research 
data is available so that children will be exposed to fewer (or less severe) risks.384   
V. CONCLUSION 
Ethical frameworks have evolved considerably from the time the Nuremburg 
Code was passed to today with respect to their treatment of minors.  Initially, minors 
were excluded from research altogether.  They were then included but deemed vulnerable 
and/or incompetent and so parental consent was deemed necessary for their participation.  
Most recently, however, the Declaration of Helsinki has been amended to remove 
references to all minors being incompetent.  As well, the Tri-Council Policy Statement 
now expressly recognizes that mature minors are able to (and must) consent to their own 
participation in research.  Despite there being some potential vulnerability on the part of 
individual mature minors, such vulnerability (when established) does not in and of itself 
remove their right to autonomous decision-making.  The recent changes to the 
Declaration of Helsinki and to the Tri-Council Policy Statement mean that the two ethical 
frameworks that have the most influence on how medical research is carried out in 
Canada now allow a broader recognition of the rights of mature minors.   
Over time, the role of law and ethics has come to be recognized as different.  As 
part of this process, ethical frameworks have come to prescribe conduct that may differ 
from what is required under the law.  These different roles affect the penalties that can be 
imposed upon researchers.  However, practically speaking, it is hoped that all those 
involved in the research enterprise strive to live up to the spirit of both legal and ethical 
requirements.  Taken together, the various legal and ethical instruments that shape the 
384  Ibid. at para. 2.3. 
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Canadian medical research landscape leave room for at least some minors to consent to 
their own participation in research if they are able to establish that they are competent.  
Now that the research setting has been examined from both perspectives, it is now 
possible to turn to the development of a framework that, while respecting the legal and 
ethical boundaries that exist, allows for the greatest role for mature minors in the consent 







THE FRAMEWORK:   






 In the two preceding chapters, I canvassed the legal and ethical instruments that 
apply to at least some research carried out in Canada.  Readers will recall that following a 
review of the legal instruments, I concluded that the welfare principle has not been 
incorporated into the common law mature minor rule.  As well, it was recognized that 
some research activities will be captured under consent to treatment legislation and child 
protection legislation in certain contexts.  Given the lack of mention of research in both 
those types of statutes, their applicability seems far from an intended consequence.  
Quebec is the only province or territory to have explicitly legislated with respect to the 
role of minors in the medical research consent process.  In terms of ethics documents, 
researchers carrying out research in Canada look to the newly released Tri-Council Policy 
Statement, which specifies how it is to be applied.  The Tri-Council Policy Statement 
briefly discusses the need for researchers and research ethics board members to be aware 
of and comply with any applicable legal requirements.  Rather than providing researchers 
with what the legal requirements are, the Tri-Council Policy Statement only gives 
researchers a list of the topics that may be captured by the law.  Specifically, it states: 
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…These legal and regulatory requirements may vary depending 
on the jurisdiction in Canada in which the research is being 
conducted, and who is funding and/or conducting the research, 
and they may comprise constitutional, statutory, regulatory, 
common law, and/or international or legal requirements of 
jurisdictions outside of Canada. Where the research is considered 
to be a governmental activity, for example, standards for 
protecting privacy flowing from the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, federal privacy legislation and regulatory 
requirements would apply. 
 
The law affects and regulates the standards and conduct of 
research involving humans in a variety of areas, including, but not 
limited to privacy, confidentiality, intellectual property and the 
capacity of participants. In addition, human rights legislation and 
most documents on research ethics prohibit discrimination on a 
variety of grounds and recognize equal treatment as 
fundamental…385 
 
This lack of guidance is particular problematic.  Given that many of those 
requirements (and the related legal standards) are rather vague and unclear to a legal 
scholar, it is doubtful that many researchers are able to make heads or tails of them, 
assuming they even knew where to look.386   
In discussing the interaction between the Tri-Council Policy Statement and the 
law, it is also worth noting that in cases where there is a perceived (or actual) tension 
between the law and ethics, the Tri-Council Policy Statement are given the following 
guidance:  
Researchers may face situations where they experience a tension 
between the requirements of the law and the guidance of the 
ethical principles in this Policy. In such situations, researchers 
should strive to comply with the law in the application of ethical 
principles. Researchers should consult with colleagues, the REB 
385  Supra note 1 at 12. 
386  The legal standard that is arguably the least clear is that pertaining to the capacity of minors in instances 
not captured by child protection legislation (which as I argued in Chapter 2 is in all research).  Does it 
require that a maturity threshold be met?  Can minors consent to their own participation that is not in 
their bests interests and if so, when can they do so?  How is capacity to be assessed and based on what 
information?  These are only some of the questions that remain unanswered.  
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or any relevant professional body, and if necessary, seek 
independent legal advice to help resolve any conflicts between 
law and ethics, and guide an appropriate course of action. 
[Emphasis Added]387 
 
 With due respect to the authors of the Statement, striving to comply with the law 
will not shield them from liability.  They need to actually comply with it; otherwise if 
they are found to have acted contrary to the law, researchers will be liable for damages 
that flowed from their actions.388  Fortunately, because of the suggestion to seek legal 
advice, any actions by a researcher or research ethics board with respect to the handling 
of a conflict between the law and the Tri-Council Policy Statement should be carried out 
knowing the consequences.   
The result of years of developing vague and unclear standards has meant that 
those responsible for carrying out research have been left with few practical tools to carry 
out research on adolescents in an ethically and legally defensible manner.  It is largely for 
that reason that this thesis has focused on providing all stakeholders with a perspective on 
the entire research landscape as it applies to one group – adolescents.  Having painted a 
picture of this landscape, attention now shifts to proposing a framework that can be used 
in practice to ensure the role of adolescents in research is properly respected.  The 
framework set out below is not an ethical instrument in its own right, nor is it a legal 
instrument; it is a practical tool to help bridge the gap between law and ethics.  It is also 
intended to draw the attention of researchers to the possible capacity of minors involved 
in medical research.   
387  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at 12. 
388  I say “if they are found to have acted contrary to the law” because in cases where there is some 
ambiguity in the legal standard, researchers could raise the ethical standard as evidence of how the 
ambiguity in the law should be resolved. 
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  Prior to setting out the framework, it is necessary to provide additional insight to 
readers as to how it was developed (beyond the contents of specific instruments) as well 
as the limits of the framework.  The first noteworthy point in this regard is that I feel it is 
desirable to have a “national” model so as to ensure that the rights of adolescents are 
defined similarly across the country.  The fact that minors residing in different 
jurisdictions are not treated the same way under the law, be it child protection or consent 
to treatment legislation, does not mean that they should not be treated in a more uniform 
manner when it comes to research.  Simply stated, I have seized an opportunity to 
encourage a more just recognition of rights.   
  Developing such a framework is not an easy task; given that each common law 
jurisdiction has passed different child protection legislation and some also have consent 
to treatment legislation, not to mention the fact that Quebec law explicitly forbids minors 
from consenting to their own research participation.  In light of this reality, the 
framework proposed herein recognizes the differences between common law jurisdictions 
and remains flexible enough so that it can be adapted to meet all legal requirements.  
With respect to Quebec, however, short of changing the law, there is no amount of 
modification to this framework that would allow minors to consent to their own research 
participation.389  The model set out later in this chapter cannot be applied to research 
being carried out in Quebec.   
  The second point is that even though some minors are afforded the right to 
provide autonomous consent under this framework, there is nothing requiring them to do 
so without consulting their parents, friends, and/or members of the research team.  Those 
389  In particular, article 21 of the Civil Code of Québec, supra note 112, would need to be amended. 
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minors are merely being extended a right afforded to all adults whose competence has not 
been challenged – the right to decide whether they wish to participate in a particular 
research study and the concomitant right to decide who they want to involve in their 
decision-making process. 
 This chapter begins by setting out reasons why the manner in which the role of 
teenagers is defined at present is no longer appropriate and why change is needed.  The 
alternative framework is then set out to give readers a complete picture of the proposal.  
Thereafter, the key elements of the frameworks (i.e. the aim of the activity at issue and 
the capacity assessment) are described and justifications are given for their inclusion.  
Reasons why risk was not included as an element are provided.  This chapter then 
concludes with suggestions as to precisely how institutions can go about implementing 
the proposed framework.  
 
II. THE STATUS QUO:  AN ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE  
 The lack of clarity and guidance in legal and ethical instruments as to the proper 
role for minors in the consent process has left researchers defining that role in vastly 
different ways.  One issue is that there is no uniform way in which minors are approached 
for participation.  In some research studies, researchers first seek consent from parents 
prior to involving the minor in any discussion about the research project.  Thereafter, the 
research is discussed with the minor and the minor is asked in some studies to sign a 
consent form identical in content to that signed by her parent(s) while in others the minor 
is asked to sign an assent form.390  Asking minors to sign either type of form without first 
390  See e.g. Marion E. Broome and Deborah J. Richards, “The Influence of Relationships on Children’s and 
Adolescents’ Participation in Research” (2003) 52 Nursing Research 191 at 193 where all minors over 
the age of twelve were required to sign a consent form that was identical in content to that signed by 
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assessing their capacity is problematic.   Having them sign a consent form implies that 
they are able to understand and appreciate the information about the research study 
sufficiently well to consent.  Stated differently, they have decision-making capacity.  This 
begs the question why researchers proceeding in this manner also require parental 
consent (i.e. they are assuming minors are competent yet are not allowing them to 
exercise it).  Conversely, having all minors participating in a given study sign an assent 
form assumes they are incompetent and does not afford minors the opportunity to prove 
they are competent.  In other instances, parents and minors are approached by researchers 
at the same time.391  This too is far from desirable because it denies the right of a 
competent minor to provide legally valid consent free from parental involvement.  
Admittedly, in the case of some minors, there is simply no way to avoid disclosing some 
basic information about the study to parents or authorized third party representatives 
because minors are contacted at home or arrive at the research site accompanied by the 
parent(s).  This does not, however, mean that researchers need to discuss all study 
procedures in the presence of the minor’s parents.  As others have argued, disclosure of 
health information and treatment details (or I would suggest research activities) in 
instances involving older minors who are against such disclosure needs to be justified.392   
their parents, without evaluating the capacity of the minor.  See also Geert Pousset et al., “Attitudes of 
Adolescent Cancer Survivors toward End-of-Life Decisions for Minors” (2009) 124 Pediatrics e1142 at 
e1143 [Pousset et al.] and John Pearce, “Consent to Treatment during Childhood:  The Assessment of 
Competence and Avoidance of Conflict” (1994) 165 British J of Psychiatry 713 at 715 for additional 
examples of instances where researchers solicited parental authorization first.  No explanation is given 
as to why parents were approached first.  In order to know who to call, they necessarily had the names 
of the minors.  This in turn means that researchers could likely have contacted minors first but chose to 
contact parents first.   
391  Broome & Richards, ibid. at 195.   
392  See e.g. Joan Loughrey, “Medical Information, Confidentiality and a Child’s Right to Privacy” (2003) 
23 Legal Stud. 510 at 535. 
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 A second issue relates to how and by whom minors are engaged.  Notably, the 
work of Unguru et al. reveals that parents were four times more likely than physicians to 
involve minors in the decision-making process.  Given that parents only included minors 
forty-three percent of the time, researchers only rarely included minors in the process at 
all.  This lack of inclusion left over half of the minors in the study feeling like they had 
“very little”, “little”, or “no role” in deciding whether to participate in a study.393  Even 
where a minor lacks capacity, they ought to be part of the discussion, if for no other 
reasons than to have their questions answered and to know what the research entails.  
Furthermore, under the Tri-Council Policy Statement researchers are required to look into 
the wishes with regards to research participation of minors who lack legal capacity but 
have “some ability to understand the significance of the research”.394     
 A third issue is the relative inability to know what role researchers are affording to 
minors in the decision-making process at present in Canada and elsewhere.  This is 
because most studies involving adolescents merely state that informed consent was 
obtained from parents.395  This lack of disclosure on the process followed in obtaining 
consent raises three possibilities.  Firstly, it could mean that capacity was appropriately 
assessed and all adolescents involved in a given study were found incompetent.  
Secondly, it could mean that the capacity of minors was not assessed.  Thirdly, it could 
mean that researchers thought that parental consent was required even if the minors were 
competent.  In oncology studies or other complex research projects, I am willing to 
393  Yoram Unguru, Anne M. Sill & Naynesh Kamani, “The Experiences of Children Enrolled in Pediatric 
Oncology Research:  Implications for Assent” (2010) 125 Pediatrics e876 at e880 [Unguru, Sill & 
Kamani]. 
394  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at art. 3.10. 
395  This holding is based on my experience reading published medical literature for previous university 
studies as well as a recent perusal of a variety of medical journals. 
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concede that the first scenario is possible.  However, in more straightforward studies, I 
am doubtful that the capacity of minors is being assessed when a parent is present.  After 
all, if it was being assessed, one would expect at least some minors to be capable of 
autonomous decision-making.  As well, with respect to the third possibility, as ought to 
be clear from the review of applicable legal instruments set out in Chapter 2, there is no 
requirement to seek parental consent unless the activities are captured under the 
applicable consent to treatment legislation or child protection statute.  Regardless of 
which of the first two possibilities proves true for a given research study, greater 
transparency into the decision-making process should be encouraged.  By requiring 
researchers to carry out a capacity assessment of each minor who is being asked to 
participate in a research study, it is my hope that the framework proposed herein will lead 
researchers to include more details on the consent process when publishing their research.  
Stated differently, I hope it will change the typical “informed consent was obtained” type 
statements to “the capacity of all participants was assessed and x number were found to 
have the capacity to give legally valid consent”.        
 Finally, as discussed at length in earlier chapters, in Canada there is no clear 
statement from the courts, the provincial or territorial legislatures, the Federal 
Government, or the principal funding agencies as to whether or not the mature minor rule 
applies to medical research.  There is also only limited guidance on how the capacity of 
minors should be assessed, including whether there is a ‘best interest’ limitation.396  
 These misconceptions and problems in the role afforded to minors are not beyond 
396  See discussion below on the capacity assessment for information on the tools available to researchers as 
well as the discussion in Chapter 2 on the welfare principle for my reasons why there is no ‘best 
interest’ limitation with respect to the right of minors to autonomous decision-making outside of the 
child protection context.  
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redress.  They can and should be remedied by the adoption of a framework that clearly 
and unequivocally sets out for researchers and research ethics board members how 
minors are to be treated in the consent process.  The framework proposed in this thesis 
sets out to do just that.   
III. THE FRAMEWORK AS A WHOLE 
At present, there is no legal or ethical statement that instructs researchers on how 
to undertake the consent process with minors.  There is also no empirical evidence 
available as to whether researchers are presently respecting the rights of mature minors to 
consent to their own research participation or not.  In light of this lacuna, it is proposed 
that the following statements be used to guide researchers carrying out research involving 
minors:  
Researchers shall abide by the following guidelines with respect to 
capacity and minors in research:  
 
(a) All potential research participants who are under the age of 
majority will undergo a capacity assessment to determine if 
they are competent.  If the researcher is satisfied that the 
minor understands and appreciates the nature and 
consequences of participating in research and the alternatives 
to research participation such that he/she is able to decide 
whether to proceed with it or not, the minor will be deemed 
competent. 
 
(b) Researchers shall use an instrument that has been validated 
for use with minors involved in research activities when 
carrying out the capacity assessments under (a). 
 
(c) Researchers shall discuss the specific research project as little 
as possible with a minor’s parent(s) or authorized third party 
representative prior to assessing the minor’s capacity under 
(a).  
 
(d) Unless involvement from parent(s) or other authorized third 
party is requested by a competent minor, researchers shall not 
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discuss the research with the competent minor’s parent(s) or 
other authorized third party.  This applies prior to the signing 
of the consent form as well as during the life of the research 
study. 
 
(e) Unless the law states otherwise, where the competent minor is 
able to provide free and informed consent, that minor’s 
consent to research participation shall be necessary and 
sufficient.    
 
It may also be beneficial to include a graphic representation of the steps to be 
followed by researchers when engaging minors in the consent process.  That diagram 
looks like this:   
Figure 1.  Schematic representation of the framework defining the role to be afforded to minors in the 
consent process for medical research studies. 
I suggest that wording to this effect and the above diagram be incorporated into 
the section of the Tri-Council Policy Statement dealing capacity as soon as an instrument 
to assess the capacity of minors involved in research is developed and validated.397  
Given that it may take some time for both of these events (i.e. the incorporation into the 
Tri-Council Policy Statement and the creation and validation of an instrument) to occur, 
individual research ethics boards are encouraged to require compliance with the above 
guidelines with the exception of (b), as soon as possible.  Support from the Federal 
397  The Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1, does not provide an age at which capacity should be 
presumed. 
145
Government of Canada (through the Office of Paediatric Initiatives) and provincial and 
territorial legislatures is also most desirable.   
IV. AIM OF THE ACTIVITY  
 
The framework proposed herein applies only to research.  Despite the difficulties 
noted in Chapter 1 with respect to distinguishing between research and treatment, I feel it 
is imperative that researchers tease these two spheres of activity apart.  The reasons for 
drawing the distinction between research and treatment, even where both involve 
interactions with the same physician-researcher are set out below.   
  Prior to looking at those reasons, however, it is helpful to consider the ways in 
which minors are involved in research.  For purposes of this framework and the 
discussion throughout this chapter generally, it is necessary to recognize that minors may 
be involved in research in one of two ways.  The research alone scenario includes studies 
designed primarily to “extend knowledge through a disciplined inquiry or systematic 
investigation”398 and consists solely of activities that the minor would not receive if she 
chose not to participate in the proposed study.  This category generally involves research 
on healthy minors.  The mixed research and treatment scenario, in turn, involves research 
(as defined above) as well as procedures that are aimed at benefiting the minor 
specifically and/or procedures that she would undergo even if she chose not to participate 
in the research.399  An example may be beneficial in explaining the two scenarios.  
Consider (a) a study looking at calcium consumption by minors and (b) a chemotherapy 
study that compares a new drug dosing regimen to the standard of care.  While a minor 
participating in (a) may benefit from her participation by learning of a calcium 
398  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at art. 2.1 and accompanying commentary. 
399  See Schwartz, supra note 39, for further discussion on distinguishing between research and treatment. 
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deficiency, such a finding is not the primary purpose of the research.  As well, any action 
by health care professionals as a result of this incidental finding would not be part of the 
study.  The minor in (a) would therefore be asked to participate in research alone.  On the 
other hand, the minor involved in (b) would receive some form of chemotherapy and the 
monitoring that goes along with such treatment (such as regular blood tests), whether or 
not she is enrolled in the study.  She would consequently be involved in mixed research 
and treatment.  Recognizing that there may be instances where researchers are uncertain 
if there is a treatment element (or if a specific procedure constitutes treatment or 
research), it is worth noting that when there any doubt, researchers and research ethics 
boards should ensure that any legal requirements applicable to treatment and research are 
respected.  Where standards of disclosure differ, researchers should meet the more 
onerous standard.  Any legal requirements contained in consent to treatment legislation 
(or very rarely in child protection legislation) must be respected. 
  The framework proposed here draws a distinction based upon the aim of the 
activity at the outset for number of reasons.  Firstly, research and treatment are different.  
Research primarily seeks to generate generalizable knowledge.  Like treatment it can also 
seek to improve the health status of a given patient/research participant.  The difference is 
that in the case of research, the likelihood of improvement is unknown.400  Where 
research activities and treatment are delivered concurrently (be it by the same health care 
professional or not) both of these interests are at play.  Besides the different primary aims 
of research and treatment, as well as the unknown efficacy of research interventions (and 
400  See e.g. Hadskis, supra note 48 at 259-260. 
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consequently different risk to benefit profile), it is appropriate to treat minors involved in 
each of these types of activities differently.   
  Secondly, research and treatment are presently treated differently by legislation, 
by the common law, and by ethical instruments.  As noted in Chapters 2, many 
legislatures have passed consent to treatment legislation, but those statutes do not 
mention research.  Under the common law, all reported decisions involving minors in 
Canada have emerged out of the treatment realm.  Finally, the principal statement on 
research ethics in Canada, the Tri-Council Policy Statement, only applies to research.  
There is no equivalent document that applies to treatment.  Together, this means that in 
the eyes of politicians at the provincial/territorial and federal levels of Government, 
judges, and the authors of the Tri-Council Policy Statement, differential treatment is both 
necessary and appropriate.401  Given this widely held belief and since the aim of this 
thesis is to develop a framework that can be applied nationally in the not-too-distant 
future, it is necessary to be respectful of the positions articulated in existing instruments 
and in the jurisprudence.  This is best achieved by not addressing treatment in the 
framework.  In the framework proposed in this thesis, efforts have been made to accord 
minors the most expansive recognition of rights possible under the current legal and 
ethical landscape.   
  Thirdly, although research and treatment are different, there are also many 
similarities between the actual procedures involved in each.  For example, a blood test 
can be part of a research protocol, much like it can be part of a standard course of 
treatment.  It is the reason why the test is carried out and the use that will be made of the 
401 The Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at 1 was developed following extensive consultation 
with stakeholders, which include researchers, lawyers, and ethicists.  It can therefore be said that at least 
some of those consulted were of the view that research and treatment differ. 
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result that is different between research and treatment.  As a result, some of the individual 
procedures that need to be understood by minors are the same.    The role of minors in the 
consent process for research cannot therefore be defined altogether differently from how 
their role with respect to treatment has been defined.       
  Fourthly, using aim of the activity as the first element in the framework simplifies 
the consent process for researchers.  Specifically, even if minors and their parents are 
unable to distinguish between treatment and research, researchers and research ethics 
boards ought to be able to relatively easily determine if they are operating in the research 
realm or treatment-alone scenario or in the mixed research and treatment scenario as 
opposed to the treatment stream in most instances.402  One easy way to make this 
distinction is for researchers to ask themselves if research ethics board approval was 
required.  If so, there is at least some research component.  Then, to distinguish between 
research alone and mixed research and treatment, researchers need only consider if the 
minor would undergo any of the procedures or receive any of the therapies included 
within the study protocol if she declined participation.  If the answer is yes, then the work 
falls within the mixed research and treatment scenario and the researcher needs to 
consider all laws applicable to the treatment realm as well as those that apply to research.   
Again, researchers should ensure that they comply with the applicable legal requirements 
(i.e. the law that applies to treatment to treatment components and the law that applies to 
research to research components).  If there is any doubt as to whether something is 
treatment or research, researchers should abide by the more onerous requirement.  Doing 
so will reduce their potential exposure to liability.   
402  Unguru, Sill & Kamani, supra note 393 at e880-e881; Jeremy Sugarman et al., “What Patients Say 
About Medical Research” (1998) 20:4 IRB:  Ethics and Human Research 1 at 5-6 [Sugarman].   
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 The clear separation of research from treatment, even when they are carried out 
concurrently will serve to remind researchers that research, due to its nature, sometimes 
carries certain risks that do not exist in the treatment realm.  Potential research 
participants need to be informed of the risks flowing from research and those flowing 
from treatment (when applicable).403  That being said, in cases of mixed research and 
treatment, researchers-clinicians are urged to assess competence to consent to research 
and treatment elements simultaneously.  Although the information to be understood and 
appreciated may be quite different for cases of research and treatment, the general test 
and criteria to be applied should be quite similar.  As well, assessing capacity to consent 
to all interventions that will be delivered concurrently (or within a relatively short period 
of time) regardless of whether they constitute treatment or research recognizes the time-
specific property of capacity determinations.   
 Based on the reasons discussed above, the creation of a framework applicable 
only to the consent process in medical research studies involving minors is appropriate.  
Although there are similarities between research and treatment, the differences between 
these two realms justify different approaches. 
V. CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
The framework requires that a capacity assessment be carried out on all minors.  
There is, however, no specific template for this assessment provided here.  Reasons for 
this omission are set out in greater detail below but generally pertain to the non-existence 
403  Readers are reminded that the disclosure requirement for research and treatment differ.  As noted by 
Hadskis, supra note 48 at 286-290, in the case of treatment, only material risks need to be disclosed 
whereas in research, all known risks must be disclosed. 
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of such a document at present and the inappropriateness of having a legal scholar draft 
one without the benefit of consultation with other interested parties.   
Despite this apparent lack of guidance as to the content of the capacity assessment 
included within the framework, researchers are reminded that such assessments are (or 
ought to be) routinely carried out by clinicians who treat adolescent patients.  Some 
institutions may also already have a process to be followed when evaluating capacity to 
consent.  Those resources should be used until an instrument is specifically validated for 
use with minors involved in research activities.     
The use of a validated instrument when assessing the capacity of all minors whose 
participation in research is sought does not mean that the degree of testing and time to 
carry out the assessment will be the same in all cases.  Where young children are 
concerned, less testing will generally be required to determine competence.  After all, 
once a researcher has conclusively determined that a minor lacks competence, it is 
unnecessary to go on with the remainder of the assessment.  However, as a minor gets 
closer to reaching the age of majority, it becomes increasingly likely that she will be 
capable of autonomous decision-making and so more testing will be required to 
determine on which side of the capacity divide the minor falls.  Regardless of the manner 
in which the capacity assessment is carried out, researchers should document all details 
regarding the assessment in writing.  Such documentation would be of assistance in any 
legal proceeding brought against a researcher for failure to obtain legally valid consent.404 
404  There is no actual evidence to suggest that parents (or other interested parties) would file law suits 
against researchers in cases where informed consent was not sought from them.  There is likewise no 
evidence that minors denied the right to decide whether they wish to participate would sue.  However, if 
and when such a case is brought, researchers would be better positioned to defend the claim if they can 
show to the court the steps they took in assessing capacity and the reasoning that underlies their 
ultimate conclusion of capacity or incapacity, as the case may be.  
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The discussion below begins by first looking at why the framework calls for an 
individualized assessment of each minor’s capacity.  It then situates the assessment 
within the broader consent process by looking at who is responsible for carrying out the 
assessment itself and with whom study-related information is shared.  Thereafter, the 
discussion shifts to considering the types of activities that are to be assessed.  Lastly, 
suggestions are given as to how a new tool could be developed. 
A. Proving Capacity:  Every Minor’s Right 
 The primary aim of this thesis is to clarify the role of minors, particularly 
adolescents, in the decision-making process with respect to research participation.  As it 
stands presently, the age of majority creates a bright line distinction between those who 
are presumed competent and those who are not.  Although both presumptions are 
rebuttable in theory, it is unknown whether minors are being given the opportunity to 
rebut the presumption of incapacity in practice.  Consequently, I propose that the rights of 
minors can be better respected by developing a framework that explicitly mandates 
researchers to assess the capacity of each minor as well as limiting the exchange of 
information with parents or authorized third parties prior to this assessment taking place.   
The capacity assessment requirement included in the framework proposed herein 
applies to individuals who are less than eighteen or nineteen, depending on province of 
residence.  Specifically, for persons living in Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince-Edward 
Island, and Saskatchewan, it applies if they are less than eighteen years of age.   In all 
405  Age of Majority Act (Alberta), supra note 231; Age of Majority Act (Manitoba), supra note 281; Age of 
Majority and Accountability Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.7, s. 1;  Age of Majority Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. A-
8, s. 1; The Age of Majority Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. A-6, s. 2(1).  
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other common law jurisdictions, the framework applies to individuals who are less than 
nineteen years of age.  
 The discussion below sets out nine reasons why requiring that each minor 
undergo a capacity assessment leads to a better, more legally and ethically defensible 
definition of the role of adolescents in the consent process.  Prior to looking at those 
reasons, I need to acknowledge the fact that some readers may not think it is necessary to 
assess the capacity of each minor.  Those readers would argue that surely there is some 
minimum age below which capacity need not be assessed.  My response to that argument 
is embedded in the reasons I set out below.  Briefly stated though, it is that the breadth of 
research is so wide that an appropriate minimum age for one research study could be seen 
as being unnecessarily low with respect to another study and too high for yet another.  
(i) Age Cannot Be Equated With Capacity 
 Age has long been used to define the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of 
classes of individuals within society.  Historically, the ability to consent to one’s own 
medical treatment has not been an exception.  Notably, “the Rule of Sevens” was first 
laid out in The Queen v. Smith, (1845) 1 Cox C.C. 260 (Crim.)407 in 1845 in England.  
Under that rule, the legal capacity of minors is divided into increments of seven years.  
Specifically, minors under the age of seven do not have legal capacity, minors between 
the ages of seven and fourteen are presumed to lack capacity, but the presumption is 
rebuttable, and minors between fourteen and twenty-one are presumed (though again the 
406  Age of Majority Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 7, s. 1(1)(a); Age of Majority Act (NB), supra note 282; Age of 
Majority Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. A-4.2, s. 2; Age of Majority Act, supra note 272; Age of Majority Act, 
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 4, s. 2(1); Age of Majority Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 2, s. 1(1); Age of Majority Act (Nu), 
supra note 272.   
407  The Queen v. Smith, (1845) 1 Cox C.C. 260 (Crim.). 
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presumption is rebuttable) to be legally competent.  Those over the age of twenty-one are 
presumed to have full capacity.408   
 Although the lives of minors have changed in many ways since 1845, capacity is 
still considered to evolve with age.  Use of age as the basis for differential treatment 
persists today; as is evident when one considers that limits on when individuals can drive 
a car, vote in elections, or even the processes to be followed in criminal proceedings are 
all based on age.   In some instances, it is necessary to confer rights upon individuals 
solely on the basis of age, despite the fact that doing so does not promote justice for 
all.409  Voting and driving are both examples of where this approach has been deemed 
necessary.  In my view, it is not necessary to use age with respect to consent to research 
participation.  The rights of minors can be respected by requiring that each minor have an 
equal opportunity to prove that they are competent. Minors involved in research, like 
those receiving medical treatment and those involved in the criminal justice system, 
should not all be treated in the same manner.  The preservation of a minor’s rights and the 
feasibility of looking at each individual in those contexts outweigh the need for 
bureaucratic efficiency.  After all, chronological age does not guarantee a certain 
decision-making ability.410 
(ii) Adolescents and Adults May Have Comparable Decision-Making Capacity 
 Researchers have only recently begun looking at decision-making by minors in 
the research process.  Consequently, much of the literature comparing the capacity of 
408  Paul Arshagouni, “But I’m An Adult Now...Sort Of”:  Adolescent Consent in Health Care Decision-
Making and the Adolescent Brain” (2006) 9 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 315 at 332 [Arshagouni]. 
409  Susan E. Zinner, “The Elusive Goal of Informed Consent by Adolescents” (1995) 16 Theoretical 
Medicine 323 at 329-330 [Zinner]. 
410  Ann Marie McCarthy et al., “Psychological Screening of Children for Participation in Nontherapeutic 
Invasive Research” (2001) 155 Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine 1197 at 1197 
[McCarthy]. 
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adolescents to adults emerges out of the medical treatment context.  Despite the 
differences between the treatment and research setting, it is useful to look at what studies 
involving medical treatment have found with regards to the capacity of minors.  Not only 
have few authors looked into the research context thereby leaving little evidence of the 
comparative capacities of minors and adults, there are also many instances where 
individuals are receiving treatment and involved in research concurrently.  Finally, a 
thorough understanding of what is known from the treatment context is necessary 
because there is no clear reason why minors who are allowed to make treatment decisions 
should not possess the “parallel right” to decide whether they wish to participate in 
medical research.411  
There is a growing body of research into the evolution of our decision-making 
ability from childhood through to adulthood.  Subscribers to the view that minors of a 
certain age should be deemed competent point to the considerable body of literature that 
has found that the transition from incompetence to universal competence occurs 
somewhere between fourteen and fifteen years of age.412  As well, it has also been shown 
that from age fifteen onwards, the majority of adolescents are able to consent to medical 
treatment without being influenced by the opinion of others.413 
411  Zinner, supra note 409 at 323-326.  At present, since the common law mature minor rule has not 
explicitly been found to apply to the research context, there is some uncertainty as to whether minors 
possess such a “parallel right”.  
412  Committee on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics, “Informed Consent, Parental Permission, 
and Assent in Pediatric Practice” (1995) 95 Pediatrics 314, which states that adolescents over the age of 
fourteen “may have as well developed decisional skills as adults for making informed health care 
decisions.” 
413  D. Bailly, “Problèmes lies au consentement chez l’enfant et l’adolescent” (2010) 17 Archives de 
Pédiatrie s7 at s12; Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, “The Competency of Children and 
Adolescents to make informed Treatment Decisions” (1982) 53 Child Development 1589 at 1595 
[Weithorn & Campbell]; Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, “Minors’ Consent to Treatment:  A 
Developmental Perspective” (1978) 9 Professional Psychology:  Research & Practice 412 at 423. 
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Research suggests that adolescents and adults have comparable decision-making 
capacity in the treatment context.  Notably, in the often-cited study by Weithorn and 
Campbell, children, adolescents and adults were presented with four hypothetical 
treatment dilemmas.  They were then interviewed, with their responses to questions 
coded on the basis of understanding, choice, reasoned outcome, and rationale.  
Ultimately, this study revealed that fourteen year old adolescents did not differ from 
adults on any of the dimensions (understanding, choice, reasoned outcome, and rationale) 
assessed.414  Although the fact that this study involved hypothetical scenarios cannot be 
ignored, it is necessary to ensure its significance is not overemphasized when trying to 
apply the findings to the research context given the inherent uncertainty of the research 
process.  Such uncertainty includes in double-blind drug trials, for example, the fact that 
neither the investigator nor the participant know which investigational product the 
participant will receive at the time consent is obtained or even while the study is ongoing.  
Efficacy of the intervention is also unknown, which is not the case in the treatment 
context.  Briefly stated then, hypothetical scenarios are more akin to the research context 
than they are to the treatment context.     
Despite the above evidence, some researchers have nonetheless pointed to alleged 
differences in capacity between adults and minors to justify treating minors differently.  
For example, Koelch et al. have assessed the capacities for understanding, appreciation, 
and reasoning of children and adolescents with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) or ADHD combined with oppositional defiant disorder.  The capacities of the 
parents of participating minors were also examined.  They found that just over two-thirds 
414  Weithorn & Campbell, ibid.   
156
of minors and one-third of parents did not understand the primary objective of the 
research.  Minors were also found to have difficulty understanding what a placebo was 
and the likelihood that they would receive it.  Based on these results, those authors 
concluded that all minors are in need of protection because they have problems 
understanding complex research projects.415   
However, the study by Koelch et al. only involved minors between seven and 
fifteen years of age and so, at best the findings only apply to that age group.416  Also, 
these authors were comparing the capacity of minors with a psychological ailment to 
their parents (whose own mental health status was not reported).  Having failed to control 
for attention-deficit issues, the authors incorrectly attributed the differences in measures 
of capacity to age alone.  Although age may explain the differences entirely, the research 
design does not allow for that conclusion to be drawn.  Despite its flawed methodology, 
this study has been included in the discussion here to alert readers that some minors may 
have diminished capacity as compared to their parents. 
(iii) Denial of Rights Based on Lack of Capacity Requires Proof 
Those who argue that minors do not have the requisite capacity generally point to 
the greater amount of understanding into long-term consequences adults have acquired 
through knowledge and experience.  They contend that minors have generally not had a 
415  Michael Koelch et al., ““...Because I Am Something Special” or “I Think I Will Be Something Like a 
Guinea Pig”:  Information and Assent of Legal Minors in Clinical Trials – Assessment of 
Understanding, Appreciation and Reasoning” (2009) 3(1) Child and Adolescent Psychiatry & Mental 
Health 2 [Koelch et al., “Something Special”]. 
416  I say “at best” because the MacCAT-CR (tool used to assess the capacity of the participants) has not 
been validated for use in children and adolescents and therefore may not correctly assess capacity in 
minors.  In fact, in Koelch et al., “Report of an Initial Pilot Study on the Feasibility of Using the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research in Children and Adolescents with 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder” (2010) 20 Journal of Child and Adolescent 
Psychopharmacoly 63 at 66, Koelch and his colleagues concluded that the MacCAT-CR “seems to be 
feasible with children” but that further validation was required.  
157
sufficient number of life experiences to make long-term projections about their health.417  
It has further been claimed that unlike adults, minors have the potential to improve their 
ability to make decisions that are in their best interest.  Since their capacity has not 
reached its full potential, Ross argues minors should not be afforded the opportunity to 
make their own treatment decisions.418      
The view that minors lack experience and can improve their decision-making 
ability is flawed for two main reasons.  Firstly, it ignores the fact that upon reaching the 
age of majority an individual is presumed competent.  Consequently, even though 
intuitively most people would accept that a forty year old has had more life experiences 
than a sixteen year old, it is doubtful that an eighteen year old has a better understanding 
of long-term consequences based on life experience than a minor who is seventeen years 
and three hundred and sixty days old.  After all, most would agree that many teenagers 
now continue to reside at home upon graduating from high school (which itself generally 
occurs between seventeen and eighteen years of age), are not married, and do not have 
children.  They have also not likely had any more exposure to the health care setting.   
Thirdly, denying all minors the right to consent on the basis of lack of experience 
and potential for improvement in their decision-making capacity means that minors will 
be held to a different standard than that expected of adults.  Stated differently, even if 
they meet the criteria set out in law for mature minor status, such competency is 
necessary but not sufficient to bestow autonomy on a minor because the decisions they 
make today may limit their autonomy in the future.419  Adults, however, are presumed 
417  Arshagouni, supra note 408 at 322. 
418  Lainie Friedman Ross, “Adolescent Sexuality and Public Policy:  A Liberal Response” (1996) 15(1) 
Politics & Life Sciences 13 at 16-17. 
419  Ibid. 
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competent and entitled to make decisions unless that presumption is rebutted.  Nothing 
further is required of adults.  As such, adults are free to make decisions that will curtail 
their autonomy later in life.  This blanket denial of rights is untenable from a legal 
standpoint.  As readers will recall, any violation of section 7 rights to liberty and security 
of the person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice as well as to 
the section 15(1) right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of an enumerated 
ground must be justified under section 1 of the Charter.  For reasons set out in Chapter 2 
of this thesis, outright banning all minors from deciding whether they wish to participate 
in a research study would not withstand Charter scrutiny.420  Based on the reasoning in 
A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) as well as the jurisprudence on 
the common law mature minor rule reviewed in Chapter 2, the rebuttable presumption of 
incapacity that applies to all minors under the framework proposed herein, however, 
would be constitutional. 
(iv) Mandating Capacity Assessments is Consistent with the Jurisprudence 
 It is doubtful that the courts would opt for a more expansive recognition of the 
rights of minors in the research setting as compared to the treatment setting, even when 
the two contexts can be distinguished from one another.  This view is based on the great 
emphasis placed on the vulnerability of minors and on their need for protection by the 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and 
420  As readers will recall, in its decision in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra 
note 65, the majority and the minority of the Supreme Court of Canada found that there was no Charter 
violation.  Specifically, the majority and the minority concurred that there was no section 7 violation 
because no principal of fundamental justice had been violated.  As well, there was no section 15(1) 
violation because, according to the majority, the presumption that those under the age of 16 lacked 
maturity to make treatment decisions was rebuttable.  The minority, in turn, held that although a 
distinction had been made on the basis of age, there was no discrimination because the steps taken were 
ameliorative. 
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Family Services).421  As readers will recall, under the common law, ‘mature minors’ are 
entitled to consent to their own medical treatment.  This right is, of course, subject to any 
applicable consent to treatment legislation and child protection legislation.  In the child 
protection context, however, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada recently 
upheld the constitutionality of a section of Manitoba’s child protection statute that 
allowed treatment to be forced upon an unwilling minor under the age of sixteen where 
such treatment was in her “best interests”.422  Faced with such a clear endorsement of the 
welfare principle from our highest court, the most that can be hoped for is a narrow 
reading of A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), whereby the “best 
interests” criteria is restricted to the child protection context.  That being said, one cannot 
deny the fact that some protection is still warranted in the research context, particularly in 
instances where the minor will not derive any direct benefit from her participation.  One 
such source of protection is the requirement to use a validated tool for the capacity 
assessment of each and every minor whose participation is sought.   
(v) Existing Legislation Acknowledges That Not All Minors Have Equivalent 
Capacity 
 
Ten provincial and territorial legislatures already recognize that not all minors 
require the same protections. Specifically, the medical decision-making provisions 
contained within the child protection statutes of Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova 
Scotia, Nunavut, the North West Territories, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and 
Saskatchewan only apply to minors under the age of sixteen.423  As well, Saskatchewan 
421  Ibid. at paras. 85-87, 97-117. 
422  Ibid. at paras. 97-117. 
423  Children, Youth and Family Services Act, supra note 260, s. 2(1)(d); Child and Family Services Act, 
(NWT), supra note 278, s. 1; Children and Family Services Act (Nova Scotia), supra note 278, s.3(1); 
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allows all minors over the age of sixteen to consent to treatment, while Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador presume minors who are sixteen years and 
older to be competent.424  Five other jurisdictions (British Columbia, Ontario, Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Yukon) require an individualized assessment of 
capacity rather than using age to delineate rights.425  The ability of minors to consent to 
treatment in British Columbia, New Brunswick and Yukon may nonetheless be limited 
by child protection legislation, which in all three jurisdictions applies to minors under 
nineteen years of age.426  
Without delving into the debate that occurred at the time that each of the relevant 
provisions were passed, politicians in those ten jurisdictions clearly felt that it was 
appropriate to draw a distinction with respect to capacity between minors based on age.  
In most cases, a bright line was drawn at sixteen years of age.  This means that unlike the 
rebuttable presumption included within the framework proposed here, the bright lines 
included in the aforementioned statutes do not bestow care providers with the ability to 
override the decisions of minors over the legislated age that do not have the requisite 
understanding (i.e. those who would not be mature minors if an assessment was carried 
Child and Family Services Act (Nunavut), supra note 278, s.1; Child and Family Services Act (Ontario), 
supra note 101, s. 37(1); Child and Family Services Act (Saskatchewan), supra note 103, s. 2(1)(d). 
424  The Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care Decision Makers Act, supra note 232, s. 
2(1)(d); The Health Care Directives Act, supra note 215, s.1; Medical Consent of Minors Act, supra 
note 27, s. 3(1); Advance Health Care Directives Act, supra note 130, s. 7(b).  In New Brunswick, the 
treatment must also be in the minor’s best interests.  
425  Infants Act, supra note 29, s.17(2)-(3); Health Care Consent Act, supra note 227, s.1, 4(1)-(3); Personal 
Directives Act, supra note 253; Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, supra note 256, 
s. 3; Care Consent Act, supra note 229, s.5(e), 6(2).  In British Columbia, the treatment must also be in 
the minor’s best interests.
426  Child, Family and Community Service Act, supra note 278, s. 1(1); Family Services Act, supra note 278, 
s. 1; Age of Majority Act (NB), supra note 282; Child and Family Services Act (Yukon), supra note 270, 
s. 1. 
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out).  They also do not afford minors under the age of sixteen to demonstrate that they are 
mature minors and should therefore be allowed to provide autonomous consent.  
(vi) The Capacity Assessment as a Measure of Protection 
One of the frequent reasons given for requiring parental consent rather than 
allowing minors to provide legally valid consent is that minors are vulnerable and 
consequently are in need of protection.  Nowhere is this more succinctly stated than in the 
European Union’s Ethical Considerations for Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products 
Conducted in the Paediatric Population427, which states that all minors are vulnerable 
and that even those who are not considered minors under national law may need 
“additional discussions and explanations.”428   
 This justification for interfering with the rights of minors assumes that all minors 
are vulnerable.  The basis for such vulnerability appears to be primarily their diminished 
decision-making capacity due to their age.429  So, if a minor is competent (i.e. is a mature 
minor), much (if not all) of the rationale for her vulnerability disappears.430  Any 
lingering vulnerability can be addressed through less constraining means than outright 
denying her the right to choose whether or not she wishes to participate in a research 
study prior to her parents being consulted.431  Besides ensuring that appropriate means of 
427  Ad Hoc Group For the Development of Implementing Guidelines For Directive 2001/20/EC Relating to 
Good Clinical Practice in the Conduct of Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, 
“Ethical Considerations for Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products Conducted in the Paediatric 
Population” (2008) 15 Eur. J. Health L. 223. 
428  Ibid. at 225, 231. 
429  The notion of vulnerability is further discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
430  Note that the majority in A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), supra note 65, held 
in child protection proceedings, minors under the age of sixteen were vulnerable, whether or not they 
had decision-making capacity.  They did not, however, go so far as to say all minors in all contexts 
remain vulnerable regardless of they have the capacity to provide legally valid consent. 
431  As noted in Chapter 3, minors must provide their assent in order to participate in a research study in 
circumstances where the Tri-Council Policy Statement applies.  Article 3.10 of the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement, supra note 1, further requires that the dissent of incompetent minors must be respected when 
that individual has “some ability to understand the significance of the research”.  However, the present 
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communicating with the prospective research participants are used (as discussed further 
below), requiring that each minor undergo a capacity assessment is in itself a protective 
measure.  Specifically, the individualized assessment means that no minors will be 
afforded rights that exceed their abilities because they have met some arbitrary age 
threshold. 
(vii) No Evidence that Capacity Assessments are Routinely Carried Out 
One cannot ignore the potential infringement of the rights of mature minors 
involved in research.  The reality at present is that there is no guarantee that the right of 
mature minors to consent to their own research participation will be respected.  The Tri-
Council Policy Statement’s silence on this point means that research ethics boards and 
researchers are not explicitly alerted to the need to turn their mind to any right to consent 
minors may possess. Some may suggest that there is no need for a provision that 
mandates a capacity assessment because such assessments are routinely carried out by 
researchers.  My response to this is that there is no indication in any publication of 
research findings that I have read that gives any indication that capacity is being assessed, 
never mind that all researchers are evaluating the capacity of each and every minor they 
attempt to recruit into a study.  Given this dearth of information, the thoroughness of any 
assessments, when assessments are even being done, is also unknown.  Absent such proof 
and information on the accuracy of capacity assessments, I am of the view that minors are 
deserving of a guarantee that their rights will be respected in an appropriate manner.   
 
 
process does not require that minors be approached first and without their parents present (unless the 
minor elects to have her parents there). 
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(viii) Standard Procedures Encourage Consistency and Predictability 
 Explicitly requiring a capacity assessment prior to any minor participating in a 
research study encourages consistency and fosters predictability.  In a framework that is 
to be applied nationally, such characteristics are highly desirable.  By leaving the 
presumption of capacity unchanged (i.e. at the age of majority) and requiring a capacity 
assessment on each minor, all minors have an equal opportunity to demonstrate that they 
are capable of autonomous decision-making.  Minors will be informed of their right to 
establish that they are competent and researchers will be required to be able to point to 
specific reasons why a minor has been found to lack the capacity required to give legally 
valid consent.  
(ix) International Perspective 
Minors residing in other countries have been allowed to consent to their own 
participation in medical research studies.  For example, New Zealand recently adopted a 
framework with respect to age of consent similar to that proposed here.  Specifically, the 
Health Research Council of New Zealand’s Guidelines for Health Research with 
Children432 states: 
7. Before undertaking research with children the investigator must 
ensure that legally valid consent is sought on the basis of the 
information provided:  
 
i. The consent of a child of or over the age of 16 must be 
obtained and has the same effect as if the child were of full 
age, provided the child does not lack competence for reasons 
other than age.  
 
432  Health Research Council of New Zealand, Guidelines for Health Research with Children, 2000 
(updated 2007), online: <http://www.hrc.govt.nz/assets/pdfs/publications/Appendix%201%20-
%20Guidelines%20for%20Health%20Research%20with%20Children%20030407%20-%20Final.pdf>. 
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ii. If the child is below the age of 16, but has the competence to 
understand the nature, risks and consequences of the 
research:  
 
(a)  the consent of the child must be obtained, and  
 
(b)  that consent will have the same effect as if the child were 
of full age.433 
  
In cases of mixed research and treatment, these guidelines are modified by the 
Care of Children Act 2004434, a statute that essentially combines what Canadian 
jurisdictions include in child protection and consent to treatment legislation.   The Care 
of Children Act allows minors who are sixteen years of age or older to consent to “any 
medical, surgical, or dental treatment or procedure” that will benefit that minor.435  Upon 
reaching the age of eighteen, there are no restrictions on an individual’s ability to consent 
(i.e. the treatment or procedure need not be beneficial).436    
As well, in the United Kingdom, young people who are sixteen years of age or 
older are afforded the right to consent to all forms of research.  Those minors who are 
less than sixteen years of age can consent if (1) the research is of minimal risk, (2) 
participation is in their best interest, (3) they are found to be mature minors, and (4) they 
refuse parental involvement.437  Reasons as to why this author finds the use of the type of 
433  Ibid. at principle 7.  It is worth drawing the attention of readers to the fact that, unlike in the framework 
proposed here, New Zealand’s instrument does not explicitly mandate that contact is to be between the 
minor who is over sixteen years of age and the researcher. 
434  (N.Z.), 2004/90. 
435  Ibid. at s. 36(1).  
436  Ibid. at s. 8. 
437  National Health Service Central Office for Research Ethics Committees, Multi-Centre Research Ethics 
Committees Guidance Notes, 2000, Research on children (Manual II.7 & V27.1) cited in Sanci et al., 
“Youth Health Research Ethics:  Time For a Mature Minor Clause?” (2004) 180 Medical Journal of 
Australia 336 at 336 [Sanci et al.]. 
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risk involved as a criterion for determining when minors have the right to consent 
problematic are set out below.   
B. The Researcher’s Role 
Under the framework proposed herein, the researcher (when qualified) is expected 
to carry out the capacity assessment on each minor that the researcher seeks to recruit for 
a particular study.  Fulfilling that obligation requires that researchers use appropriate 
means of communicating with prospective research participants so as to ensure that a 
minor found to be incompetent really lacks decision-making capacity as opposed to fails 
to understand the vocabulary used by the researcher.  Both of these duties imposed on 
researchers are discussed in this section. 
(i) Carrying Out the Capacity Assessment 
There is no legal or ethical obligation on researchers in Canada to assess the 
competence of either potential or present research participants themselves.438  The 
principal researcher is, however, ultimately responsible for ensuring that anyone acting 
under delegated authority acts in accordance with all legal and ethical requirements.439  
Obtaining valid consent is one such requirement.  Given the breadth of research being 
carried out in Canada, requiring a certain class of individuals to assess competence for all 
types of research is inappropriate.  Consequently, the discussion below sets out reasons 
why generally the researcher is likely best positioned to make the determination while 
still recognizing that in some instances, others may be a better choice.  To this end, the 
comments below are only intended to provide researchers with some guidance as to who 
438  Of course, if a researcher fails to allow a competent participant to consent, the researcher is exposing 
herself to a battery action.  
439  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at art. 3.2 and accompanying commentary. 
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should carry out the capacity assessment.  Ultimately it is individual researchers and 
research ethics boards who must decide who with respect to a particular study ought to 
carry out the assessment.  
Although the Tri-Council Policy Statement is silent about the assessment of 
capacity itself, it does state that in any research captured by the instrument, the researcher 
or her “qualified designated representative” must seek consent from competent potential 
research subjects at the outset of the study.440  In the case of physician-researchers, one 
would expect the researcher to obtain consent since they are tasked with obtaining 
consent from their minor patients with respect to consent to treatment.441  Researchers 
from other disciplines may or may not possess the same degree of skill.442   
I would suggest that in most cases, the researcher responsible for the research 
should carry out the assessment.  Where that individual feels she does not possess the 
necessary expertise, the assessment should be carried out by another properly skilled 
individual, such as a psychologist.  The assumption that researchers have the requisite 
skills to obtain consent can be extended to the capacity assessment because the 
assessment is either a necessary precursor to the consent process, or alternatively is itself 
part of the consent process.   Regardless of which way the role of the capacity assessment 
is framed, the fact that researchers are appropriately skilled to carry out the assessment is 
supported by the Tri-Council Policy Statement.  Notably, in research involving minors 
440  Ibid. 
441  I have used the phrase “seems sound” because there is no information available as to the frequency with 
which consent is obtained from mature minors in the treatment context.  It is possible that physicians 
providing care to minors are merely seeking parental consent rather than undertaking a competence 
assessment. 
442  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to speculate as to the nature of the consent being obtained by 
various professionals.  The point is being raised only to flag the possibility that it may be necessary to 
look to someone outside the research team, such as a psychologist, where no one within the team has 
the requisite expertise to properly determine if a minor is competent or not. 
167
who are incompetent at the time informed consent is obtained, the researcher has a duty 
to obtain consent from that minor during the course of the study if the latter becomes 
competent.443  The researcher would only be able to fulfill that duty if she knew that the 
minor was now competent. 
Beyond being a reasonable expansion of the Tri-Council Policy Statement, having 
the researcher carry out the assessment also has a number of significant advantages.  
These advantages include the fact that the researcher is more familiar with the study and 
so could more easily explain the study to the minor, answer questions, and evaluate how 
much information the minor understands.  It may also be more cost effective since the 
researcher could then obtain consent at the same time.444  That being said, there are also 
some challenges in implementing this approach.  Most notably, researchers would need to 
have a thorough understanding of the requirements for adolescents’ informed consent and 
research ethics boards would need a thorough understanding of adolescent 
development.445  These hurdles are not insurmountable.  Some researchers (particularly 
those who are also clinicians) likely have this understanding already.  Others could 
acquire this knowledge through education.446  
(ii) Using Appropriate Means of Communicating 
Legislators and the Tri-Council are entitled to put in place processes to ensure 
minors are given an appropriate level of responsibility when it comes to healthcare 
decision-making.  In doing so, however, the Charter requires that they use means that are 
443  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at art. 3.9(e). 
444  Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment:  A Guide for 
Physicians and Other Health Professionals (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1998) at 77-78 
[Grisso & Appelbaum]. 
445  Sanci et al., supra note 437 at 337. 
446  Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 444, is an example of a resource that could be used to educate 
researchers and research ethics board members. 
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minimally impairing.447  The Supreme Court of Canada has been clear:  a complete ban 
on a specific activity will be more difficult to justify.448  As a result of this clear direction 
from our highest court, the framework proposed herein includes appropriate forms of 
protection:  a focus on communication and an individualized assessment of capacity, the 
latter of which is discussed in a separate section above. 
When one examines the literature on the way in which information is 
communicated to potential research participants and their decision-making capacity, it 
becomes evident that this is a topic that has garnered little attention.  Specifically, the 
research comparing the decision-making capacity of adolescents to that of their parents 
makes no mention of the fact that differences may be due to the manner in which 
information was conveyed.  No articles reviewed in the preparation of this thesis gave 
any detail on what subjects and their parents were told prior to signing a consent form or 
even included a copy of the form as an appendix.  Rather, most articles merely report that 
informed consent was obtained from parents.449  Recently, however, Unguru et al. looked 
at the understanding of research-related treatment and the preferences for inclusion in 
decision-making of children with cancer.  The mean age of the participants was just over 
thirteen and a half.  They found that over two-thirds of minors found the trial-related 
information a “little hard” or “very hard” to understand.  This was overwhelmingly 
attributed to their inability to understand the language used by their physician.450   
447  Charter, supra note 64, s.1; R. v. Oakes, supra note 210.  Further details on the test to be carried out 
when determining if a violation of s. 7 or s. 15(1) is justified can be found in Chapter 2 of this thesis and 
so will not be repeated here. 
448  Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), 1993 CanLII 60 (S.C.C.) at 26, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084.   
449  See e.g. Weithorn and Campbell, supra note 413 and Koelch et al., “Something Special”, supra note 
415. 
450  Unguru, Sill & Kamani, supra note 393 at e878-e879.   
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The mature minor test requires that a minor demonstrates “sufficient 
understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences of treatment and its 
alternatives to be able to decide whether to proceed with it or not.”451  There is nothing in 
the previous statement that limits how information is conveyed to the minor (i.e. the same 
language as that used when discussing research procedures to parents need not be used).  
It is therefore essential that difficulty understanding the language used by a researcher not 
be equated to difficulty understanding the proposed research project.452  Only the latter is 
evidence of a lack of capacity.  Consequently, capacity should only be assessed after a 
minor has been presented with information in a manner that she can understand.  Other 
forms of communication that should be considered by researchers include diagrams, 
graphs, and less sophisticated vocabulary.     
C. The Limits on the Sharing of Study-Related Information 
To ensure minimal interference with the privacy rights of minors, the framework 
proposed in this thesis requires that researchers discuss as few details of a specific 
research project with parents or authorized third party representatives of potential 
research participation as possible prior to carrying out the capacity assessment.  This limit 
has been included in order to properly define the role of parents given the differences that 
may exist between their motivations and their child’s motivations with respect to research 
participation.  It is also part of the process for practical reasons, which reasons include 
getting parents to bring young children to research sites.  The use of the phrase “as 
possible” in part (c) of the framework also recognizes that the amount of information that 
451  Gilmour, “Children”, supra note 89. 
452  Research Ethics Boards review the language found in consent and assent forms to ensure the 
appropriateness of that language.  However, there is no such review of the language used by researchers 
when they discuss the study either over the telephone or in person with potential research participants. 
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will need to be shared with parents prior to carrying out the capacity assessment will vary 
depending on the circumstances.  
(i) Different Reasons, Values and Choices 
Research has found that adolescents and their parents weigh different values and 
factors when deciding whether or not to consent to (or in the case of parents to their 
children’s) participation in a particular research study.  Notably, Brody et al. compared 
the views of adolescents, parents, and physicians with respect to participation in asthma 
research.  Results revealed that more adolescents than parents were willing to enrol in 
greater than minimal risk asthma research.  They also looked at the disagreement rate 
between adolescents and their parents, which earlier research had reported to be as high 
as 40%.453  Brody et al. found that most initial disagreements arose from the parent’s 
wish to decline and the adolescent’s willingness to participate.  Such differing views were 
subsequently resolved in favour of the parent two-thirds of the time.454  Although this 
statistic does not tell us whether or not the minors were capable of giving legally valid 
consent, it does suggest that recruitment rates (and the participants recruited) differ 
depending on who is approached by researchers about a particular study and on who 
consents to research participation.   
As well, Read et al. recently asked adolescents diagnosed with cancer and their 
parents from a number of sites, including three Canadian sites, to complete a 
453  Janet L. Brody et al., “Comparisons of Adolescent and Parent Willingness to Participate in Minimal and 
Above-Minimal Risk Pediatric Asthma Research Protocols” (2005) 37 Journal of Adolescent Health 
229 at 234 [Brody et al., “Comparisons”]. 
454  Janet L. Brody et al., “Enrolling Adolescents in Asthma Research:  Adolescent, Parent, and Physician 
Influence in the Decision-Making Process” (2009) 46 Journal of Asthma 492 at 495-496. 
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questionnaire about health research participation.455  The most frequently given reason 
for agreeing to participate by both the young adults (median age was 18 years) and the 
parents asked to consent on their minor child’s behalf was to help others. However, the 
reasons for declining participation differed between the groups; the young adults pointed 
to time commitment while parents’ reasons included travel barriers, wanting the best 
proven treatment, and not being ready to tell the child the diagnosis. 456  Young adults 
were also found to place greater emphasis on the recommendations of friends and family 
to participate than did their parents.457  Merely being interested in the views of others 
does not mean a minor lacks capacity.  Allowing minors to consent still affords them the 
option to consult with friends and family, it just does not require it.  Admittedly, having 
different reasons for declining participation does not necessarily lead to a different result 
(i.e. both parents and adolescents could refuse for different reasons), it is nonetheless 
possible.  As noted previously, researchers are obligated to respect the right of minors to 
decline to participate in research and so disagreement between an adolescent’s wishes 
and those of her parent(s) with respect to participation is less problematic.  However, 
where a minor wishes to participate and her parent(s) disagrees, unless she can provide 
autonomous consent, the minor’s rights are infringed.   
The effect of different views is further seen in a study by Pousset et al. In that 
study, answers about hypothetical end-of-life decisions given by adolescent cancer 
survivors (who were between 11 and 18 years old) during an interview were compared to 
455  The fact that three sites included in the study were in Canada is mentioned because the participants in 
that study had been enrolled in a manner consistent with the Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1.  
It also demonstrates that Canadian minors and their parents hold discordant views.  Stated differently, 
this is not merely an issue that has presented itself in other countries.    
456 Kate Read et al., “Decision-making by Adolescents and Parents of Children with Cancer Regarding 
Health Research Participation” (2002) 124 Pediatrics 959 at 962-963. 
457  Ibid. at 963. 
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answers from children with no experience of chronic illness.  At the outset, parents were 
sent a letter explaining the research objectives and asked to consent to their child’s 
participation, which 179 of 198 did.  Children whose parents had consented were then 
asked to consent, which only 83 of the 179 did.458    These numbers are striking in that 
more than half of the minors did not want to participate in a study their parents wanted 
them to participate in.  Although not required under the framework proposed here, one 
way in which researchers could ensure that the study is discussed as little as possible with 
a minor’s parent(s) or authorized third party while also saving time and money would be 
to make minors over the age of sixteen the first point of contact, rather than their 
parents.459 
(ii) The Role of Parents 
It is sometimes assumed that the vulnerability of minors is best protected by 
removing the right of minors to consent and instead requiring researchers to obtain 
parental consent and assent from the potential subjects.  The flaw with this reasoning is 
although intuitively it seems reasonable to expect parents to safeguard the interests of 
their minor children, research is now emerging that brings into question whether parents 
are better-positioned than mature minors and older adolescents to make decisions about 
research participation.460   
458  Pousset et al., supra note 390 at e1143-e1144. 
459  For example, if Pousset et al. had contacted the minors who were sixteen years of age or older first, all 
costs associated with mailing letters to parents as well as the weeks between the time the letter was 
mailed to parents and consent was sought from those minors would be saved.  
460  All child protection statutes discussed in Chapter 2 are premised at least in part on the duty parents owe 
to their children to protect them.  When parents fail to meet this obligation, the statutes allow for the 
State to intervene.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine whether parents are best positioned 
to afford such protection in circumstances beyond the realm of medical research where such legislation 
applies.  
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Beyond the fact that mature minors by definition have the capacity to make their 
own decisions and so arguably are in no more need of protection than a healthy adult, 
their parents’ understanding of the research process is not necessarily any better than 
their own.461  In fact, Tait et al. have found that only one-quarter of parents participating 
in an internet survey had an “adequate understanding” of the benefits of a hypothetical 
study.462  Similarly Sugarman et al. found that nearly half of adult research participants 
did not know or recall that the ‘treatment’ they were receiving was in fact clinical 
research.463  These studies do not tell us whether the understanding of minors in those 
circumstances would have been better, the same, or worse.  They do, however, suggest 
that turning to parents for consent to their child’s research participation, may mean that 
consent is being obtained from individuals who themselves do not possess decision-
making capacity.      
If minors are being ‘protected’ by individuals who themselves lack an 
understanding of the research, they are not the beneficiaries of any real protection.  
Furthermore, not only are they not protected, all those involved in the research enterprise 
are proceeding on the mistaken belief that minors are being protected.  In my opinion, 
more harm can result from proceeding on the assumption that mature minors are being 
protected when they are not than if they are allowed to provide autonomous consent.  The 
obvious question then becomes:  how can we respect the rights of mature minors while 
461  Although not understanding is not the same as not having capacity, since capacity requires both an 
understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences of research participation and 
alternatives to participation, a lack of understanding of the research process generally gives rise to the 
possibility that parents may not in fact have capacity to consent.  I was unable to find any reported study 
in which the capacity of parents to consent was evaluated.  Rather, it seems to be often taken for 
granted. 
462  Alan R. Tait et al., “Effect of Various Risk/Benefit Trade-offs on Parents’ Understanding of a Pediatric 
Research Study” (2010) 125 Pediatrics e1475 at e1480.
463  Sugarman, supra note 402. 
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still safeguarding their interests?  Contrary to the conclusion reached by Koelch et al. that 
all minors are in need of protection and that such protection is best provided by their 
parents even when the latter has a questionable understanding of a particular research 
study, I believe that this can be achieved through better communication and a validated 
process to assess decision-making capacity in minors who are less than sixteen years of 
age.464 
(iii) The Practical Reality 
Recognizing that minors may not attend at a research site without a parent or 
authorized third party present (or at least without such an individual knowing of their 
planned attendance), researchers are permitted some communication with the parent or 
authorized third party under the framework.  However, discussions about the details of 
the specific research project should be as limited as possible, bearing in mind the need to 
get young children to attend research sites.  
Once the capacity assessment has been completed, if the minor has been found to 
have decision-making capacity, it is up her to decide with whom she wishes to discuss the 
study.  However, it is worth reminding readers that even if a minor is found to be 
incompetent to provide legally valid consent, she may still possess sufficient 
understanding and appreciation of the research procedures to assent to her own 
participation.  When this is the case, if the minor declines participation, that decision is 
binding on the researcher, regardless of whether or not parental consent had been 
obtained.465   
464  Koelch et al., “Something Special”, supra note 415. 
465  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at art. 3.10. 
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The limitation on discussing specific study-related procedures should not be taken 
as precluding researchers from discussing the general process involved in obtaining 
consent to parents and minors.  Specifically, researchers remain free to explain to all 
interested parties how things will unfold, including that the minor’s capacity will be 
assessed and that consent will be sought from the appropriate individual.  Researchers 
can also tell a minor and her parents the general reason for the study because precluding 
the sharing of such general information would likely make the recruitment process close 
to impossible.  As well, in some instances, such information is available to the general 
public through study-specific advertisements.   
D. Activities That Are To Be Assessed 
Under the framework proposed herein, the capacity of all minors must be assessed 
to determine if they are competent to provide autonomous consent to participate in a 
particular study.  Capacity is situation-specific and so the assessment must be carried out 
in relation to the research study in question rather than with respect to research 
participation generally.466  A minor who is found to have the requisite capacity to consent 
to her own participation in one study may not be competent to consent to her 
participation in another study.  Simply stated, different research studies will require 
different levels of decision-making skills.   
In considering what is to be included in assessing the capacity of minors, one 
must be mindful not to set a threshold for competence that is, as one author has put it, 
466  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at 37-40. 
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“sufficiently exacting that many adults might fail it.”467  So, precisely what needs to be 
assessed then?  According to the jurisprudence, the assessment is aimed at determining 
whether the minor in question is a “mature minor”.  That is, whether the minor has 
“sufficient understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences of treatment 
and its alternatives to be able to decide whether to proceed with it or not.”468     
 One way that has been proposed to determine if the legal requirements for 
competence (i.e. mature minor standard in the case of minors) have been met is by 
examining an individual’s functional ability in four areas.  According to Grisso and 
Appelbaum, the leading scholars on the assessment of competence to consent to 
treatment, these abilities are: 
• The ability to express a choice; 
• The ability to understand information relevant to 
treatment decision-making; 
• The ability to appreciate the significance of that 
information for one’s own situation, especially 
concerning one’s illness and the probable consequences 
of one’s treatment options; and 
• The ability to reason with relevant information so as to 
engage in a logical process of weighing treatment 
options. [Emphasis in original]469  
Each of these abilities is framed in reference to treatment decisions, but they nonetheless 
seem to be equally applicable to the research context. 
Prior to looking at tools that have been developed to assess decision-making 
skills, it is worth mentioning that some authors have suggested that different levels of 
467  Andrew Bainham, “The Judge and the Competent Minor” (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 194, cited 
in Carolyn Johnston, “Overriding Competent Medical Treatment Refusal By Adolescents:  When “No” 
Means “No”” (2009) 94 Archives of Disease in Childhood 487 at 487. 
468  Gilmour, “Children”, supra note 89. 
469  Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 444 at 31.  Each of these categories is further discussed in Paul S. 
Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, “The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study.  I:  Mental Illness and 
Competence to Consent to Treatment” (1995) 19 Law Hum Behav 105. 
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competence ought to be required depending on the type of research at issue.  Specifically, 
it has been argued that minors would need to demonstrate “a higher level of competency 
prior to being afforded the right to consent to non-therapeutic research procedures than is 
ordinarily required for therapeutic procedures”.470  However, given the current lack of 
clarity as to how competence should be evaluated, it would seem that adding degrees of 
competency would only further confuse the matter.   Furthermore, degrees of competence 
are already indirectly included in the current approach in the treatment context (and in the 
research framework proposed herein) because as procedures become more complex, 
minors must demonstrate a more sophisticated understanding.  Consequently, I propose 
that for the time being, a binary classification system be used (i.e. is the minor competent 
to make the particular decision at issue or not).   
E. Using Existing Instruments to Develop a New Instrument 
The competence assessment is only as sophisticated as those carrying it out 
choose to make it.471  Based on the complete absence of a validated instrument to assess 
the competence of minors in the research context, it is likely that at present there is 
considerable variation in the thoroughness of assessments.  Although the criteria will 
always require subjective evaluation, if the process to be followed in making the 
subjective determinations is spelled out, minors under the age of sixteen will at least be 
able to gain some comfort from the fact that they all have the same opportunity to rebut 
the presumption of incompetence.   
470  Rodney K. Adams, “Live Organ Donors and Informed Consent:  A Difficult Minuet” (1987) 8 J. of 
Legal Med. 555 at 577. 
471  Michelle Oberman, “Minor Rights and Wrongs” (1996) 24 J.L. Med. & Ethics 127 at 129. 
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Many authors have identified a need for a tool to assist in the assessment of 
capacity of minors.472  Recognition by scholars that such an instrument is lacking 
suggests that it may be inappropriate to use adult criteria to assess the competence of 
minors.  It also implies that some clinicians and researchers may be opting to informally 
assess competence rather than using a flawed tool.  Although there is no research 
available to confirm or reject these possibilities, it is irrefutable that the use of a properly 
designed and validated tool is more likely to yield results that are representative of a 
given adolescent’s actual functioning and competence.473   
  Unfortunately, it is not possible to include an instrument that can be used to assess 
the competence of minors to consent to their own research participation within the 
framework here because no such tool exists at present and one could only be developed 
after extensive consultation with physicians, researchers, ethicists, psychologists, and 
lawyers.  Each of these classes of individuals would bring a necessary expertise to the 
process.  For example, lawyers could help ensure that the instrument was of assistance to 
researchers in any legal proceedings arising from a finding that a minor had the requisite 
capacity to provide autonomous consent to her participation in research.474   
Despite being unable to provide researchers with a resource that is ready for use, 
it would nonetheless seem appropriate to refer readers to two existing resources that 
could be used as the basis for a new instrument.  The first such instrument is the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Treatment (MacCAT-T).  This instrument 
472  See e.g. Sari Leanne Kives, “Opinions in Pediatric and Adolescent Gynecology” (2008) 21 J Pediatr 
Adolesc Gynecol 47 at 50 [Kives] and Arshagouni, supra note 408 at 338. 
473  Frances J. Lexcen & N. Dickon Reppuci, “Effects of Psychopathology on Adolescent Decision-
Making” (1998) 5 U. Chicago L. Sch. Roundtable 63 at 64. 
474  Kives, supra note 472 at 49. 
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was developed by Grisso and Appelbaum to provide clinicians with a way of obtaining 
and organizing information about patients’ decision-making abilities.475   
The second tool has been developed by McCarthy et al..  It consists of a 
psychological screening protocol to screen children involved in non-therapeutic, invasive 
research to determine those children who may be at risk of developing psychological 
distress.  Although not focused solely on assessing competence, this tool does include an 
evaluation of cognitive abilities, thereby making certain elements of it relevant to the 
present discussion.  It is also worth noting that data was only collected on twenty children 
(whose mean age was 10.6) and that the screening tool as a whole has not yet been 
validated.476  So, despite it not being ripe for competence assessments, elements of it may 
be of interest to those involved in the development of a new instrument.  
VI. RISK 
  The Tri-Council Policy Statement sets out different requirements based on the 
magnitude and type of risk involved in a particular study for research involving 
individuals who lack legal competence.477  Risk has also been used in the United 
Kingdom as well as in Australia through the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research (2007)478, the framework recently developed in Australia that sets out 
when minors can consent to their own participation.  Notably, the latter does not divide 
minors according to age but rather into four more ambiguous categories:  (1) infants (who 
475  See Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 444 at 101-147, 173-200.  As these authors have written 
extensively on how the MacCAT-T was developed and how it is to be used to assess the competence of 
individuals, readers seeking to know more about the instrument are encouraged to refer to this source.    
476  McCarthy et al., supra note 410. 
477  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at arts. 3.9, 4.6. 
478  National Health and Medical Research Council, National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research (2007), online: <http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/file/publications/synopses/e72-
jul09.pdf>. 
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cannot give autonomous consent), (2) young children (whose consent is required but not 
sufficient), (3) young people “who are mature enough to understand and consent and are 
not vulnerable through immaturity in ways that warrant additional consent from a parent 
or guardian”, and (4) adults (who are presumed competent).479  Additionally, the relevant 
review body can deem the consent of a young person to be sufficient where the young 
person understands the risks and benefits of participation but is nonetheless vulnerable 
because of relative immaturity in other respects where (i) the research is of low risk, (ii) 
the research will benefit the specific category of children within which the young person 
falls into, and (iii) the young person is either estranged from his or her parents or it is not 
in his or her best interest to obtain parental consent.480  Given this use in other 
instruments and in anticipation of suggestions from others that risk ought to have been 
used as a determinant in the framework proposed herein, the concept of risk is reviewed 
briefly below, following which I provide the two primary reasons why risk has not been 
used are briefly set out below.  However, before proceeding further, I must state 
explicitly that I am not advocating removing the minimal risk criteria from the Tri-
Council Policy Statement.  Rather, it is merely not being applied in a situation where the 
authors of the Tri-Council Policy Statement have not explicitly imposed the minimal risk 
requirement.   Under the framework proposed here, when a minor is found to be 
incompetent and consent is sought from a parent or an authorized third party 
representative, the minimal risk rules are triggered and must be met.   
 
 
479  Ibid. at chapter 4.2. 
480  Ibid. at guideline 4.2.9. 
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A. Overview of Risk 
(i) Acceptable Risks  
Society has come to accept that risk exists in medicine, regardless of how 
frequently a treatment has been used and how much skill a physician possesses.481  The 
research enterprise is no exception.  Although research participants, be they adults or 
children, are not assured that they will not encounter any risks whatsoever, there are 
limits on tolerable exposure.  Only research in which the potential benefits for the 
individual participant and society outweigh the foreseeable risks is legally permitted in 
Canada.482  Beyond this general requirement for a potential positive benefit-to-risk 
balance, little guidance as to the threshold of acceptable risk is provided in legislative 
instruments.  This is somewhat unsurprising, given the relative absence of law generally 
in relation to those aspects of medical research extending beyond the drug approval 
process.
Fortunately, ethical frameworks compensate somewhat for the lack of guidance 
from the legal realm as to the risks research participants can face.  As well, no research 
participant can be subjected to unnecessary risks of harms though there is no clear upper 
threshold beyond which risks are no longer acceptable.483  The only restriction is that any 
harms to which a subject may be exposed must not outweigh the benefits that are 
anticipated to flow from the research (i.e. there must be a positive balance between the 
benefits and harms, as required under the law).   
481  Órlaith Molloy, “Autonomy and Consent:  The Lack of Protection for Incompetent Individuals in the 
Healthcare Context” (2007) 15 ISLR 65 at 68-69. 
482  ICH GCP, supra note 55 at para. 2.2. 
483 Neither the Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at 10 nor the Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 
41, provides an explicit upper limit of acceptable risk.   
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Beyond these few limitations, adult research participants are generally able to 
decide what risks they are willing to assume.484   The same is true for mature minors.  
Presumably based on the perceived need for greater protection, there are more stringent 
restrictions for research involving immature minors.  Specifically, immature minors can 
only participate in research that poses greater than minimal risk if they may derive direct 
benefits from the research.  For minimal risk research, immature minors can participate if 
the research is potentially beneficial to the immature minor or to a group to which the 
immature minor belongs.485   
(ii) Minimal Risk 
The law in Canada makes no mention of the concept of “minimal risk” in defining 
the scope of acceptable research.  However, this concept underlies many of the boundary 
lines drawn in the Tri-Council Policy Statement, the most extensively used ethical 
framework in Canada. There, “minimal risk” is defined as “research in which the 
probability and magnitude of possible harms implied by participation in the research is no 
greater than those encountered by participants in those aspects of their everyday life that 
relate to the research”486 [emphasis added].  Note that the risks to be considered when 
determining if research poses minimal risk or if the overall balancing of potential risks 
and benefits is appropriate are those related to the research.  Stated differently, risks 
related to treatment that would exist regardless of whether or not the minor participates in 
the research are not relevant to the evaluation of the research.  Those risks associated 
484 Kopelman, “Group”, supra note 46 at 177. 
485  Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at art. 4.6. 
486 Supra note 1 at 23.  This definition is essentially unchanged from that found in the first edition of the 
Tri-Council Policy Statement (1998), supra note 319 at para. 1.5, which stated “if potential subjects can 
reasonably be expected to regard the probability and magnitude of possible harms implied by 
participation in the research to be no greater than those encountered by the subject in those aspects of 
his or her everyday life that relate to the research then the research can be regarded as within the range 
of minimal risk.” 
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with treatment are, however, to be considered when selecting an appropriate course of 
treatment.487   
Even though the definition of minimal risk set out above has not proven to be 
entirely straightforward, it marks Canada’s most recent attempt at providing guidance to 
the research community as to what constitutes minimal risk.  Furthermore, the definitions 
of minimal risk adopted by other countries have garnered similar criticism.  For example, 
the legislated American definition states that “the probability and magnitude of harm or 
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those 
ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or 
psychological examinations or tests” [emphasis added].488  Although very similar to the 
Canadian definition, the current view is that risks in the United States must be assessed 
from the perspective of the healthy child (rather than from the potential subject’s 
perspective under the Canadian definition).489  A somewhat different approach to 
defining minimal risk has been endorsed by the United Kingdom’s Medical Research 
Council and Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health’s Ethical Advisory Board.  
Those organizations have opted to provide researchers with specific examples of 
activities at each of minimal, low, and high risk thresholds.490  Under the United 
487 The need to consider research-related risks separate and apart from treatment-related risks bolsters my 
earlier argument that research and treatment need to be distinguished, even when they are to be 
delivered concurrently by the same physician/researcher.   
488  Protection of Human Subjects, 45 CFR §46.101(i) (2009). 
489  Robert M. Nelson, “Nontherapeutic Research, Minimal Risk, and the Kennedy Krieger Lead Abatement 
Study” (2001) 23(6) IRB 7 at 8. 
490  Loretta M. Kopelman, “What Conditions Justify Risky Nontherapeutic or “No Benefit” Pediatric 
Studies:  A Sliding Scale Analysis” (2004 Winter) The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 749 at 749 
[Kopelman, “Conditions”].   See also Medical Research Council, “MRC Ethics Guide:  Medical 
Research Involving Children”, online:  <www.mrcac.uk> [Medical Research Council]. 
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Kingdom regime, high risks studies can only be carried out where there is a prospect of 
direct benefit.491   
The fact that no country has defined minimal risk in a way that elicits praise 
rather than criticism largely speaks to the fact that researchers (and particularly research 
ethics board members) are not actuaries and are rarely provided with documentation as to 
the probability and magnitude of risks occurring.492  As such, the comparison between 
research risks and risks encountered in everyday life may at times be based on little more 
than perception and speculation.  This has, rather unsurprisingly, led to a great degree of 
discrepancy in risk assessment between research ethics boards.493   
The restriction on research participation based on magnitude of risk that flows 
from the distinction between “minimal risk” and other risks has two noteworthy 
implications.494  Firstly, it allows researchers to recruit minors for ‘riskier’ research 
where participants may benefit from their participation.  More specifically, assuming the 
other requirements of free and informed consent have been met, children, including 
mature minors, can be asked to participate in such research so long as there is a 
potentially favourable risk-benefit balance.  Without embarking upon an exhaustive 
discussion on how risks and harms are weighed and balanced against one another, the 
participation of minors in oncology trials appears to be an instance in which there is 
491  Medical Research Council, ibid. at 15. 
492  Research ethics board members are not the only individuals involved in the research process who have 
difficulty quantifying risks associated with everyday activities.  Both parents and children have also 
been shown to have a poor understanding of such harms.  See David Wendler & Tammara Jenkins, 
“Children’s and Their Parents’ Views on Facing Research Risks for the Benefit of Others” (2008) 
162(1) Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med. 9 at 13, for further elaboration on this point as well as for a 
discussion on how the description of risk affects willingness to participate in non-beneficial research. 
493  Shah, supra note 3 at 477, 479. 
494  There are other implications, such as whether informed consent is required for secondary use of the data 
collected, the nature of the ongoing review process, and who should explain research to potential 
participants.   
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likely more than minimal risk.  Such additional risk is due to the drugs used as well as to 
the fact that the standard treatment is often quite effective.    
Secondly, research ethics board members must evaluate the risks of proposed 
research on a case-by-case basis and determine if these risks fall within an acceptable 
range.  Given the highly subjective nature of such an exercise, it is possible that research 
ethics boards overestimate the magnitude of research risks as well as the likelihood that 
such risks will materialize.  Such a flawed evaluation of risk (assuming it is in fact 
flawed) leads to unjustified intervention into the research enterprise.        
From the above discussion, it is clear that although participation in research 
studies is likely to bring about some exposure to risks that may not have been 
encountered in the course of standard treatment, all research participants can derive some 
protection from both legal and ethical frameworks that have been developed to limit the 
scope of acceptable risks.  It is equally evident that, like other countries, the use of the 
term “minimal risk” is problematic and may be leading to inconsistent research practices 
across the country.  Nonetheless, because of its use as an additional means of protection 
in research involving children, it must be considered when devising a framework that 
better defines the roles of mature minors in the research process.  Furthermore, when 
canvassing the approaches adopted in foreign jurisdictions, it is of great importance to 
consider the situations in which minors in those jurisdictions can participate in research, 
regardless of whether they consent to their own participation or if consent is sought from 




(iii) Disclosure of Risk 
  It is worth briefly mentioning that researchers must disclose risks and anticipate 
anticipated benefits to potential research participants (or their legally authorized 
representative) at the time consent is obtained.495  When applicable, the federal Food and 
Drugs Regulations further require that research sponsors ensure that such disclosure is 
made.496  Although there is a clear obligation to provide some disclosure, as noted above, 
different views as to precisely what needs to be disclosed have been articulated in the 
literature.497  This difference in opinion is based on different interpretations of Halushka 
v. University of Saskatchewan and Weiss v. Solomon.  That said, in relation to risk and for 
purposes of the present discussion, it is sufficient to state that the disclosure standard is at 
least as onerous as that found within the treatment context.498    
B. Reasons Why Risk Is Not In The Framework 
  The first reason is that risk determinations are highly arbitrary and the process as a 
whole has been criticized.  Researchers simply do not have the expertise to quantify 
specific risks involved in research relative to risks faced by individuals in everyday life.  
They would, however, be called upon to make precisely that assessment if risk had been 
included as an element of this framework.  Specifically, the researcher would have to 
determine what level of risk is involved in a particular research study prior to obtaining 
research ethics board approval because the type of risk would affect the manner in which 
consent would be obtained, a fact which needs to be spelled out in the research protocol 
that is submitted for approval.  It is also within the jurisdiction of research ethics boards 
495  Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436 at 444 (Sask. C.A.). 
496  Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 18 at C.05.010. 
497  See Kopelman, “Conditions”, supra note 490. 
498  Hadskis, supra note 48 at 286-290. 
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to assess the risks.499  In cases of mixed research and treatment, the situation would be 
further complicated in that researchers have to also tease out the risks attributable to 
research from those linked to treatment.  The research risks would need to be weighed as 
whole to determine if the total risk is minimal or greater than minimal.   
The second reason is that it was not necessary to include risk in the framework 
proposed herein to strike a legally and ethically defensible balance between the rights of 
minors to provide autonomous consent and the concordant need to protect the vulnerable 
and incompetent.  None of the applicable legal instruments discussed at length in Chapter 
2 make any mention of minimal risk as a tool to be used in delineating the bounds of 
acceptable research.  There are boundaries set on when consent can be sought but none of 
those pertain to minimal risk specifically.  Similarly, although a number of ethical 
instruments, including the Tri-Council Policy Statement refer to minimal risk, there are 
no restrictions based on risk on a competent minor’s right to consent to research 
participation.  Under the framework, where minors fail to prove themselves to be mature 
minors, the protections extended to them by child protection legislation, consent to 
treatment legislation, and the Tri-Council Policy Statement apply.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The framework proposed herein represents a balance between respecting the 
rights of mature minors while still ensuring that those minors who lack capacity receive 
appropriate protection.  This is achieved in three steps.  At the first step, researchers are 
required to consider the aim of the activity involved (i.e. research alone or mixed research 
and treatment).  This provides a straightforward way for them to identify if consent to 
499 Tri-Council Policy Statement, supra note 1 at 22-27. 
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treatment and child protection legislation applies and needs to be considered.  At the 
second step, all minors are to undergo an individualized capacity assessment carried out 
in accordance with parameters set out in a validated instrument.   
 The framework proposed above focuses on consent and so, since consent from the 
legally authorized individual must be maintained throughout the life of a research study, 
this framework can and should be used by researchers throughout the entire life of the 
study.  This, in turn, means that researchers ought to be encouraged to apply the 
framework to research that is ongoing at the time a particular institution chooses or is 
required to incorporate it into its research practices.  Although efforts have been made to 
keep the framework as simple and user-friendly as possible, institutions will nonetheless 
have to expend resources to educate researchers about how the framework is to be 
applied in their institution.  Consequently, despite the fact that from the perspective of the 
adolescents participating in research, it is desirable that the framework be adopted as 
soon as possible and be applied to all research, whether a study has already started or not, 
I suggest that institutions take the time to ensure the framework is properly understood by 









 The preceding analysis of the role of mature minors in the medical research 
consent process has sought to correct an emerging wrong – the exclusion of mature 
minors in medical research without proper regard to what their rights are and how they 
ought to be treated.  This thesis proposes that this wrong can be corrected by 
implementing a two-step framework that balances respecting the rights of mature minors 
and ensuring that those minors who lack capacity receive appropriate protection.  At the 
first step, researchers are required to consider the aim of the activity involved (i.e. 
research alone or mixed research and treatment).  This provides a straightforward way for 
them to identify if consent to treatment and child protection legislation applies and needs 
to be considered.  At the second step, all minors are to undergo an individualized capacity 
assessment carried out in accordance with parameters set out in a validated instrument.500  
If the minor is found to have capacity (i.e. is a mature minor), her consent, provided it is 
informed and voluntarily given, is necessary and sufficient.  According to the framework 
proposed here, the degree of parental involvement is determined by the minor such that if 
500  Ideally the instrument would be validated for all ages.  However, in recognition of the expense and 
difficulty associated with validating an instrument for use on infants and very young children, at least 
initially, researchers should strive to validate an instrument that can be used to assess the capacity of 
children and adolescents. 
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she wishes to involve her parents in discussions about the research, she is free to do so.  
She is, however, not required to so include them.   
 The proposed framework is consistent with the law and ethical instruments and 
principles that apply in all jurisdictions except Quebec, where the Civil Code specifically 
requires parental consent.  Turning firstly to the applicable law, much of the discussion in 
this thesis focuses on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in A.C. v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services).  In that decision, the Majority outlines seven 
factors that could be (the list is not exhaustive) considered when evaluating the maturity 
of a minor.  While the decision is somewhat confusing and has been subject to differing 
interpretations, I have argued that, there is nothing in that list or elsewhere in any of the 
three sets of reasons included in the decision that restricts a mature minor’s ability to 
consent to her own medical research participation.  In my view therefore, at common law 
mature minors remain able to consent where they have sufficient understanding and 
appreciation of the nature and consequences of the research and its alternatives to be able 
to decide whether to participate in the particular study or not.       
 Beyond the common law, one finds international, national, and 
provincial/territorial instruments.  While one instrument, the United Nations’ Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, applies to all medical research involving minors, all other 
codified instruments only apply to a subset of research.  Limits on their applicability are 
both due to their origin (e.g. a provincial/territorial statute necessarily only applies within 
that jurisdiction) as well as how certain terms such as “health care” have been defined.  A 
cross-country review of consent to treatment revealed that three jurisdictions (Alberta, 
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) have not passed legislation of this type, meaning 
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that the common law mature minor rule is unchanged.  The remaining common law 
jurisdictions (British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Yukon) use a 
combination of age, a best interest requirement, and definition of terms to modify or 
codify the mature minor rule.  Child protection statutes which exist in each common law 
jurisdiction have less bearing on medical research, largely because ten such statutes only 
apply when a parent refuses to provide necessary care.  This has two implications: firstly, 
research is rarely if ever “necessary” and secondly, the legislation is not triggered if 
consent is only sought from the minor.   
 A review of the ethical instruments and principles leads to the same conclusion.  
In the past, minors were deemed incompetent and therefore unable to consent to their 
own participation.  Recently, however, both the Declaration of Helsinki and the Tri-
Council Policy Statement have been revised to allow for a broader recognition of the 
rights of minors.  As is clear from the literature on autonomy, paternalism, and 
vulnerability, broader recognition does not mean treating minors like adults.  It means 
affording them the opportunity to demonstrate that they are able to decide whether they 
wish to participate in a particular research study by requiring researchers to carry out an 
appropriate capacity assessment.  Mature minors will be found to have capacity.  In the 
case of non-mature minors, on the other hand, their vulnerability or their need for 
protection will mean that parental consent will be necessary.     
Having developed a framework that is defensible from both a legal and an ethical 
standpoint, the next steps in properly respecting the rights of minors involved in medical 
research are the validation of an instrument to be used to assess the capacity of minors 
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and the implementation of the framework.  The latter first requires making institutions 
aware of its existence, which I will endeavour to do through subsequent publications.  
Once that is done, the burden will shift to institutions and individual researchers.  The 
framework proposed herein has the potential to benefit many minors:  both the mature 
minors whose rights are better respected, and other minors who will subsequently benefit 
from the research findings.  As well, since consent from the legally authorized individual 
must be maintained throughout the life of a research study, this framework can and 
should be used by researchers throughout the entire life of the study.  This, in turn, means 
that researchers ought to be encouraged to apply the framework to research that is 
ongoing at the time a particular institution chooses or is required to incorporate it into its 
research practices.  Although efforts have been made to keep the framework as simple 
and user-friendly as possible, institutions will nonetheless have to expend resources to 
educate researchers about how the framework is to be applied in their institution.  
Consequently, despite the fact that from the perspective of adolescents participating in 
research, it is desirable that the framework be adopted as soon as possible and be applied 
to all research, whether a study has already started or not, I suggest that institutions take 
the time to ensure the framework is properly understood by researchers prior to 
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